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Abstract 
 
Various areas within analytic philosophy make some central appeal to the 
concept of truth: the theory of meaning, metaphysics, and epistemology. They 
all place certain demands on the concept, and this suggests a network in which 
a theoretical term, ‘truth’, is implicitly and partially defined. This invites a 
question: is there a stable univocal concept at work – one which picks out a 
unique property that is capable of playing this complex role? This thesis is a 
constructive project which investigates this question. I aim to ascertain how 
different constraints placed on the concept of truth in the theory meaning can 
in turn constrain the role that truth can play in metaphysics. I offer six 
systematic case studies all of which offer different conceptions of relationship 
between the role assigned to truth in the theory of meaning and in 
metaphysics. Ultimately, I contend that paying close attention to the role of 
truth in metaphysics places serious pressure on the possibility of certain kinds 
of robust realist metaphysical projects. My thesis thus significantly contributes 
to the ongoing debate in metametaphysics about the status and proper method 
of contemporary metaphysics.  
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Introduction  
 
I. The Project 
 
This project sits within an area of inquiry known as Metametaphysics. 
Metametaphysics is that area of analytic philosophy which aims to call in to 
question, or provide arguments for, the legitimacy or nature of metaphysics. 
The almost mythologised resurgence of serious metaphysics in the latter half of 
the twentieth century invited some questions: how should serious metaphysics 
be done? What constrains metaphysical inquiry? Is metaphysics even possible? 
If metaphysics is possible, what is the status of its theories? Are they in the 
business of saying something about what the world is like independent of our 
representation of it? Or are such theories necessarily constrained by the type of 
creatures doing the inquiring? This thesis is concerned with investigating a 
candidate constraint on metaphysical inquiry, and in so doing, providing 
conditional answers to some of the central question of metametaphysics. 
I am interested in the role of truth in metaphysics. Why should metaphysicians 
care about truth? Metaphysicians can be found saying things like the following: 
the goal of metaphysical inquiry is to provide a true picture of what the world 
is like; metaphysical theories correspond to the fundamental level of reality; 
truth is what a representation has when it corresponds to non-representational 
reality; when a representation is true, it is reality that makes it so. They can also 
sometimes be found worrying about the status of their discipline. This worry 
sometimes takes the following form: perhaps metaphysics cannot tell us 
anything true about what the world is like. We can see, then, that talk of truth 
may potentially be deployed as a means of vindicating metaphysical inquiry. 
One of the routes to legitimacy for metaphysics is to show that the theories it 
generates are true, and that its methods are epistemically responsible because 
they are truth conducive.  
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There is another area of analytic philosophy that has a preoccupation with 
truth. The philosophy of language, in particular the theory of meaning, makes a 
central appeal to the concept. Philosophers of language can be found saying 
things like: truth is what speakers aim at when they make assertions; 
understanding a sentence consists in knowing the conditions under which it 
would be true; synonymous expressions can be substituted in a sentence 
without altering the sentence’s truth value; the truth value of a complex 
expression depends upon the truth value of its component expressions. 
Whereas the metaphysical deployment of the concept is supposed to secure 
some kind of relation between representations and non-representational reality, 
the deployment in the philosophy of language is centrally concerned with the 
requirements of knowing and using a language.  
Truth is thus required to play a complex theoretical role. This generates some 
important questions: (1) what demands do each of these enterprises place on 
the concept of truth, (2) how do these two deployments of the concept 
interact, and (3) is there a concept which can satisfy all of the demands placed 
upon it? Do commitments to a particular view of the role of truth on one side, 
force you into commitments about the role of truth on the other? That is: if we 
shape our concept of truth primarily with the demands of metaphysics in mind, 
does this put pressure on its aptitude to figure in an adequate theory of 
meaning? Conversely, if we delineate our concept of truth primarily with the 
theory of meaning in mind, does this put pressure on its aptitude to figure in 
metaphysics? 
In this project I treat ‘truth’ as a theoretical term. I am trying to ascertain 
whether there is a consistent set of demands that can be placed on the concept. 
I will take it as a constraint on the acceptable deployment of the concept that it 
cannot make it opaque or mysterious how truth can play the role assigned to it. 
That is: in order to be entitled to use the concept some kind of principled story 
must be told about how truth gets into the picture in the first place. Such a 
story would show why the concept of truth is not simply dispensable in the 
way that redundancy theorists have advocated. This is not to say that the 
concept of truth needs to be explicitly defined. Indeed, and to forestall a 
misconception about the extent of my project, I am not in the business of 
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providing a general theory about what truth is. Rather, drawing on the different 
sets of demands placed upon the concept of truth as it is used in metaphysics 
and the theory of meaning, I aim to determine the theoretical and explanatory 
limits of that concept.  
So the first major task is to investigate whether there is a consistent and 
explanatorily potent concept which can play a role both in the theory of 
meaning and in metaphysics. Having established a role for truth in 
metaphysics, the second major task is to investigate the conception of 
metaphysics with which this role for truth furnishes us. It is here where I 
intend to make some headway in metametaphysics. In particular, I want to 
determine what kinds of metaphysical projects are possible given the role 
assigned to truth. What I offer is a taxonomy of the theoretical space relevant 
to these concerns. I aim to provide a theoretical road map which details the 
commitments, choice points, and assumptions pertinent to different 
approaches to thinking about the role of truth in metaphysics. If we want to 
get a handle on the proper role of truth, where do we start? What does this 
starting place tell us or dictate about the concept of truth? What does this 
starting place tell us or dictate about the nature or possibility of metaphysics?  
So what are the options? First, maybe there is a univocal notion of truth at 
work across both the theory of meaning and metaphysics, and there is a robust 
conception of both of these projects. If this first option is to be a contender it 
needs to be able to provide a story as to why should it be that correspondence 
to reality has anything to do with using a language. Second, maybe the concept 
of truth as it functions in the theory of meaning for natural language is not the 
notion with which metaphysicians should be concerned. Perhaps rather 
metaphysics requires a special metaphysical notion of truth. Finally, maybe the 
only well motivated notion of truth that metaphysics can entertain must be the 
one that functions in the theory of meaning. The question then becomes: what 
are the metaphysical consequences of this? Given the constructive nature of 
my project, I do not consider those positions according to which truth is 
completely dispensable from either semantic or metaphysical inquiry.  
This thesis proceeds by offering six systematic case studies. Investigations into 
metaphysical methodology are by their nature highly speculative. It is, 
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therefore, even more important that steps are taken to prevent such inquiry 
from becoming hopelessly stratospheric. Approaching questions of 
metaphysical methodology through case studies which exemplify the different 
theoretical options has the virtue of constraining inquiry by rooting it in the 
details of those worked-out philosophical positions. Of course, any findings 
will be of limited interest if the lessons learned from reflecting on these case 
studies cannot be generalised. My present investigation does not, however, 
have this flaw. I take it that each case study I evaluate exemplifies different 
common themes and, whilst my evaluations of each proposal may not 
uniformly transfer over to similar positions, they do generate an instructive set 
of concerns with which any similar position should contend.  
 
II. The Plan 
 
I offer the following six case studies as a means of exploring and evaluating the 
available theoretical options:  
In Chapter One I evaluate David Lewis’s project of philosophical analysis. I 
take Lewis’s project as my starting point as it promises robust conceptions of 
both meaning and metaphysics, with a central and integrated role for truth in 
both of these inquiries. In Lewis’s system, truth both anchors his theory of 
meaning by playing an indispensable and central role in the semantic 
component of that theory, and it supervenes on being. I present Lewis’s 
project of philosophical analysis as the method by which each inquiry is 
conducted, as well as how they connect and support each other. My central 
claim about Lewis and the role of truth in metaphysics is that the notion of 
truth does not have work to do beyond its role is semantic analysis and a broad 
supervenience claim. Thus, in order to sustain a robustly realist metaphysical 
enterprise, Lewis must utilise distinct metaphysical methods.  
In Chapter Two I evaluate Heather Dyke’s philosophical project in Metaphysics 
and the Representational Fallacy. Dyke offers a metaphysical conception of truth 
and her project is representative of a certain animosity towards taking meaning 
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and language to be in some sense authoritative when doing metaphysics. This 
chapter therefore takes Dyke’s position as a case study for the prospects of an 
unmediated approach to metaphysics. I argue both that Dyke’s arguments 
against taking language seriously when doing metaphysics, and that her 
proposed alternative methodological strategy are unsuccessful. I argue that if 
we propose to make use of the concept of truth in a metaphysical framework 
that distances itself from the role assigned to truth in the theory of meaning, 
then we must have a story to tell about how that concept can play the role 
assigned to it.  
In Chapter Three I evaluate a language-first approach to metaphysics, where 
the language in question is not natural language but rather a special 
metaphysical language. I take as my primary case study Ted Sider’s project in 
Writing the Book of the World (2011). Sider’s project offers a promising synthesis 
between approaches to metaphysics which take meaning and truth to be 
altogether orthogonal to metaphysical inquiry, and those which take 
metaphysics to be in some sense posterior to considerations about language. 
The method of metaphysics is therefore centrally concerned with meaning and 
truth, but not as these notions function in the theory of meaning for natural 
language. I argue that for Sider’s approach to be viable he must articulate an 
adequate theoretical role for truth, but that as it stands his approach is lacking 
such an articulation.  
In Chapter Four I evaluate Donald Davidson’s conception of the role of truth 
in metaphysics, and the status of the subsequent metaphysical inquiry. 
Davidson’s project presents an interesting case study. A semantic conception 
of truth is his central theoretical notion, which earns its keep through the role 
it plays in the theory of meaning. Metaphysical commitments are then 
generated when the true sentences of the language are analysed to reveal 
quantificational structure. I show how Davidson’s project illuminates how the 
status of metaphysical inquiry can be transformed depending on claims made 
about other semantic concepts. I argue that if you think that a truth conditional 
analysis of language is a prerequisite for generating metaphysical commitments, 
but that the interpretation of that language is indeterminate, then these 
 16 
 
commitments together limit the type of metaphysical project in which you can 
engage.  
In Chapter Five I evaluate the prospects for a deflationary approach to the 
project of ontology. My discussion focuses on the neo-Fregeanism of Bob 
Hale and the neo-Carnapian position championed by Amie Thomasson. Such 
approaches advocate for a view of metaphysics according to which ontology is 
exhausted by semantically analysing the true sentences of the language. If 
viable, these approaches, which I call metaontological deflationism, promise a realist 
ontology with a transparent epistemology. I argue that for such an approach to 
be viable, for it to be able to deliver on it promises, it must articulate an 
adequate conception of truth. I contend that as it stands the approach is 
lacking such an articulation. My aims in the chapter are to explain why the 
metaontological deflationist must articulate an adequate conception of truth; 
argue that there are three constraints on how their operative conception of 
truth should be understood; and present a positive proposal for how the 
metaontological deflationist should approach the articulation of their 
conception.  
In Chapter Six I evaluate how commitment to an epistemically constrained 
conception of truth can affect the possibility and nature of metaphysical 
inquiry. I consider two historically influential arguments for the claim that all 
truths are knowable: one from Dummett and one from Putnam. According to 
this approach, doing justice to the role of truth in language requires rejecting 
both an epistemically unconstrained conception of truth and realist 
metaphysics. The aim of this chapter is not to establish whether or not truth is 
in fact epistemically constrained. The aim of this chapter is rather to evaluate 
the supposed connection between truth and realism. I defend the following 
conditional: if truth is epistemically constrained, then this has unavoidable 
metametaphysical consequences. Defending this conditional requires some 
significant revision of what Dummett and Putnam take to be the realist/anti-
realist consequences of their respective arguments.  
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Chapter One: David Lewis and Philosophical 
Analysis 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate David Lewis’s conception of the role 
of truth in metaphysics. I take Lewis’s project as my starting point as it 
promises robust conceptions of both meaning and metaphysics, with a central 
and integrated role for truth in both of these inquiries. In Lewis’s system, truth 
is both indispensable to semantics, and anchors his theory of meaning, and it 
supervenes on being, and as such is connected to his metaphysical theorising. I 
present Lewis’s project of philosophical analysis as the method by which each 
inquiry should be conducted, as well as how they connect and support each 
other. Lewis does not provide a single, explicit, comprehensive, and 
authoritative statement of what he takes analysis to be. However, in many 
places he offers statements which partially illuminate what he takes to be 
constitutive of an analysis. Therefore, by taking his work as a whole, a picture 
of his analytical method can reconstructed and his conception of the role of 
truth in metaphysics can be understood.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I establish the primary purpose of 
analysis. (§II) I argue that Lewis’s brand of philosophical analysis is intrinsically 
and primarily concerned with giving the meanings of expressions in terms of 
their truth conditions. Second, I detail the relationship between analysis and 
metaphysics. (§III) I argue that whilst Lewis’s method proposes a systematic 
approach to semantic and metaphysical theorising, these projects must be 
viewed as theoretically distinct. I propose an understanding of Lewisian 
analysis whereby it is indispensable to metaphysics yet a different theoretical 
enterprise. Finally, I consider whether the role assigned to truth in Lewis’s 
framework constrains the nature of the resultant metaphysical project. (§IV) I 
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argue that the theoretical role assigned to truth in metaphysics has a limit. 
Consequently, Lewis must employ a metaphysical method independent of the 
role of truth if he is to engage in his robustly realist metaphysical enterprise.  
 
II. Analysis, Meaning, and Truth  
 
i. What is Analysis? 
 
The first point to make is the frequency of Lewis’s use of the phrase ‘semantic 
analysis’.1 We must be careful to distinguish two readings of this. There is one 
reading according to which ‘semantic analysis’ is but a subspecies of the 
broader category of analysis. There is a second reading according to which 
analysis is exhausted by ‘semantic analysis’. My thesis is that it is the latter of 
these readings which best characterises Lewis’s analytical projects: for Lewis, 
semantic analysis and analysis are the same thing. Much of what follows 
defends that this is the only plausible interpretation of Lewisian analysis.  
To understand the aim of semantic analysis, we need to appreciate Lewis’s 
view of language, and the relationship between semantics and truth. Lewis’s 
conception of natural language is as a conventional practice governed by 
norms of assertability which allow successful interpretation and 
communication between truthful and trusting partners. In giving a theory of 
meaning Lewis wants to provide a two tier account. (Lewis 1970b, 190) One 
project consists in providing an abstract description of the workings of 
possible languages. This gives us the idea of languages as semantic and 
syntactic systems, where items of a language get to be associated with things in 
the world. There is another project which is the project of explaining the 
psychological, sociological, and worldly facts that underpin how particular 
                                            
1 For example see Lewis 1970a, 10; 1973b, 118; 1974b, 260; 1979a, 154; 1979b, 38; 1981, 415; 
1983b, 17; 1994b, 319.  
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populations use one of these abstract semantic systems. Although the projects 
can be drawn apart, the former project is importantly constrained by the latter. 
The task is thus to give a semantic theory for natural language in such a way as 
to be appropriately constrained by considerations to do with language use, 
translation, and interpretation. Lewis’s primary motivation in offering the 
semantic theory that he does is that it should contribute to the explanation of 
successful communication between interlocutors. (Lewis 1976a, 139-140) 
Truth then gets into the picture by playing an explanatory role in the theory of 
communication: it is that feature which we take sentences to have when we 
assert or believe them. Consequently, Lewis thinks that the best grasp we have 
on meaning is through giving truth conditions; he holds that “semantics with 
no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics”. (Lewis 1970b, 190) We can 
see why this is so. If I utter a sentence with assertoric force then I am claiming 
that things are as the sentence says they are. So, for me to understand a 
sentence (i.e. know its meaning), I need to know how things would be if what 
was asserted by the sentence were true. That is: I need to know its truth 
conditions.  
Whilst Lewis does not explicitly express his views on the function of the 
concept of truth in this way, I think it is a justified interpretive step for the 
following two reasons. First, although Lewis doesn’t offer an explicit, 
comprehensive, and authoritative statement of how he is thinking about the 
role of truth, taking his work as a whole we can extract the story above. An 
example of such a partial statement is the following:   
“We might reasonably take it as the goal of semantics to specify our 
prevailing rules of assertability. Most of the time, to be sure, that can 
best be done by giving truth conditions plus the general rule that 
speakers should try to be truthful, or in other words that assertability 
goes by probability of truth.” (Lewis 1976a, 139-140) 
Second, taking Lewis to think about the role of truth in the way I suggest is in 
keeping with his overarching methodology. We start by treating truth as a 
theoretical term, and then ask what role we need it to play. Thinking about 
truth in this way is analogous to how Lewis asks us to think about meaning. 
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Although Lewis does give us something which he considers to be the meanings 
of expressions, he doesn’t take himself to have given the definitive answer on 
what should be construed as ‘meaning’. Much like his other analyses, I take his 
view of meaning to be providing an account of how we should construe 
meaning, given the role we want it to play in our theorising. (Lewis 1986b, 49) 
Truth, then, first and foremost gets into the picture via the role we need it to 
play in the theory of communication. From here, we then construe semantics 
as the study of the meaning and truth conditions of whole sentences, and the 
contribution made by their constituent expressions to their meaning and truth 
conditions.  
A semantic analysis for a particular term or expression gives the meaning for 
that term or expression.  Lewis thought a good candidate for the meaning of 
sentences, names, common nouns, etc. are functions that give as a value an 
extension and take as argument various contextual factors on which that 
extension may depend. (Lewis 1970b, 194) For example, in ‘Languages and 
Language’ he claims that the meaning of a sentence is “something which, when 
combined with factual information about the world – or factual information 
about any possible world – yields a truth value” (Lewis 1975, 163). Likewise, in 
Convention he tells us that the meaning of sentence (insofar as this can be given 
without the meanings of the parts) is the function “whereby its set of 
interpretations depends on features of occasions of utterance” (Lewis 1969, 
165). The function, therefore, provides the analysis of the analysandum and, in 
so doing, gives its meaning.  
An analysis gives the meaning of the analysed expression. The best handle we 
have on the meaning of an expression is via its truth conditions. So, an analysis 
must provide truth conditions. The type of truth conditions that Lewis thinks 
should be given by analysis are world invariant truth conditions. World invariant 
truth conditions provide a uniform type of condition that applies at each 
world, and a sentence is true at a world if and only if it satisfies the condition at 
that world. It is because such truth conditions are supplied that semantic 
analysis can enrich our understanding of the subject matter in question. For 
example, Lewis is in a position to defuse certain criticisms of identity theory 
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because of his analysis of expressions of necessity when they occur de re. 
(Lewis 1971, 49)  
For Lewis, analysing a term and defining that term are very often the same 
thing. When discussing Armstrong’s ‘compulsory question’2, Lewis claims 
Armstrong is working with an unfamiliar notion of analysis. (Lewis 1992, 202-
203) By contrast, the ‘familiar notion’ is one whereby analysis is primarily a 
search for definitions. I take it that this is Lewis’s conception of analysis. It is 
by supplying definitions that Lewis gives the meaning and the truth conditions 
for the concepts in which he is interested. In addition to distancing Lewis from 
Armstrong’s conception of analysis (which is a search for truthmakers), we 
must also distance the Lewisian project of definition from the project of Real 
Definition: Lewis is interested in the definition of linguistic expressions, unlike 
the project of Real Definition which aims to define (in general) non-linguistic 
phenomena.  
In ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’, when talking about the analysis of 
duplication, Lewis claims that a particular “‘definition’ is no analysis.”3 (Lewis 
1983b, 27) The reason it is not an analysis is that it does not provide truth 
conditions which are world invariant. Definitions may be reference fixing, but 
if they only fix reference at this world, they do not provide the sort of 
definitions that Lewis thinks are given by an analysis. Such sentiments are 
reiterated in ‘Causation’ when he claims that much needs doing to turn a 
candidate definition into a defensible analysis.4 (Lewis 1973a, 160) The 
commitment motivating this claim is that an analysis must not just serve to 
successfully characterise something at this world, but must apply to all worlds. 
To further emphasize this point, in a number of places Lewis claims that 
although a candidate analysis must successfully systematise opinion, if it fails to 
provide a definition that specifies world invariant truth conditions for the 
                                            
2 That is: the question of unanalysed predication. See Armstrong (1980). 
3 Here, Lewis is criticising analyses which propose to analyse duplication as alikeness in 
arrangement of particles. 
4 In this case Lewis claims that regularity analyses of causation fail as they confuse causation 
itself with other causal relations.  
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analysandum, it cannot be seen as an acceptable analysis. (Lewis 1997a, 140; 
1983d, 158) 
Although an adequate definition must always provide world invariant truth 
conditions, it is worth noting that the form of the definition can differ 
depending on the nature of the definiendum. In his analyses of contingent 
concepts, such as mental state terms or causation, Lewis provides functional 
definitions. For example, as a matter of analytic necessity counterfactual 
dependence of events on other events provides the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for causation. (Lewis 2004, 287) This analysis holds across all 
worlds in virtue of its articulation in terms of world invariant truth conditions. 
This, however, allows that as a matter of contingent fact the thing at the actual 
world “on which the truth values of causal statements supervene” is the ‘biff’ 
kind of causation. (Lewis 2004, 287) Similarly, a mental state term such as 
‘pain’ is analysed in terms of its causal role. It can then be contingently 
identified with a physical role-player at the actual world, and we can thus 
contingently derive the truth of identity theory. The idea driving this treatment 
is that semantically contingent expressions are those whose extensions vary 
from world to world. By contrast, in his analysis of a non-contingent concept, 
such as necessity, Lewis gives an explicit definition. Unlike the contingent 
cases, the truth values of necessity statements do not vary from world to 
world: it is the whole of logical space which determines their truth value.  
Lewis provides us with a number of features that these definitions must have. 
They should be general, finitely specifiable, a priori, uniform, and simple. 
(Lewis 1997a, 144; 1979b, 41; 1974a, 115) A good illustration of Lewis’s 
commitment to finite stateability comes in his treatment of supervenience in ‘A 
Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’. When discussing supervenience, he 
says that we shouldn’t take it to be a doctrine of analysability, since the 
metaphysical thesis of supervenience, cannot be stated in a finite way. 5 (Lewis 
                                            
5 By this I do not mean that the doctrine of metaphysical supervenience cannot be stated finitely 
(e.g. no change in A-facts without a change in B-facts). Rather I mean that a full specification 
of the A-facts, on which the B-facts supervene, cannot be finitely stated, and thus metaphysical 
supervenience cannot be doctrine of analysability. This point will become clearer in section III.  
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1980, 111) That is: because it falls short of finite definability it cannot be part 
of analysis itself. (Lewis 1986b, 222) 
Up to this point, it seems like Lewis in engaged in a very traditional 
philosophical project. Lewis thinks that starting point of systematic philosophy 
is semantic analysis. (Lewis 1983a, 112, 1983b, 20-21) However, Lewis’s 
conception of analysis is not a mere restatement of a more traditional 
conception. For example, in ‘Reduction of Mind’, he tells us:  
“Arbiters of fashion proclaim that analysis is out of date. Yet without 
it, I see no possible way to establish that any feature of the world does 
or does not deserve a name drawn from our traditional mental 
vocabulary. We should repudiate not analysis itself, but only some 
simplistic goals for it. We should allow for semantic indecision: any 
interesting analysandum is likely to turn out vague and ambiguous. 
Often the best that any one analysis can do is to fall safely within the 
range of indecision. And it should allow for semantic satisficing: 
analysis may reveal what it would take to deserve a name perfectly, but 
imperfect deservers of the name may yet deserve it well enough.” 
(Lewis 1994b, 298) 
Thus, whilst Lewis’s brand of philosophical analysis is intrinsically and 
primarily a matter of giving the meanings for expressions, in terms of their 
truth conditions, analysis need not rule out semantic indecision, and an analysis 
can still be useful even when it reveals that there is nothing that satisfies it 
perfectly. 
 
ii. How is Analysis Constrained? 
 
For Lewis the aim of semantic analysis is to explain why the things that we take 
to be true can be so taken. In determining belief contents, through the process 
of radical interpretation, we should be charitable to agents, and thus assign true 
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beliefs where possible.6 The assignment of truth conditions to the sentences 
we hold to be true is, in turn, constrained by this commitment to charity. Thus, 
if we seem to pre-theoretically say true things about the analysandum, Lewis is 
going to want to offer an analysis, and thus truth conditions, which respect this 
feature of our discourse. This explains Lewis’s general rejection of error-
theoretic positions. For example, Lewis claims that an “analysis that imputes 
widespread error is prima facie implausible.” (Lewis 1986d, 175) In this section I 
want to say more about how common opinion acts as the data for and a 
constraint on analysis. I take this to be illuminating as it helpfully draws out a 
number of features of analysis, which helps to set up some of the issues I 
discuss in section III.  
Lewis tells us that our job as theorisers is to systematize the mass of common 
opinion into some kind of coherent picture: “A metaphysician’s analysis of 
mind is an attempt at systematizing our opinions about mind.” (Lewis 1973b, 
88) Whilst merely systematizing common opinion is not sufficient for providing 
an adequate analysis, in many places Lewis presents it as a necessary feature of 
a satisfactory theory. (Lewis 1974a, 111-114) For Lewis, ‘common opinion’ 
refers to those beliefs or statements which we collectively take to be true as 
language users. This will include, in addition to folk common sense, some well-
established and widely held scientific beliefs. For example, among our analysis-
relevant pre-philosophical opinions are the beliefs that there are more particles 
in my coffee mug than there are dinosaurs, and that volcanoes are caused by 
tectonic activity. Common opinion, therefore, must be pre-philosophical 
opinion, but may still include some well-established theoretical scientific 
opinions. 
Lewis takes it as non-negotiable that analysis must (to some extent) 
accommodate the platitudes of common sense. Whilst the analysis we end up 
with does not have to have all those platitudes as direct components, it must 
still be compatible with them. To say that common opinion is the data for 
analysis does not necessarily mean that it is the common opinion itself that we 
                                            
6 This isn’t to say that the principle of charity is the only constraint on interpretation. See 
(1974a) for Lewis’s discussion of how charity fits into the wider rationalisation story.  
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are analysing: common opinion acts, in many cases, as the signifier of the 
explanandum. When we try to construct a theory of, say, modality, it is 
possibility and necessity in which we are interested. However, our best guide to 
that subject matter is to be given by the everyday pre-theoretic thought 
pertaining to the area in question. Lewis can talk both of systematizing 
common opinion and analysing the concept; this makes sense as it is the 
common opinion which helps us pick out the thing in which we are interested. 
Common opinion serves another function in Lewis’s analytic projects: in 
addition to acting as the data for analysis, common opinion also acts to 
constrain what constitutes an acceptable analysis. To explain the role of 
common opinion, therefore, it is not sufficient to just acknowledge that it fixes 
the relevant notion, we must explain how it further guides the analysis. In 
many places throughout his work Lewis tells us that if presented with two 
analyses, two posits, two answers to particular problems, we should prefer “the 
platitude of common sense to the interesting philosophical thesis.” (Lewis 
1976b, 56) He argues that in cases where we have a firm and uncontroversial 
opinion, “theory had better agree.” (Lewis 1986d, 194) The guiding idea is that 
the plausibility of any particular analysis is seriously decreased if it diverges too 
far from what we ordinarily think about such matters. Thus, analysis must be 
conservative of common opinion. Lewis claims that to deny common opinion 
this role is to reject much of what we would recognise as analytic philosophical 
method. (Lewis 1994b, 311-312) 
I think it is useful to pause briefly to consider how common opinion plays a 
role in connecting two of Lewis’s semantic projects. I said before that Lewis’s 
semantic theory must be appropriately constrained by considerations to do 
with language use, interpretation, and communication. The metasemantic story 
here is Lewis’s project of radical interpretation, which is his foundational 
account of the semantic content of beliefs and sentences. According to this 
project, the content of beliefs is whatever it has to be in order to rationalise an 
agent’s actions, given their evidence.7 From here we can work out what 
                                            
7 I discuss Lewis’s radical interpretation project at greater length in Chapter Four when 
contrasting it with Davidson’s. 
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speakers’ sentences mean. Radical interpretation provides an account of how it 
is that we should assign meaning and thus truth conditions to speakers’ 
sentences. How does this fit together with the analytical project as I’ve 
described it? Both are in the business of giving the meaning of expressions of 
natural language, but they seem like different projects. Lewis does not offer an 
explicit comment on exactly how these projects relate. Nonetheless, I think 
there is a fairly natural way of fitting them together, which further highlights to 
role of common opinion.  
Radical interpretation is the means by which we determine the content of an 
agent’s beliefs and sentences. Semantic analysis is the means by which we give 
definitions of the concepts in which we are interested. The data required for 
semantic analysis are the commonly held beliefs of a linguistic community. 
Thus it is the output from the radical interpretation project which provides 
part of the input for the analytical project. Consider an example. We tell a 
rationalisation story to arrive at the claim that Stirling believes Kane is in pain. 
Further, Stirling believes that Kane is likely to cry, is recoiling because he’s in 
pain, etc. Imagine all the other rationalisation stories which could be told to 
arrive at similar belief contents. Now, imagine we want to semantically analyse 
the mental state term ‘pain’. To begin, we need to elicit and systematise all of 
these pre-philosophical common beliefs into the folk theory of pain. And from 
here we proceed as I outlined above.  
In establishing this robust role for common opinion, we must acknowledge 
that Lewis treats it as defeasible: he thinks that it is permissible to deviate from 
common opinion. For example, he tells us that “canons of reasonable belief 
need not be counsels on perfection.” (Lewis 1980, 85) The question is, then, 
under what circumstances should common opinion be respected, and when 
should it be overridden? Lewis does not give a categorical answer to this 
question. However, I think his view on the limits of common opinion as a 
decisive theoretical tool can be reconstructed. There are three reasons why we 
might not want to take common opinion to be a significant constraint on our 
theorising. I take them in turn.  
First, our opinions about certain cases might be inconsistent. That is: we might 
have competing opinions about some cases. Remember, part of the job of 
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analysis is to systematise our opinions about the subject matter. However, we 
cannot systematise what is inconsistent. I take it that a good example of a case 
such as this is his treatment of actuality. When faced with a tension between our 
opinions about actuality, Lewis opts to side with common opinion about what 
sorts of things are actual, how many things are actual, and how those things 
relate to us, which forces him to reject common opinion that everything is 
actual. (Lewis 1983c, 25; 1986b, 100) The choice to go one way rather than 
another in this case is motivated by his wider theoretical commitments.  
Second, Lewis does not think that we need to respect opinion that is not really 
common opinion. I take it that there are a number of ways this could be the case. 
Perhaps the opinion is “offhand”, in which case he does not think we need to 
adhere to it. (Lewis 1973b, 80; 1986b, 87) For example, he does not want to 
endorse off-hand opinion about colour metaphysics. (Lewis 1997b, 332) He 
also does not think we need to pay attention to opinion about extreme cases. 
For example, he claims that in cases of “extreme oddities” our opinions cannot 
be taken as a guide, as in the truth conditions of farfetched counterfactuals. 
(Lewis 1973b, 28) He counsels that in cases where it appears that we do have 
opinions about farfetched matters, we should not trust them. Thus, he rejects 
“naïve opinion”. (Lewis 1986b, 246-247) In addition, we also do not need 
respect opinion that has become saturated with theory. (Lewis 1974a, 111-112) 
I take it that what unites these ways in which common opinion can be safely 
ignored is that they are all cases in which our opinions are too far removed 
from the kind of pre-philosophical thought that Lewis thinks can act as a 
constraint on analysis. 
Finally, we may diverge from common opinion because it leads to an 
unfavourable theory. For example, if an analysis forces us to accept something 
mysterious, we do not need to adhere to such opinions, as in his discussion of 
the counterfactual analysis of causation. (Lewis 1986d, 182) A particularly 
interesting manifestation of this kind of motivation to move away from 
common opinion is that if common opinion forces us to accept an analysis 
that, in turn, dictates acceptance of certain empirical theories, we need not 
adhere to that opinion. This point invites discussion. Much in the same way 
that common opinion acts as a defeasible restriction on what constitutes an 
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acceptable analysis, Lewis also takes scientific theory to place a restriction on 
his analytical projects. Lewis does not think scientific posits should be 
constitutive of an analysis. The reason for this is that Lewis does not think that 
scientific relationships deserve to be built into our analyses, as we could not 
establish such connections a priori. (Lewis 1992, 209; 1986c, 126) Two things 
follow from Lewis’s commitment to the a prioricity of analysis. First, analysis 
itself should not posit empirical relations. Second, we should reject an analysis 
if it forces either the acceptance or the dismissal of particular scientific 
theories.  
This latter component has two dimensions. On the one hand, Lewis does not 
want any particular analysis to rule out any physical theories as impossible a 
priori. (Lewis 1979b, 41) Although we may have good empirical reasons for 
rejecting a certain scientific theory, Lewis thinks that the falsity of scientific 
hypotheses should not be established by means of analysis. From the other 
direction, he does not want analysis to force the acceptance of particular 
scientific theories. This would be to a priori commit ourselves to things that 
should be established empirically. Lewis thinks that there are certain kinds of 
things (for example for empirical posits of natural science) which should not 
be determined by philosophy alone, and certainly not by analysis. (Lewis 1992, 
198) Essentially, he does not want to “impose a priori answers on questions 
that ought to be empirical.” (Lewis 1986e, 63) 
 
III. Analysis and Metaphysics 
 
In this section I outline Lewis’s conception of the relationship between analysis 
and metaphysics. Having set up in the previous section that the primary 
purpose of analysis is giving the meanings of expressions in terms of truth 
conditions, I consider how we should think about this project as relating to 
metaphysical inquiry. I consider three hypotheses: (1) analysis should provide 
truthmakers, (2) analysis and metaphysical inquiry are the very same thing, (3) 
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analysis should provide metaphysical reductions. I argue that all of these views 
are misguided as interpretations of Lewis.  
 
iii. Analysis and Truthmakers  
 
According to the view of analysis I defended in the previous section, analysis 
must give truth conditions. This seems fairly innocuous. However, you might 
think that this claim is radically underspecified. Perhaps we should understand 
the request for truth conditions as a request for truthmakers. Truthmakers 
place a certain kind of worldly constraint on the satisfaction of the truth 
conditions: the truthmaker must exist. In the context of his discussion of 
Humean supervenience Lewis endorses Bigelow’s claim that truth supervenes 
on being. (Lewis 1994a, 225) So, with respect to a particular world the totality 
of truths supervene on being. The supervenience claim must concern a 
particular part of logical space, and it must be expressed holistically. It must 
concern a part of logical space as, for Lewis, the totality of being is non-
contingent, so the totality of truths across all of possible space cannot vary. It 
must be holistic as it would not be instructive, or perhaps possible, to go 
sentence by sentence. 
However, whilst Lewis is prepared to endorse some notion of truthmaking, that 
does not commit him to an endorsement of truthmakers. That is: he can accept 
that there are some worldly conditions on truth, without a more specific 
commitment to truth always obtaining in virtue of the existence of an entity. 
This doesn’t rule out the possibility that sometimes there might be an entity 
that makes a particular statement true. For example, the sentence ‘Jade exists’ is 
plausibly made true by me. However, we shouldn’t take the fact that some 
statements have truthmakers to reveal a requirement of truth, but rather it 
shows something interesting about those particular existential statements. In 
resisting the request for truthmakers then, I take the thought to be that even if 
there are some worldly conditions on truth, we need not consequently engage 
in a practice of positing theoretical entities (e.g. states of affairs, Tractatian 
facts, etc.) in virtue of which truth invariably obtains.  
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The idea that Lewisian analysis should provide truthmakers is not a thesis that 
suggests itself from Lewis’s corpus. However, he does briefly discuss the idea 
that analysis is primarily a quest for truthmakers. For example, when discussing 
Armstrong on analysis he writes:  
“I suggest that Armstrong has an unfamiliar notion of analysis. 
Analysis is not, primarily, a quest for definitions. Rather, it is a quest 
for truthmakers. The ‘harlot’s privilege’ is not the privilege of using 
undefined terms. It is the privilege of truth without benefit of 
truthmakers.” (Lewis 1992, 202-203) 
In identifying this ‘quest for truthmakers’ as an ‘unfamiliar notion of analysis’ I 
take it Lewis does not identify such a notion as his own. To add further 
credence to the thought that this is not what Lewis has in mind, Lewis 
explicitly does not commit himself to the view that all truths must have 
truthmakers (Lewis 1992, 204), whereas he does think that all truths must have 
truth conditions. This is sufficient to establish that he does not think that truth 
conditions should be understood in terms of truthmakers. 
However, the important idea driving this commitment is that the specification 
of truthmakers cannot be constitutive of analysis, as the constraints on analysis 
require that the connections posited by the analysis must be a priori. Lewis 
writes: 
“We don’t know any recipe for a talking donkey in terms of elements 
of the basic structure; and if we did, we still wouldn’t know it a priori 
and so wouldn’t be entitled to build it into out analyses.” (Lewis 1992, 
209) 
The world which supplies the truthmakers may be complex and infinite, and 
avails itself to empirical a posterori investigation. However, we have already 
established that Lewis takes analysis to be specifying finite and stateable 
definitions. The analysis, therefore, must meet conditions which the worldly 
truthmakers need not. Inasmuch as this is the case, we may discharge the idea 
that analysis should provide truthmakers as being inconsistent both with 
explicit claims that Lewis makes about the ‘unfamiliar notion of analysis’ and 
with the implicit consequences of his other analytical commitments. 
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iv. Analysis as a Guide to Metaphysics  
 
Lewis claims that analysis serves the cause of metaphysics by systematising our 
pre-theoretic opinions pertaining to the area in question. He tells us:  
“One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. 
It is not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify 
these preexisting opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to 
discover ways of expanding them into an orderly system. A 
metaphysician’s analysis of mind is an attempt at systematizing our 
opinions about mind. It succeeds to the extent that (1) it is systematic, 
and (2) it respects those of our pre-theoretic opinions to which we are 
firmly attached. Insofar as it does both better than any alternative we 
have thought of, we give it credence… So it is throughout 
metaphysics.” (Lewis 1973b, 88) 
There is a multiplicity of words or concepts that play certain roles in our 
ordinary and everyday thinking and in our various philosophical and scientific 
theories. (Lewis 1986b, 55) Answering the metaphysical question of what those 
things are turns on the question of which entities are best suited to play the 
everyday and theoretical roles of the concept in question. (Lewis 1986b, 184) 
Taking functional analyses as a case study, consider this possible interpretation 
of Lewis’s view on the connection between analysis and metaphysics: analysis 
just is metaphysics. It is analysis that systematises our pre-theoretic thought. 
This systemisation provides us with a definition in terms of the relation the 
definiendum bears to our other concepts and beliefs. (Lewis 1972, 255) We 
might then think that whatever thing in the world satisfies the functional 
definition is part of our metaphysical theory. So, for example, Lewis tells us 
that: “A feature of Reality deserves the name of chance to the extent that it 
occupies the definitive role of chance.” (Lewis 1994a, 246) According to such a 
view, then, we are to construct our metaphysical theories by offering an 
account of what the relevant terms mean, in terms of their truth conditions. 
This would give truth a central and indispensable role in metaphysics.  
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There are a number of reasons we might think that analysis just is metaphysics. 
I take them in turn. First, in his discussion of the definition of theoretical 
terms, Lewis seems to suggest that analysis is sufficient for determining 
ontological commitments. For example: 
“The defining of theoretical terms serves the cause of scientific realism. 
A term correctly defined by means of other terms that admittedly have 
sense and denotation can scarcely be regarded as a mere bead on a 
formal abacus. If it purports to name something, then if the theory that 
introduced it is true it does name something.” (Lewis 1970c, 79) 
And, 
“Because we understand the O-terms, and we can define the T-terms 
from them, theories are fully meaningful; we have reason to think a 
good theory true; and if a theory is true, then whatever exists according 
to the theory really does exist.” (Lewis 1972, 256) 
Certainly, if we proceed as suggested, our analyses will anchor our metaphysical 
theories onto our subject matter and our metaphysical posits will be 
constrained by our analyses. Perhaps, then, we should take analysis to settle 
metaphysical questions? I do not think this view of Lewisian metaphysics can 
be right. Our ability to reliably deploy our concepts does not necessarily 
provide a satisfactory understanding of what sort of entities they refer to 
(1986b:189). Even after we have constructed the definition from the pre-
theoretic thought, and even if that term appears in a true statement, a 
substantial amount of work still needs to be done to determine what thing in 
the world satisfies it.  
Second, another point at which we might think that analysis gives us 
metaphysical commitments, is in Lewis’s discussion of semantic values. Lewis 
can often be found to be discussing the ‘entities’ to which the analysis commits 
us.8 However, I do not take this to be a commitment to substantive 
metaphysical theory. It is important when thinking about Lewis’s view of the 
analysis-metaphysical connection, therefore, to disambiguate between the 
                                            
8 For some good examples see Lewis (1969), (1970b), (1970c), and (1972). 
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commitments generated by the semantic theory versus a more full blooded 
type of metaphysical commitment. When Lewis says: “If we want to give the 
connective an entity to be its meaning, the operation can serve this purpose” 
(Lewis 1973b, 47), he is providing a referent for the connective. Likewise for 
the case of properties: a set acts as the referent for the predicate. However, in 
these cases Lewis’s talk of entities should not be seen as telling us anything 
significant about non-semantic reality.9 The thought driving the distinction 
here is that although analysis can existentially commit us, it does so in a 
metaphysically open way. So, analysis can (assuming the truth of the relevant 
statements) commit us to the existence of something that plays the role of 
properties. What analysis does not commit us to is what the particular 
something is that plays that role. Thus, analysis (and truth) can metaphysically 
commit us to certain roles, but there is a further metaphysical question about 
what the role players are.  
Third, in setting up analysis as his primary philosophical project, Lewis appears 
to locate it as a metaphysical option. When attempting to offer a theory of 
some subject matter, such as causation, colour, mind, or modality, Lewis claims 
that there are three ways to give an account. (Lewis 1983a, 112, 1983b, 20-21) 
First, we can decline the invitation and go eliminativist. This option requires 
that we deny the existence of the things in question, and we must then explain 
away any apparent commitment to them. Lewis claims this approach is 
generally unfavourable. Second, we can accept it as primitive. Thus we 
embrace the existence of the thing in question, but we are not required to offer 
a more basic account of it in other terms. Lewis thinks that all theories must 
have primitives, but prefers analyses where possible. Finally, we can offer an 
analysis. Eliminativism and primitivism seems to be metaphysical positions: 
either denying existence, or claiming that that something is metaphysically 
basic. In pitting the quest for analyses again these other two theoretical 
options, we might be tempted to think that analysis is itself a metaphysical 
enterprise. I think this would be a mistake. The question of analysis is rather a 
                                            
9 By way of example, consider an error theory about colour. We can agree about what the 
relevant colour terms mean (i.e. we can agree on their semantic analysis), but substantially 
disagree once we move below the level of semantic reality.  
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question of methodological priority. Prior to analysis, we might think that we 
need to be ontologically commitment to, for example, irreducible mental states. 
We can then engage in questions about whether we should deny their existence 
or take it as metaphysically basic. However, once we have analysed our mental 
state terms, we can see that we needn’t engage this particular question at all. 
Rather, we need to find satisfiers for mental states’ functional role. In this way, 
analysis may help to direct metaphysical inquiry, but isn’t that inquiry itself.  
Whilst it is fair to claim, therefore, that the analyses Lewis offers do constrain or 
direct his metaphysical inquires, the analyses cannot be seen as constituting the 
metaphysical theories themselves. The conception of the analysis-metaphysics 
connection endorsed by Lewis that I want to urge here is twofold. First, there 
is an analytic element of metaphysical inquiry, which specifies the meaning of 
terms and acts to stop the metaphysical posits from floating free from what the 
terms mean and how they are used. Second, that metaphysical method is still, 
in some way yet to be unspecified, distinct from the analysis.  
I take one of the primary motivations for the claim that analysis and 
metaphysical inquiry are not the same thing is that in a number of places Lewis 
tells us that analysis will only get you so far. Although analysis may determine 
part of the content of our metaphysical theories (e.g. the functional role of the 
thing in question) we do not get a full picture of the commitments. I take it 
that this is something that becomes pronounced when you view Lewis’s corpus 
as a whole. Although in the early work, when his attention is directed at more 
logical and semantic concerns, he provides analyses of certain kinds of things, 
for example possibility and necessity in terms of quantification over worlds 
(Lewis 1968, 1970a), he leaves much of the metaphysics largely untouched. For 
example, he claims:   
“Up to a point is makes little difference whether you believe as I do in 
a multitude of concrete worlds of which ours is one, or whether instead 
you believe as Quine does in a multitude of abstract ersatz worlds, of 
which one is special in that it represents that one and only concrete 
world. Most analyses involving possible worlds go through equally well 
either way.” (Lewis 1979a, 148) 
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Lewis thinks that there will be much of metaphysical interest left unsaid even 
after we have given the analysis.  
In the secondary literature on Lewisian analysis, a number of commenters 
forward the claim that Lewis offers a two-level approach.  For example, 
Livingston claims that Lewis: 
“Envision[s] a program comprising two clearly distinct levels of 
analysis: first, the logical descriptions of causal roles, and second, the 
empirical identification of their occupiers.” (Livingston 2005, 35) 
Likewise, Menzies and Price identify two distinct yet interconnected stages of 
Lewis’s program. They claim it is the second stage which satisfies Lewis’s 
metaphysical ambitions:  
“The core of the second stage of Lewis’s program is that what the first 
stage provides, in effect, is a non-trivial target for empirical 
investigation: in this case, investigation of what it is, in fact, that plays 
the causal role R.” (Mezies & Price 2009, 6) 
Whilst I think it is sensible to separate the analytical part of the project from 
the metaphysical part, I think it is misleading to call both these parts the 
‘analysis’. To illustrate why, consider again Lewis’s metaphysics of mind. His 
argument for psychophysical identification consists of two stages (Lewis 
1994b, 303). The analytical stage: where we define that some mental state M is 
the occupant of the M-role. The empirical stage: where we establish that some 
physical state P is the occupant of the M-role.  From these two stages together 
we arrive at the conclusion that M = P. The analysis, therefore, is only part of 
the theory: the part that says that some mental state is equivalent to some 
functional role, and this is the case world-invariantly. The other part of the 
metaphysical theory is the empirical claim that there is some physical state 
which realises this functional role, which is specific to the actual world. The 
important part of Lewis’s program that gets us from analysis to ontological 
commitment is identifying what thing plays the functional role we have defined 
by analysis. 
To strengthen my claims here, and relate analysis back to its primary objective, 
recall that I said that analysis need not rule out semantic indecision. Analysis 
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can still be useful even when it reveals that there is nothing that satisfies it 
perfectly. I take it that this commitment is in part motivated by the 
metaphysical work to which Lewis puts analysis. The process by which we 
define some theoretical role is quite traditional; however, the analysis has still 
done good work for us even if nothing perfectly satisfies the definition. Lewis’s 
commitment to semantic indecision helps to ameliorate the distance between 
analysis and metaphysics. However, although this commitment enables analysis 
and metaphysics to work together, it should also help us appreciate why they 
cannot be the same. On the metaphysical side we are trying to provide some 
kind of generalisation, which does not have to be stateable or finite; by 
contrast, the analysis does have to be stateable and finite. Therefore, given that 
the world may imperfectly satisfy the analysis, any specification of that world 
cannot be given just by the analytic theory alone. As I have stressed: more 
must be done.   
I have emphasized that Lewis thinks that more must be done to get you from a 
serviceable analysis to ontological commitments. There are two important 
steps. First: we must establish the non-emptiness of the analysis. That is: 
whether anything satisfies the analysis. Second: we must establish the character 
or nature of what satisfies the analysis. Of course, the analysis itself may tell us 
what the thing is like in causal terms; so this second stage may consist in a non-
causal specification. In the application of the analytical results we must look 
further afield to provide the full metaphysical theory.  
To summarise: I think we should interpret Lewis’s conception of the analysis-
metaphysics relationship in the following way. If we are going to try and give a 
metaphysical account of some phenomena, we require some idea of what 
would count as a satisfactory answer; I take it that analysis can be of great help 
here. It is hard to imagine exactly how we could even begin our metaphysical 
theorising had we not (to some extent) already established what the relevant 
terms of the discourse mean and how they are related. However, although the 
analysis clarifies the subject matter, this does not mean that the analysis is 
identical to the metaphysical account of that subject matter. The analytical 
process may indeed be a prerequisite for metaphysical theorising, but it is not 
the metaphysical theorising itself. In slogan form: Lewis takes it that analysis is 
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necessary, but insufficient for an adequate metaphysical methodology. 
However, although these projects are distinct in that they have different aims, 
in practice Lewis thinks that we should be concerned with both the analytical 
project and the metaphysical project given their methodological connection. 
(Lewis 1986b, 15) 
 
v. Semantic Analysis and Metaphysical Reduction  
 
In this section I want to discuss the claim that analysis provides us with a 
means of generating metaphysical reductions. I take this to forward the cause 
of the previous section: demonstrating how analysis and metaphysical 
reduction come apart further supports my claim that analysis and metaphysics 
are distinct theoretical enterprises.  
I take this hypothesis to be an important one as some of the secondary 
literature use the terms ‘analysis’ and ‘reduction’ interchangeably10. In principle, 
I do not object to this, provided this terminological move does not obscure the 
sort of nuanced treatment of analysis I think is necessary. However, as the 
present proposal is concerned with metaphysical reductions, I think using ‘analysis’ 
and ‘metaphysical reduction’ interchangeably is misleading. Given that analysis 
cannot alone determine metaphysical commitments, analysis could not fully 
specify the reduction. That is: merely on the basis of the analytic theory, we 
will frequently not be in a position to identify how/whether the metaphysical 
base satisfies the conditions specified by the analysans. So analysis cannot be 
sufficient for metaphysical reduction as a reduction requires that there is a 
reductive base, and analysis alone cannot guarantee that.11   
Perhaps we could understand the proposal that analysis generates metaphysical 
reductions as suggesting that one aim for analysis is to reduce the number of 
primitives to which a theory must be committed. This does seem consistent 
                                            
10 E.g. see Berkovski (2011, 102) and Maguire (2013, 133).  
11 For example, it doesn’t seem implausible to think that a successful analysis may be 
consistent with an error theory.  
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with much of what Lewis says. Analysis does aim to reduce primitives. For 
example, Lewis tells us that: “The object of analysis is to reduce our burden of 
primitive notions, and to make tacit understanding explicit”. (Lewis 1986b, 
154) This invites a question: what sort of primitives? Should the primitives that 
analysis aims to reduce be interpreted as primitive ontology, primitive ideology, 
or semantically primitive predicates? I argue that analysis aims to reduce 
semantic primitives.  
You might be tempted to think that I am over complicating the story by 
introducing these distinctions. Why not think that in reducing the number of 
semantic primitives we thereby reduce metaphysical primitives? First, there is 
textual evidence to suggest that Lewis thinks that they come apart. Consider 
Lewis’s remarks in On the Plurality of Worlds regarding the balance of ontological 
and analytic questions:  
“But if our work is directed to ontological questions and analytic 
questions both, as I think it usually is, then we are trying at once to cut 
down on questionable ontology and to cut down on primitives, and it 
is fair to object if one goal is served at too much a cost to the other.” 
(Lewis 1986b, 15) 
In opposing the acceptance of primitives against the acceptance of certain 
ontologies, Lewis gestures at the difference between semantically primitive 
predicates and being ontologically primitive or basic.  
The most compelling reason to maintain this distinction, however, is that 
without it important theoretical subtlety will be ignored. Consider two 
examples. Presumably, if God exists, his existence is not dependent on 
anything. His existence does not (non-trivially) supervene on anything else, it is 
not grounded in anything else, it is not caused by anything else. Metaphysically 
speaking, God is primitive. Consider the predicate ‘is God’. Is this semantically 
primitive? No. ‘Is God’ can be analysed in terms of ‘is benevolent’, ‘is 
omniscient’, ‘is omnipresent’, and ‘is omnipotent’. So, we have found a case 
where the semantically primitive and the metaphysically primitive come apart: 
where there is something metaphysically basic, that can nonetheless be 
semantically analysed. This thought is significant as if we thought that because 
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there is more analytical work to be done there must be more metaphysical 
work, then we would end up drawing incorrect conclusions about the nature of 
God’s existence.  
Consider another example. According to Lewis’s analysis, modal predications 
such as: ‘it is possible that Danny DeVito is six feet tall’ are to be analysed in 
terms of what is true of Danny DeVito’s relevantly similar counterparts at 
other worlds. Semantically, this sentence cannot be further analysed. However, 
it seems that there is rather more we can say metaphysically. There will be 
cases where the semantically primitive is not metaphysically primitive. Whilst a 
semantic analysis of modal predications is going to bottom out at a counterpart 
relation in terms of similarity, and quantification over worlds, there is a much 
richer metaphysical story to be told pertaining to those worlds and counterpart 
relations. We may agree that the semantic analysis commits us to possible 
worlds, without having committed to a particular view of the nature of those 
worlds. I take Lewis’s project in On the Plurality of Worlds to be engaged with 
providing that kind of metaphysical substance. Important metaphysical work 
would be ignored if we assumed that because the analysis of such sentences is 
complete that there is nothing metaphysically interesting left to say. This claim 
is well supported by previous discussion. Given that we know that analysis 
must be finitely stateable, whilst metaphysical commitments need not be, it 
seems reasonable to hold that substantial metaphysically reductive work will 
remain even once we have reached a semantic primitive.  
Having said this, however, there is a sense in which analysis can assist 
metaphysical reduction. Analysing primitive modality in terms of quantification 
over worlds certainly reduces our primitive metaphysically ideological 
commitments, even if there is still ontological work left to do. There is also 
another way that analysis can play a role in metaphysical reduction. Consider 
the picture I laid out above regarding Lewis’s metaphysics of mind. When we 
show that M = P, we have shown that M can be reduced to P. Nonetheless, 
the analysis of M as the occupant of the M-role provides a framework for the 
empirical investigation which identifies P as the M-role. In this way, analysis 
does provide us with a method for generating metaphysical reductions, albeit 
an incomplete one.  
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I think it best to characterise Lewis’s view on analysis and metaphysical 
reduction as twofold. First there is the understanding of analysis as the 
shrinking of primitives. This should be understood as the shrinking of 
semantically primitive predicates. Sometimes, this will correspond to a 
shrinking of primitive ideology, and so can be said to aid metaphysical 
reduction. Second, analysis can be viewed as helping to provide ontological 
reductions. However, if only the analytical theory is known, such reductions 
are incomplete. 
 
IV. Metaphysics and Truth  
 
In the previous section I argued that analysis and metaphysics must be 
understood as distinct theoretical enterprises. The primary purpose of 
philosophical analysis is to give the meanings of the concepts under 
investigation. Whilst this enterprise is a prerequisite for successful metaphysical 
theorising, it is not identical to it.  I claimed that the reason for this is that 
more needs to be done to arrive at the metaphysical theory. In this section I 
want to investigate the relationship between truth and metaphysics in Lewis’s 
framework. To this end I will answer the following two questions. First, what 
role does truth play in metaphysics? Second, given this role, how should we 
understand the method and status of the resultant metaphysical enterprise?  
 
vi. The Role of Truth in Metaphysics  
 
I started this chapter by claiming that Lewis promises robust conceptions of 
both meaning and metaphysics, with a central and integrated role for truth in 
both these projects. To close this chapter I want to consider whether Lewis’s 
project delivers on all it promised. What must be identified, therefore, are the 
salient and ineliminable places where true plays a role. 
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What role does Lewis assign to truth in the theory of meaning? There are two 
places where a role can be identified. First, in Lewis’s project of radical 
interpretation, truth figures significantly in assigning an interpretation to the 
object language in the metalanguage. The output of this project gives the truth 
conditions for speakers’ utterances. A second place where truth can be seen to 
have a role is in semantic analysis. Whilst both radical interpretation and 
semantic analysis aim to give meanings, the target of semantic analysis is 
different. Rather than aiming to give truth conditions for sentences, it aims to 
provide definitions for concepts. As previously described, an analysis is given 
by specifying the functional role of the concept under investigation, where this 
functional role is in part to be identified by systematising the output from the 
radical interpretation project. Lewis thinks that in giving a definition of the 
concept, analysis must provide world invariant truth conditions.  
It is important to here to consider whether truth plays an ineliminable role in 
semantic analysis. If the aim is to specify the functional role of the concept 
under investigation, why does this need to be done in terms of truth 
conditions: couldn’t the relevant roles be specified purely in the object 
language? There is of course room in theoretical space for a project which aims 
to specify the functional role of concepts without utilising truth conditions. It 
should be noted though that even if we take analysis to not be concerned with 
providing truth conditions, truth will yet have a role to play in analysis: not as 
an output of the approach, but as an input makes the approach possible.  
Whilst this conception of sematic analysis, which is prosecuted purely in the 
object language, appears to be legitimate, we should ask whether this is Lewis’s 
conception. That is: did Lewis think it necessary for analysis to provide truth 
conditions? I think it would be over committing to claim that Lewis thought 
that the analytic component of his approach could not be executed without 
utilising the notion of truth conditions. He doesn’t really consider this as an 
option. Nonetheless, I think that the textual evidence supplied in section (i) 
provides a modest affirmative answer to this question of whether analysis 
should provide truth conditions – when giving the meaning, of either 
sentences or concepts, Lewis is explicit that giving the meaning is to be done in 
terms of truth conditions. (Lewis 1970b, 190) So not only will truth play a 
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facilitating role, with respect to the input for semantic analysis, but additionally 
it will feature as an output analysis.  
Now to the question of the role assigned to truth in metaphysics. First, as we 
saw in (iii), Lewis is happy to endorse a general truthmaking claim: that truth 
supervenes on being. Second, if we take analysis to provide truth conditions, as 
I think we should, then, given that semantic analysis is a prerequisite for 
metaphysical inquiry, we have already identified a central role for truth in 
metaphysics. Part of metaphysical inquiry consists in finding the occupants of 
the roles identified by analysis, and if the specification of these roles is in terms 
of world invariant truth conditions, then truth is required to play an important 
role in the method of metaphysis.  
Perhaps the identification of this role for truth in metaphysics can in turn 
provide some justification for my claim above that we should take truth 
conditions as the output from semantic analysis. Only some of the functional 
roles identified by analysis are going to place demands on reality – i.e. only the 
ones where the conditions specified by analysis are satisfied. There may well be 
many concepts which we can analyse for which there are no worldly satisfiers. 
But, when those conditions are satisfied, that tells us that there is something in 
the world which plays that role. As we saw in (iv), the non-emptiness of an 
analysis can be established by the relevant terms appearing in a true statement 
or theory. Thus, when a sentence (or theory) which contains the concept under 
investigation is true, this tells us that the x-conditions identified by analysis are 
satisfied. It seems reasonable, therefore, to call these conditions are truth 
conditions.  
The concept of truth that metaphysics inherits from the theory of meaning can 
only get us so far, inasmuch as the metaphysics in concerned. This limitation is 
well illustrated in (iv) where we see that, even after successful analysis, we can 
still ask questions about what the role players are: what is the character of the 
things to which analysis commits us. So how should one respond to this 
limitation? For all I’ve said about the role of truth in metaphysics, we might 
think that this is compatible with a much more minimal metaphysical 
enterprise. Perhaps we should cease metaphysical inquiry at the end of analysis, 
and accept that we cannot answer questions about the character of the role 
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players. We semantically analyse the true sentences of the language and then 
this gives us all the metaphysics we can get.12 This is not Lewis’s desired 
conception of the limit of metaphysics. 
If we want a more robust conception of metaphysical inquiry, perhaps we 
could enrich the conception of truth with which we are working. Perhaps we 
need to place further restrictions on the specification of truth conditions such 
that when they are satisfied this settles all that is of metaphysical interest.13 I 
suggest that given the constraints that Lewis places on the concept of truth he 
cannot do this. The truth predicate for Lewis is a theoretical term of the 
semantic theory. If Lewis tried to offer ‘metaphysical truth conditions’ it isn’t 
that these would be falsehoods, but rather such ‘truth conditions’ would be 
gratuitous. In order to express what we want to in fundamental metaphysics, 
we may as well say: p iff s. The introduction of ‘is true’ at this level isn’t doing 
any explanatory work for Lewis, and as such he should not pursue this move. 
I’ve already argued Lewis cannot adopt a truthmaker conception of truth as it 
would be in tension with his aims for and constraints on analysis.  
So two questions for Lewis: how far does truth get us, and how does he 
respond to the limit? I argue that truth gets us pretty far, as the project of 
semantic analysis gives us quite a lot of direction with respect to metaphysical 
commitments. Metaphysics is thus well constrained on the Lewisian picture. 
However, there is still much of metaphysical interest left unsettled. By way of 
example, recall Lewis’s remarks about how he can agree with the Ersatzist 
about the analysis of modality but radically diverge with respect to the 
metaphysics. Thus, if we want a robust conception of metaphysics which 
doesn’t place any further demands on the conception of truth we need to 
employ independent metaphysical methods to determine the nature of the role 
players. So Lewis does deliver on a robust conception of metaphysics, but this 
project, whilst constrained, is autonomous. My central claim about Lewis and 
the role of truth in metaphysics is that the truth does not have work to do 
                                            
12 I consider options like this in Chapters Four and Five.  
13 I consider an option like this in Chapter Three. 
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beyond its role in semantic analysis and the broad claim that truth supervenes 
on being.   
 
vii. The Metaphysical Enterprise  
 
In this section I want to elucidate the significant remaining questions for 
Lewis. I have argued that if we go with Lewis’s conception of the role of truth 
in metaphysics, then we need to employ independent metaphysical methods to 
get us beyond the limit of semantic analysis. This invites the following 
questions: (1) What are these methods? (2) Are these methods legitimate? (3) 
Are these methods truth conducive?  
The answer to (1) is twofold. First, given the broadly naturalistic outlook of 
Lewis’s metaphysics, in many cases the methods used to determine the nature 
of the role players just are the methods of natural science. Think again about 
the psychophysical identification. Identifying the worldly role players of the M-
Role is work for neurobiologists, and thus requires the best methods of that 
scientific discipline. Second, where natural science will not deliver a verdict on 
the nature of the role players Lewis adopts a cost-benefit analysis involving 
theoretical virtues.14 This typically involves assessing a candidate theory for 
parsimony, explanatory power, elegance, applicability, coherence with other 
commitments, etc. The virtues (and vices) of this theory are then weighed in 
contrast to other theories of the same subject matter. The theory with the 
greatest virtues on balance is the theory which should be adopted.  
This naturally invites questions (2) and (3). Why should such methods be 
accepted, and why should we think that these methods will yield true beliefs 
about the world? The questions are obviously related, showing that (3) is the 
case would provide justification for (2). That is: if it can be shown that such 
virtues do yield true belief about the world, then this would provide a 
motivation for a method that utilises them. However, even if (2) can be 
motivated because theories which possess such virtues make theories more 
                                            
14 I take Lewis (1986b) to provide the most comprehensive description of this method.  
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intelligible or computable for creatures like us, we might still wonder whether 
the possession of these features is truth conducive.  
Definitively answering (2) and (3) falls outside of the scope of my thesis. 
Nonetheless, merely articulating these questions and the relationship between 
them is useful as it illuminates what would be required to adopt Lewis’s 
approach to metaphysics. If an affirmative answer to (2) could be achieved, but 
not to (3), then this suggests a conception of metaphysics which may well 
depart from Lewis’s robustly realist ambitious. However, if an affirmative 
answer to (3), and consequently (2), could be achieved then the adoption of 
this method for metaphysics promises a realist enterprise. It is the latter of 
these options that seems more in keeping with how Lewis describes the aims 
and statuses of the metaphysical theories he offers. Of course the argument 
needs to be made. Therefore, if you favour an approach to metaphysics which 
proceeds via semantic analysis in the way Lewis endorses and want that 
approach to deliver a robust, realist metaphysics, then what Lewis offers is 
going to be conditional upon providing satisfactory answers to these questions.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I offered a critical evaluation of David Lewis’s project of 
philosophical analysis. I have argued that analysis and metaphysics must be 
understood as distinct theoretical enterprises. The primary purpose of 
philosophical analysis is to give the meanings of the concepts under 
investigation. Whilst this enterprise is a prerequisite for successful metaphysical 
theorising, it is not identical to it.  My central claim about Lewis and the role of 
truth in metaphysics is that the concept of truth does not have work to do 
beyond its role is semantic analysis and the broad supervenience claim. 
Adopting Lewis’s approach therefore requires utilising distinct metaphysical 
methods to answer metaphysical questions, and thus the viability of the project 
rests on the legitimacy of these methods.  
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Chapter Two: Heather Dyke and Unmediated 
Metaphysics 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy (2008) Heather Dyke presents a 
methodological challenge to a certain way of doing metaphysics. The aim of 
her book is to argue against what she terms ‘the representational fallacy’, which 
is “a general strategy of reading metaphysics off language.” (Dyke 2008, 7) In 
place of this allegedly problematic strategy, she proposes an alternative 
theoretical framework in which to prosecute serious metaphysical inquiry.  
This chapter offers a critique of Dyke’s proposal. The proposal is 
representative of a certain animosity towards taking meaning and language to 
be in some sense authoritative when doing metaphysics.1 My present 
investigation therefore takes Dyke’s position as a case study for the prospects 
of an unmediated approach to metaphysics. I argue both that Dyke’s 
arguments against taking language seriously when doing metaphysics, and her 
proposed alternative methodological strategy are unsuccessful. With respect to 
the former, I contend that her arguments do not have the far reaching 
methodological significance she intends; with respect to the latter, I argue that 
her proposal is either subject to some of her own criticisms, or that it 
presupposes the use of theoretical tools which are left both underspecified and 
undermotivated.   
The chapter proceeds as follows. In §II, I present Dyke’s proposal. First, I 
situate her project and sketch her view of the aims of metaphysics. Second, I 
outline the methodology that Dyke takes to be problematic and her argument 
against it. Third, I present her preferred methodological strategy. In §III, I turn 
                                            
1 Similar sentiments can be found in John Heil (2003) and Michael Devitt’s (1983) work.  
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to offer criticisms of Dyke’s proposal. First, I argue that Dyke’s preferred 
method problematically commits her to the view that all metaphysics is realist 
metaphysics. Second, I demonstrate that her own proposal falls short of her 
methodological aspirations: either her arguments are not fatal to the 
metaphysician who wants to take language seriously, or they end up being self-
defeating. Finally, and most importantly, I consider the role she assigns to truth 
in her theoretical framework, and argue that she cannot sustain this role 
without undermining her proposed theoretical framework. In §IV, I conclude 
by offering what I take to be the generalizable lessons of the preceding 
discussion.  
  
II. The Representational Fallacy – Overview 
 
i. Situating the Project  
 
Dyke offers a historical reconstruction of the development of metaphysics, and 
presents this as a partial explanation for why metaphysicians are systematically 
methodologically misguided. Her story starts from Kant, through to the logical 
positivists. Dyke argues that these philosophers did not themselves commit the 
representational fallacy, as they did not think metaphysics (what we might call 
realist, or perhaps noumenal metaphysics) was a possible subject of 
philosophical investigation. These philosophers thought that there are 
insurmountable epistemic or linguistic barriers to theorising about the world as 
it is in and of itself. Philosophy, they argued, must therefore content itself with 
a different kind of theoretical enterprise.  
Dyke then argues that the ‘linguistic turn’ of the positivists was followed by a 
re-emergence of metaphysics, but that this re-emergence did not satisfactorily 
shake off the prior preoccupation with language. In using the tools of a 
philosophy which has decidedly non-metaphysical objects and aims, these 
post-turn metaphysicians are, the argument goes, ill-equipped to deal with the 
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demands of a thoroughgoing realist metaphysics. These philosophers 
maintained that the proper focus of philosophical inquiry is language, but they 
also thought that extralinguistic reality avails itself to substantive investigation. 
Consequently, they believed that “the study of language must be the proper 
route to knowledge of it”. (Dyke 2008, 21) Dyke makes the bold claim that the 
project of 20th and 21st Century metaphysics has been to try and strive for the 
‘ideal’ language in which to describe extralinguistic reality. (Dyke 2008, 8-9) 
Setting the question of historical accuracy aside, it should be clear that there are 
some ways of viewing the aim of metaphysical inquiry such that starting with 
language is entirely appropriate. For example, if I think that the aim of 
metaphysics is to understand and systematise the conceptual repertoire needed 
to think about and navigate extralinguistic reality, then starting with our 
linguistic representations of reality seems apt. However, for Dyke, this is not 
the proper aim of metaphysics, and a tension arises when we think both that 
language is the proper source of philosophical knowledge and when we also 
think that the aim of inquiry is a theory about reality as it is in and of itself. 
Dyke holds that only the latter of these views is defensible. She tells us that: 
“Metaphysics studies the nature of existence, what kind (or kinds) of 
things exist. Its subject matter is reality itself, and its aim is to discover 
the nature and structure of that reality.”2 (Dyke 2008, 22) 
She positions Aristotelianism as the desired metaphysical project. (Dyke 2008, 
22-23) She claims that the purpose of metaphysical inquiry is to uncover the 
fundamental structure of reality. She is careful to distinguish between a 
metaphysically deflationary conception of this project, according to which 
metaphysics is exhausted by the inquiry of natural science, and the view she 
prefers, which she considers to be a robust realist conception of metaphysics. 
She claims that we can be robust realist metaphysicians whilst consistently 
“denying that we can learn about the nature or structure of reality from the 
                                            
2 You might be concerned that this way of putting the point glides over some substantial issues 
about whether all being reduces to existence. It seems like a serious metaphysical question 
whether ideology reduces to ontology. To say that metaphysics studies existence seems to 
worryingly neglect metaphysical views which think that metaphysics studies what exists and 
what those things that exist are like. Such views take the latter question to be irreducibly non-
existential. Cf. Melia (1995).  
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nature or structure of the language we use to describe it.” (Dyke 2008, 21) Her 
project is thus an antidote to what she takes to be the misguided metaphysics 
of the 20th and 21st Century.  
 
ii. The Problematic Methodology 
 
Here is a crude sketch of how we might think we should approach 
metaphysical inquiry. We start with some kind of general existential question, 
we then examine our pre-theoretic thought and talk about that subject matter 
and use this to determine the correct answer to the existential question. (Dyke 
2008, 27-28) If we do talk about the subject matter (i.e. seem to utter true 
sentences about it) but we don’t want to affirm the existential question, we can 
perhaps offer a paraphrase, where we try to do away with the seeming 
commitment. Dyke describes this as “A typical methodology… [which] 
involves taking our prephilosophical way of representing reality and asking 
what sorts of entities their truth implies the existence of.” (Dyke 2008, 9)  
Dyke claims that philosophers are frequently seduced into theorising as above, 
because they implicitly endorse a strong view about the relationship between 
language and the world. The assumption that gets us from a linguistic claim 
about a certain portion of the language (i.e. that the sentences that make up 
that portion of the language are ineliminable and true), to a view about 
corresponding ontological facts about what the world is like, is that there is 
one true description of reality. (Dyke 2008, 45) She calls this the ‘strong 
linguistic thesis’: 
“SLT: There is one privileged, true description of reality, the sentences 
of which (a) stand in a one-to-one correspondence with facts in the 
world, and (b) are structurally isomorphic to the facts with which they 
correspond.” (Dyke 2008, 46) 
The upshot of a commitment to SLT is that putatively ontological debates get 
caught up in arguing about the meanings of the suspect terms. If we have true 
sentences which contain the suspect terms, either those sentences themselves 
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will be part of the one true description, or they must be paraphrased away, in 
favour of synonymous sentences which do not contain the suspect terms. 
There is a dual concern here. First, metaphysicians will get caught up merely 
arguing about semantic issues, and so may not get to the serious business of 
metaphysics at all. But, second, even if they do, this initial preoccupation with 
meaning and translation will skew any subsequent debate such that the 
resultant theories will not be able to satisfy their Aristotelian ambitions.  
Dyke is explicit that she thinks that SLT is false. (Dyke 2008, 71) Her master 
argument against this approach is that many different ontologies are 
compatible with a particular language. As she says: “All that is central to my 
view is that two or more truths can have the same truthmaker while being non-
synonymous.” (Dyke 2008, 99) The view underpinning this is that there are 
multiple accurate ways of describing reality, which may not be reducible to 
each other. (Dyke 2008, 99) Dyke wants to deny the claim, therefore, that all 
true sentences will be reducible to one privileged class of truths. (Dyke 2008, 
72) This is connected to the method of paraphrase. She doesn’t like the 
thought that the terms which appear in the privileged description only do so 
because we are unable to paraphrase them away.  (Dyke 2008, 72) By way of 
example for how the SLT functions, she offers indispensability arguments for 
mathematical Platonism: she claims that those who endorse indispensability 
arguments must assume that the fact that mathematical discourse is 
ineliminable from true scientific discourse entails something about the 
truthmakers for such discourse. (Dyke 2008, 72)  
It must be noted that Dyke takes her argument against SLT to be compatible 
with the claim that some descriptions can be better than others; that they can 
say ‘more objectively’ what reality is like. (Dyke 2008, 71) For example, she 
claims that in theories of fundamental physics we do seem to have 
correspondence between the description of reality, and reality itself. (Dyke 
2008, 75) Dyke maintains, however, that this claim does not commit one to the 
thesis that there is one true description of reality. Even if there is a 
metaphysically perspicuous way to describe the facts of fundamental physics, it 
does not mean that those facts won’t also serve as truthmakers for 
metaphysically unperspicuous true sentences. She thus holds that metaphysics 
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should not be in the business of reading any metaphysical commitments off 
the true sentences of our language.  
  
iii. The Proposed Alterative  
 
Dyke claims that theorising in line with the SLT results in an inadequate 
conception of the theoretical options. Once it has been rejected, however, a 
new position emerges. She calls this the ‘overlooked strategy’. Broadly, this 
strategy is to shift metaphysical debate from a question of whether ‘there are 
Fs’ is true, to a question of whether Fs are among the truthmakers for true 
sentences. She thinks once we make this move we will then be liberated to 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of the metaphysical theories 
themselves. (Dyke 2008, 88) She outlines this new strategy as follows. First, we 
“explore the possible ways the world might be, ruling out of contention any 
ways that it is not possible for the world to be”, and then we “argue that one 
of these way the world might be is the way the world actually is.” (Dyke 2008, 
60) The former is a distinctly metaphysical stage, and normally employs a priori 
reasoning. The second stage needs to appeal to empirical evidence, and so “in 
this respect metaphysics is continuous with science.” (Dyke 2008, 60)  
I want to briefly gesture at an expositional concern. Dyke doesn’t give much by 
way of example for how this methodology is supposed to unfold. She tells us 
in the case of the metaphysics of time that stage one consists in demonstrating 
the incoherence of A-theory, which shows why it cannot be a genuine 
metaphysical possibility. The second stage consists in arguing that B-theory is 
the best theory with respect to our best confirmed current scientific theory: 
that B-theory is consistent with the special theory of relativity. I think given the 
straight-to-metaphysics approach she is advocating, there is a serious question 
about what kind of incoherence is being demonstrated in this first stage. You 
might think that it must be conceptual incoherence, but then it seems like she 
will be engaging in taking conceptual relations to tell us something about the 
world; a move I take it she wouldn’t want. If it isn’t conceptual incoherence 
then perhaps it is that A-theory (on some interpretations) is inconsistent with 
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the theory of special relativity. However, this suggests that stage one and two 
collapse into each other. Working out the details of the proposal is important.  
However, given that the primary critical concern of this chapter is to discern 
whether Dyke’s method assigns a legitimate role to truth, I will proceed by 
assuming that these details can be worked out in a satisfactory way.  
When discussing how this overlooked strategy relates to the aims of 
metaphysics Dyke claims that “the aim of metaphysics is to provide us with a 
map of the structure of all that exists.” (Dyke 2008, 63) Whilst this way of 
phrasing the point may make it a little opaque, I take it that she means that in 
order to construct a map we need to start from the terrain. Dyke explicitly 
criticises ‘top-down’ methodology: one that starts with true representations and 
infers ontology from those representations. (Dyke 2008, 73) In addition, 
another thought that seems consistent with what she says in these passages is 
that we may have different maps for different explanatory purposes. So, 
starting with the maps may tell us more about our explanatory needs, than 
about what the world is like independently of them. To put her argument 
against SLT in these terms: multiple maps are going to be consistent with a 
single terrain.  
Given that truthmakers are going to be playing a central role in Dyke’s 
metaphysics, we need a better idea of how it is that she is thinking about them. 
Dyke defines facts as follows: 
“I take a fact to be simply a portion of reality, a bit of the world, a way 
some part of reality is. I am, thus, not using the term to denote a 
linguistic entity: a true sentence or proposition. I am, instead, using it 
to denote an extralinguistic entity: a part of the world.” (Dyke 2008, 39) 
She claims that she means to use this understanding of ‘facts’ and ‘truthmaker’ 
interchangeably. (Dyke 2008, 39) Dyke, however, does not offer a fully 
developed theory of truthmaking or truthmakers. (Dyke 2008, 77) She does 
not think that the method she offers requires any one particular view about 
what truthmakers are, but rather has a kind of generality. (Dyke 2008, 81) She 
claims that we have an intuitive understanding of what locutions like ‘making 
true’ or ‘true in virtue of’ mean, and she is happy to stick with this intuitive 
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appreciation. (Dyke 2008, 79) This approach has merit. If the aim of her 
proposal is to provide a theoretical framework in which to engage metaphysical 
questions, then making the proposal neutral with respect to different theories 
of truthmakers may make her suggestion more appealing.  
Dyke claims that once we appreciate the overlooked strategy, and we have our 
intuitive grasp of truthmakers and truthmaking, we see that “the truthmaking 
project undermines the paraphrasing project.” (Dyke 2008, 85) In the 
paraphrase project we sought to find acceptable translations of sentences 
containing suspect terms into sentences not containing such terms. The 
thought being that our true unparaphrasable sentences are going to determine 
our metaphysical commitments. However, once we move to a conception of 
metaphysical theorising that is primarily concerned with truthmaking, we see 
that multiple non-synonymous sentences can have the same truthmakers, and 
so we should not paraphrase anything away. As Dyke says: “The alternative 
position that has been overlooked is that truths from outside the realm of 
physics are made true by physical facts, facts describable in the language of 
physics, even though they are not reducible to physical truths.”3 (Dyke 2008, 
98)  
 
III. The Representational Fallacy – Critique  
 
In this section I offer a critique of Dyke’s project. The critique consists of 
three stages. First, I evaluate her view of the status of metaphysics. I argue that 
Dyke’s suggested aim for metaphysics, and her preferred method for 
metaphysics, problematically commit her to the view that all metaphysics is 
realist metaphysics. Second, I evaluate her argument against taking language to 
in some sense be authoritative when doing metaphysics. I argue that either her 
arguments are not fatal to the metaphysician who wants to take language 
                                            
3 It’s not clear to me that this has actually been overlooked. This seems like the method 
pursued by Lewis (1994) with respect to psychophysical identification.  
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seriously, or they end up being self-defeating. Third, I evaluate the role 
assigned to truth in her framework. I show how her proposal requires that 
there is a conception of truth available which is absent of the demands placed 
on the concept by the theory of meaning. I then argue that she cannot sustain 
this role without undermining her proposed theoretical framework.  
 
iv. All Metaphysics as Realist Metaphysics 
 
Dyke claims that the purpose of metaphysical inquiry is to uncover the 
fundamental structure of reality. You might think that there is a substantial and 
significant distinction between a conception of metaphysical inquiry according 
to which realism is an option, and one according to which realist conclusions 
are the only possible ones. However, given the way that Dyke sets up the 
project of metaphysics and the resources that she allows herself, she cannot 
make sense of such a distinction and her project consequently precludes tout 
court many well established anti-realist positions. The challenge I forward in 
this section is essentially a methodological one: because of how Dyke sets up 
the aims and methods of metaphysics, she deprives metametaphysics of some 
important theoretical options.  
Let’s start by considering Dyke’s historical reconstruction of the development 
of metaphysics. Once we’ve moved away from Kantianism, (or indeed perhaps 
other kinds of metametaphysical views such as Berkeley’s idealism or 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics) we recover metaphysical realism as an 
option. It is therefore an open question whether we endorse realism or anti-
realism about a particular class of entities, properties, or relations. So, instead 
of us having to buy wholesale one view or the other, we can proceed in a 
piecemeal way to work out the ontological status of a particular class of 
entities, properties, or relations. For example, we may adopt a robust realism 
about the posits of physics, projectivism about moral properties, and a 
response dependent theory of colour. In each case, there is serious metaphysics 
to be done, but the resultant theories make very different claims about the 
nature of the entities or properties in question.  
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However, if the only proper aim of metaphysics is to provide a robustly realist 
theory of the fundamental structure of reality, then all theories which are not in 
the business of doing that will not count as proper metaphysics. It seems at 
least prima facie odd that Dyke cannot accommodate a practicable distinction 
between having realism as an option, versus having realism as the only option. 
If we can do metaphysics at all it seems we should, in principle, be able to have 
a genuine independent debate about the ontological status of any putative 
entities, properties, or relations to which we are committed. However, merely 
from her characterisation of the aims of metaphysics it is not clear how such 
debate can be executed. Dyke sets up the aims of metaphysics as full-blooded 
and robust, and ties both of these commitments to a conception of 
metaphysics as realist.4  
In addition to the way she articulates the aims of metaphysics, Dyke’s method 
itself suggests that the distinction cannot be maintained. Recall her positive 
proposal. When engaging in metaphysical inquiry, we start by considering the 
range of ways the world might be. Of those possible ways, we then discover 
what the truthmakers are, and this settles the way the world actually is. 
Knowing any kind of semantic information won’t help us here, as according to 
Dyke, knowing that a sentence is true, “even knowing what its truth condition 
is, does not tell us what it is about the world that makes it true.” (Dyke 2008, 
65) Metaphysics sole task is to discover what the truthmakers are, and in virtue 
of these extra-linguistic facts the sentences of the language are made true. 
Naturally, there are going to be false sentences. There will be objects and 
properties we appear to talk about for which there are no truthmakers. So, 
Dyke’s picture may be able to accommodate error-theoretic anti-realism. Prior 
to metaphysical inquiry we may think certain kinds of sentences are true, but 
once we have discovered what the truthmakers are we realise that actually a 
class of sentences are false.  
                                            
4 You might also worry about how such a characterisation of the aims of metaphysics would 
exclude metaphysical inquiry into so-called ‘derivative ontology’. If the only proper aim of 
metaphysics is to provide theories of fundamental reality, then inquiry into the existence and 
nature of, for example, social kinds would also be off the table. For some interesting discussion 
of the metametaphysical significance of the nonfundamental, see Barnes (2014).  
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What of other forms of anti-realism? Dyke tells us that non-cognitivism is 
“unappealing”. (Dyke 2008, 130) However, at the very least, even if you don’t 
want to endorse a non-cognitivist view, the question of how sentences are 
made true or if they are even eligible for truth seems like a substantive 
philosophical question. There is more, it seems, to the relationship between 
language and metaphysics than just truthmaking. Even if we decide to agree 
with Dyke that truthmaking is the primary concern for metaphysics, being able 
to account for discourses which don’t aim to describe the fundamental nature 
of reality and give a full blooded and robust account of how these function 
should also be a job for metaphysics. Of course, Dyke may dig her heels in and 
insist that such a project is not one happily situated in metaphysics. She might 
claim that these sentiments are merely a throwback from an outdated way of 
thinking. However, I think this should give us pause. To claim this would be to 
rule out most of the classic and contemporary debate in the realist-anti-realist 
literature as not really metaphysics. What is worse, this exclusion is just a 
consequence of the way the method is set up, and not a product of any serious 
argument against the particular anti-realist positions. There seems something 
dialectically inappropriate in such a move, and I think Dyke owes these 
positions more.  
Finally, there are ways of engaging with the question of anti-realism which do 
not solely attend to considerations to do with language and truth. One 
concerning consequence of Dyke’s view seems to be that even some 
prominent forms of Aristotelian metaphysics seem to be off the table. Kit Fine 
(2001) argues that we can use a neo-Aristotelian framework to determine 
whether we should be realist or anti-realist about some candidate entities, by 
attending to the question of what grounds what. Whilst Dyke is well within her 
rights to disagree with the Finean metaphysical program, it seems that on her 
view much of Fine’s approach would not count as metaphysics if anti-realism 
is ruled out. There is a way of making sense of the Finean view such that it is 
not committing the representational fallacy: we really are concerned with the 
fundamental facts, but something interesting nonetheless hangs on the 
relationship these facts bear to our ways of thinking about the world. However, 
if the only proper aim for metaphysics is something robustly realist, it is hard 
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to see how a Finean project which in part aims to explain how the fundamental 
relates to the nonfundamental can be accommodated.  
I conclude, therefore, that Dyke’s position carves up the theoretical space in a 
way such that there is an unacceptable loss of theoretical options, which is 
damaging to the plausibility of both her characterisation of the aims of 
metaphysics, and the methods she employs to satisfy those aims. This is all the 
more worrying given that the aim of her project is to provide a framework 
from which we can prosecute metaphysical theorising.  
 
v. Truthmaking and the Representational Fallacy 
 
In this section I argue that Dyke’s proposed methodology itself falls short of 
her own theoretical aspirations. My critique proceeds as follows. First, I show 
that there are two different readings of Dyke’s claim that we ought not take the 
relationship between language and world to be significant when doing 
metaphysics: a weak reading and a strong reading. I then argue that both 
readings severely compromise Dyke’s position. On the weak reading, the claim 
doesn’t have the far reaching methodological significance her rhetoric suggests. 
But on the strong reading, Dyke is committed either to a mysterious 
truthmaking relation, or to a relation with appears to be in conflict with the 
strong reading itself. Finally, I consider a possible concessionary move on 
Dyke’s part: that she allow for a metaphysically significant relation between 
language and world, but one that must obey a certain direction of fit. I argue 
that this move cannot do the work that Dyke needs it to, as it fails to respect a 
crucial distinction between epistemic and metaphysical concerns.  
Dyke offers us a ‘metaphysics first’ conception of metaphysical method. She 
maintains that something has gone wrong when we focus on the relationship 
between language and the world when doing metaphysics. Not only is 
metaphysics about the world, but the methods we use to theorise about it 
should not make central concerns to do with the relation between language 
and the world. Her charge is that those philosophers who take concerns to do 
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with truth as it functions in the theory of meaning, and language to be 
significant when doing metaphysics have made a mistake.  
Now, there is a strong and a weak reading of some of Dyke’s claims with 
regards to these matters. On the weak reading, philosophers have gone wrong 
because they have focussed their attention on the wrong relation. Perhaps they 
have been concerned with a method which only looks to the true sentences of 
the language to determine ontological commitments, rather than doing any 
independent metaphysical work. Perhaps they were misguided because they 
thought that there was only one such relation, when in fact there are many. 
This latter view in particular seems to be at the root of Dyke’s master 
argument against SLT. There are many equally important relations between the 
language we use to describe the world and the world itself, and so metaphysics 
should not just focus on one such relation. But, there is a much stronger 
reading as well. According to this second reading philosophers have made a 
mistake in thinking that focussing on any such relation is appropriate work for 
metaphysicians. To put the point another way: according to the weak view some 
ways of methodologically proceeding from language to the world are wrong. 
According to the strong view, any method which moves from language to the 
world is mistaken.  
Dyke seems to endorse latter of these readings but her arguments only really 
seems to generate, if anything at all, a reason to accept the former. I will 
consider the strong reading below, but first some comment on the weak 
reading. There is a gap between the rhetoric and the argument that Dyke 
forwards. Her master argument, if successful, merely shows that there is not a 
unique fit between language and world: that there are multiple ways that our 
language can hook up with reality. The trouble for Dyke is that it doesn’t 
follow from this underdetermination that there could not be a privileged true 
description. She concedes that the language of physics is in some sense more 
accurate than other discourses. But if this is so why not think that the complete 
language of complete physics provides something like a privileged description 
of reality? If Dyke’s proposed alternative method for metaphysics is to be 
practicable, I assume we should be able to name the truthmakers for the true 
sentences of our language. If we can’t do this, then it is not clear how we could 
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begin to theorise about the truthmakers in the first place. Given this, couldn’t 
the privileged language just be that language that names the truthmakers? 
Maybe there will be other languages which state truths about the world in a 
metaphysically unperspicuous ways, but there will be at least one language 
which is in the business of describing the fundamental structure of reality.  
At the very least, even if we cannot recover a privileged description, if all Dyke 
aims to defeat is the view that there is a single unique relation between 
language and the world, then her attack doesn’t seem so damning. Indeed, this 
would be consistent with numerous arguments for semantic indeterminacy. 
This is even compatible with the view, held by some metaphysicians, that when 
we are engaged in metaphysical inquiry we theorise using a special metaphysical 
language.5 But I take it that she intends more than this. She claims that her 
intention is to rid us of a way of doing metaphysics according to which word-
world relations are relevant at all. It isn’t merely that some conception of the 
relationship between language and world is off the table, but rather that we 
shouldn’t be taking representation seriously at all. This is the strong claim. And 
if this is what she intends, then her own preferred method cannot satisfy it.  
Dyke’s alternative strategy consists in determine what the truthmakers are. 
Thus at the centre of the proposed method is a notion of truthmaking. As I 
noted, Dyke doesn’t tell us much about what view of truthmaking and 
truthmakers we should prefer, but minimally it seems uncontentious to claim 
that truthmaking is a relation. This invites a question. What are the relata? 
Now, perhaps it is a relation between facts (i.e. truthmakers) and something 
else non-representational. I have trouble making sense of this view. What 
could the non-representational relatum be? If Dyke’s preferred method entails 
us committing to such a mysterious relation, then I think it is not unreasonable 
to claim that she has not given us a viable philosophical method. After all, it is 
far from clear how to proceed with a method where the central machinery of 
this method is in some sense mysterious.   
Alternatively, perhaps it is a relation between something with representational 
content (a truth-bearer) and a fact. However, if this is the way to understand 
                                            
5 For example, see Sider (2009 & 2011), Cameron (2010), and Dorr (2008).  
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truthmaking, and I think it is, then it seems there is something to the thought 
that some claims about the relationship between language and world are 
permissible in metaphysics after all. This is a long way from a commitment to 
SLT, but it is nevertheless a claim that there is a space in metaphysics for 
theorising about the relationship between our representations of the world and 
the world itself. Inasmuch as this is the case, this falls foul of the strong 
reading. 
At this point Dyke might claim that that the concern about relations between 
representations and world is a concern about the direction of fit between the 
two. So, we can move from claims about the world, to claims about language 
safely, as this is the correct direction of explanation. What is impermissible is 
moving from claims about the true sentences of the language to claims about 
what the world is like. I am in agreement with Dyke that, “the direction of fit 
between language and reality is not from language to reality, but from reality to 
language.” (Dyke 2008, 66) But this can be read very weakly as no more than a 
commitment to a non-idealist metaphysics, where this consists in 
commitments to the following two claims: (a) there is a world independent of 
my representations of it, and (b) the majority of the true sentences I utter are 
true (to use the popular locution) in virtue of what the world is like. But a 
commitment to this (admittedly coarse-grained and radically underspecified) 
view of the relationship between language and metaphysics, tells us very little 
about the method I should employ in order to do metaphysics. I can accept 
this view and consistently think that methodologically I must proceed from 
systems of representation to facts about the world.  
Perhaps Dyke would say that this gets the order of explanation wrong. Her 
constant claim is that we cannot read what the truthmakers are off sentences. 
(Dyke 2008, 57) Once we appreciate this, I take it she thinks that we can 
essentially reverse the direction of explanation between the semantics and the 
metaphysics. So, rather than moving from meaning facts to world facts (the 
representational fallacy), we first attend to the metaphysical facts which means 
that we can then explain why certain sentences of the language are true. (Dyke 
2008, 54) In response to this I think the crucial observation is that to claim 
there is an order of metaphysical priority, is to say nothing of the order to 
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methodological priority. I take this as a familiar distinction in the philosophy of 
science, which is helpfully elucidated by Reichenbach:  
“The objective relation from the given entities to the solution, and 
the subjective way of finding it, are clearly separated for problems of a 
deductive character; we must learn to make the same distinction for the 
problem of the inductive relation from facts to theories.” (Reichenbach 
1938, 36– 37) 
Dyke’s framework problematically blurs this metaphysical-epistemological 
distinction.  
A defender of Dyke might claim that the fact that there isn’t a uniquely best 
description of reality shows that our epistemological route to knowledge of 
reality should not be in the business of utilising our representations of reality. 
If we take Dyke’s target to be the metaphysician who takes the true sentences 
of the language to be the only authoritative source of evidence in metaphysics, 
then this defence seems convincing. However, we can imagine a more modest 
metaphysician who takes such evidence to provide a defeasible source of 
evidence for theory construction in metaphysics. With this target in mind, the 
defence still seems successful in the case where we have a single sentence 
which could be made true by different incompatible truthmakers.  
However, in the case where we have multiple non-synonymous sentences, all 
of which share a truthmaker, it just does not follow from the fact that a set of 
sentences all share a truthmaker that the study of those sentences cannot 
facilitate our investigation into what their truthmaker is. Of course, we will 
often not be in a position to know whether we are dealing with the former or 
the latter case, so the putative evidence should be approached with caution. 
But, given that Dyke aims to establish that we should never take the true 
sentences of the language to provide evidence for a metaphysical theory, I trust 
that the preceding discussion can provide some restitution for those who want 
a method for metaphysics which takes our representations of reality to provide 
some evidence for what reality is like.  
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vi. Motivating the Role of Truth 
 
In this section I assess the legitimacy of Dyke’s deployment of the notion of 
truth in her proposed method. The task at hand is to get a handle on how 
Dyke motivates truth’s role in her theoretical framework. To clarify, I take it 
that Dyke’s project is not in any way deflationary about truth: truth plays an 
indispensable role in both the theory of meaning and in metaphysics. The 
section consists of two stages. First, I evaluate what Dyke says about the 
relationship between the role assigned to truth in the theory of meaning and 
the role assigned to it in metaphysics. I aim to ascertain whether it is possible 
to motivate the role of truth in metaphysics via the role that it plays in the 
theory of meaning. Second, given that Dyke requires a concept of truth which 
is free from the constraints placed on it in the theory of meaning, I aim to 
determine whether this role for truth in metaphysics is can be motivated, and if 
so how.  
Although “talk of truth conditions is commonplace throughout philosophy”, 
Dyke claims that “the notion of truth conditions is ambiguous between 
semantics and ontology.” (Dyke 2008, 48) We might think that talk of truth 
conditions happily sits in a project of giving the meaning for sentences of the 
language. Or, we might think that talk of truth conditions speaks to ontological 
concerns in that there is “a significant connection between the truth condition 
of a sentence and the ontology that grounds the truth of that sentence if it is 
true”. (Dyke 2008, 49) It is important to note that even those philosophers 
who think that metaphysical inquiry is posterior to the satisfactory semantic 
analysis of language do not think that semantics alone can give us metaphysical 
commitments. Even if you think that language is in some sense the proper 
source of knowledge in metaphysics, you still need to know the truth values for 
the statements of a language, as well as the truth conditions. Of course Dyke 
thinks that even this isn’t enough. We need to know the truthmakers, as well as 
truth values: merely knowing the truth conditions for a true sentence is not 
sufficient for telling us what in the world makes said sentence true.  
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Dyke holds that truth conditions ambiguously serve a dual function. There is 
an ontological function of providing truth conditions, which pertains to the 
relationship between truth and reality, and a semantic function, which pertains 
to the relationship between truth and meaning. (Dyke 2008, 50) Dyke thinks 
that to acknowledge that there is this dual theoretical role for truth conditions 
is not to commit the representational fallacy; it all depends on the work to 
which the truth conditions are being put. (Dyke 2008, 53) I think there are 
some serious exegetical concerns here about exactly how this ambiguity view 
works. Is the thought that irrespective of whether truth conditions are put to 
semantic or metaphysical work, what ‘truth conditions’ means is stable across 
both of deployments? But then, depending on whether they are put to 
ontological or semantic work, the manner in which the truth conditions are 
expressed can be subject to change? So when talk of truth conditions is put to 
ontological work we have some story about what constrains their use in that 
context, and when they are put to their semantic work we also have a story 
about what constrains their use on this different context. The form this might 
take is that there is some kind of restriction placed on the specification of truth 
conditions when they are put to metaphysical work. For example, perhaps the 
right-hand side of the biconditional must be stated in joint carving terms.6 And 
when they are put to semantic work the specifications of the truth conditions 
must be constrained by what speakers need to know if they are to understand a 
sentence? Then we commit the representational fallacy when we infer 
something about the nature of reality from truth conditions which are serving 
their semantic function. 
If Dyke really does think that talk of truth conditions is ambiguous, then it 
would be good to see how these supposed two different functions relate, if 
they are supposed to at all. For example, imagine we give the (semantic) truth 
conditions for a sentence of the language and in so doing give the meaning of 
that sentence. Let’s say that that sentence is true. We then want to hold that 
there is a significant connection between the (metaphysical) truth condition of 
that sentence and the ontology that grounds the truth of that sentence. So what 
                                            
6 I consider this move in the next chapter.   
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are the truthmakers making true? Are the truthmakers satisfying (1) the 
(semantic) truth conditions, (2) the (metaphysical) truth conditions, or (3) 
both? If (1) or (3) then it is hard to see what theoretical work the 
(metaphysical) truth conditions do. It seems like we need a story here about 
what theoretical role the metaphysically functioning truth conditions play, that 
isn’t already captured by the talk of truthmaking. If (2) then it seems very 
unclear under what conditions we could appropriately talk about (semantic) 
truth conditions being satisfied. Further, I presume that we cannot translate the 
(semantic) truth condition into the (metaphysical) truth condition, as this 
would be to prosecute a paraphrase project. The root of this concern is that 
once we try to flesh out the story about how metaphysics relates to the theory 
of meaning we might find that whatever sense in which the metaphysical 
theory is ‘true’ does not appropriately support the notion at work in the theory 
of meaning. However, as it is not Dyke’s intention to provide a theory of 
meaning, it would be a misplaced criticism to claim that her framework does 
not satisfactorily explain the relationship between the theory of meaning and 
truth in metaphysics.7  
What I hope to have established thus far is that whatever is motivating Dyke’s 
talk of truth and correspondence in her project, this motivation does not come 
from any reflections on the role of truth in the theory of meaning. So, with 
respect to metaphysics, what does Dyke tell us about truth? First, she tells us 
that our true sentences are true because of the way the world is. This seems to 
make some use of a notion of correspondence. Our systems of representation 
don’t float free from the world: they can ‘get it right’. Second, and perhaps 
most importantly, her central theoretical tools are truthmakers. Both the talk of 
truth as correspondence and truthmakers invites us to consider what 
legitimises Dyke’s deployment of these notions, and what ensures that truth 
can play the substantive theoretical role assigned to it. Whilst talk about truth 
and correspondence might at first appear so common place as to be 
innocuous, you might worry that if we don’t have any idea about how these 
                                            
7 In his recent monograph Mark Jago (2018) offers a theory of truthmakers which attempts to 
unify the deployment of truthmakers across (1) the basis of metaphysis, (2) a theory of what 
truth is, and (3) their role in truthmaker semantics.  
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notions get into the theoretical picture, then perhaps they cannot play the 
robust role assigned to them. By virtue of what are certain portions of reality 
*truth*makers? Dyke identifies this metaphysical conception of truth, and I 
want to consider why it deserves the name of truth at all. I consider four 
possible options for what entitles Dyke to her truth-talk and find them all 
lacking, to greater or lesser extents, given Dyke’s purposes.  
First, Dyke’s talk of truth might be part of some sort of austere rationalist 
metaphysics. Thus, perhaps we can talk about truth and correspondence 
without having to couch either in some generally naturalistically acceptable 
story, as these concepts are a priori in good standing. I take it this is certainly 
not in keeping with the generally naturalistic story that Dyke gives. She wants 
to give a metaphysic which is broadly continuous with natural science, and to 
thus have at the centre of her theoretical framework concepts which only have 
a priori rationalist justification seems deeply at odds with what else we are told. 
Of course, nothing that Dyke says actually rules this out, but I will take this to 
not capture her theoretical aims.  
Second, perhaps she takes the concept of truth as her helping herself to a 
conceptual primitive. All theorising starts somewhere and perhaps Dyke is 
starting with this. If this is what she intends, this is not compelling. Whilst I am 
sympathetic to the thought that theories must have some minimal base of 
conceptual primitives, taking truth as correspondence and truthmaking to be 
such primitives in the context of Dyke’s project is problematic. There must be 
some restriction on what type of primitives you are allowed given the 
philosophical project in which you are engaged. If Dyke intends to posit a 
conception of truth which cannot be motivated naturalistically, this presents a 
significant epistemological cost. A theoretical posit which is both taken as 
primitive, and which does most of the heavy lifting in your theoretical 
framework makes the foundations of that framework look worryingly insecure. 
Indeed, this seems all the more worrying vis-à-vis Dyke’s particular project, 
which aims to sever the ties between language and metaphysics, given that the 
most worked out accounts of truth are generally inherited from the philosophy 
of language. So, in the absence of any further elucidation, her confidence that 
there is a language independent notion available seems unduly optimistic.  
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Third, she might want to endorse a Putnamian empirical conception of truth. 
The Putnam of Meaning and the Moral Sciences forwards a kind of empirical 
realism about truth. So we have correspondence, but an empirically satisfactory 
one. He claims that the primary constraint on what counts as a good truth-
definition for a language is that it should be the one which best explains the 
behaviour of a speaker. (Putnam 1978, 41) Rationalising the behaviour of a 
speaker is to offer an explanation, and in order to offer this explanation we 
need to have an adequate handle on the connections between understanding, 
truth conditions, belief, action, etc. (Putnam 1978, 41) This is how 
correspondence gets into the picture: “‘Correspondence’ between words and 
sets of things… can be viewed as part of an explanatory model of the speakers’ 
collective behaviour.” (Putnam 1978, 123) Putnam thinks that the fact that 
there is such correspondence is what explains the success of what we can do 
with language, and the success of natural science. (Putnam 1978, 111)  
So we get a concept of truth that is in naturalistically good standing, as it is via 
correspondence that we are to explain the success of human behaviour and 
science. Thus, the notion of truth as correspondence is secured by attending to 
the role it plays in this explanatory model. Could this be the sort of justification 
that would give Dyke the entitlement she needs? I think not. Whilst this does 
seem compatible with much of what she says, such a conception of truth is not 
robust enough to get her conception of truthmaking, along with its ontology of 
facts. If Dyke’s master argument is successful, it shows us that an empirically 
motivated truth-predicate for natural language will not yield a unique 
assignment of truthmakers. Whilst a Putnam-style empirical conception of 
truth can furnish us with a coarse-grained correspondence relation, it cannot 
by itself motivate the claim that the true sentences of the language are true in 
virtue of the existence of particular facts.   
To further see why this is troubling note that Dyke thinks it is a substantive 
metaphysical question whether reality outstrips physical reality. (Dyke 2008, 24) 
For example, it is a substantive metaphysical question whether abstracta like 
numbers exist. If this is the case, how are we to articulate the relevant notion 
of success in, for example, the case of abstract ontology, without relying on 
representational and conceptual resources? It is not clear what the notion of 
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success pertaining to non-physical reality might be, without looking to 
language and concepts for help. You might think that the presence of 
mathematical terms in a regimentation of a successful physical theory licences 
us to infer that the objects of mathematics exist. It is because the terms of the 
theory correspond to reality that the theory is successful.  
There are two reasons why this line of thought is incompatible with Dyke’s 
project. First, even if we allow that the presence of mathematical language in a 
successful scientific theory commits us to an ontology of mathematical facts, 
this relation will be silent on the nature of those putative truthmakers. The 
empirically motivated truth-predicate can’t discriminate between candidate 
truthmakers, and therefore cannot be the kind of relation that Dyke requires. 
Second, Dyke does not think that we should take the useful expressive 
resources of theories to tell us anything about what the world is like. But how 
could we come to know what abstract objects exist if it isn’t in some sense via 
reflection on the presence of the terms which putatively name them in true 
theories? Unless Dyke wants to rule out the possibility that there are non-
physical facts merely on the basis of the conception of truth at work (which I 
take it would be deeply at odds with her whole approach), rooting the notion 
of truth in success does not look promising.  
Fourth, and finally, perhaps Dyke intends that we get to talk about truth 
through claiming that the principle characteristic of truth is belief. Both Lewis 
and Davidson think that the concept of truth has to be established as in 
naturalistic good standing.8 They do not merely help themselves to a 
metaphysical conception of truth as correspondence to reality. Thus, they both 
think it needs to be articulated in a way that gives truth an explanatory role: 
truth is that feature that we take sentences to have when we assent them or 
believe them. If we don’t give truth this explanatory role, then it is not clear 
what entitles us to use it in our theories.  
Could Dyke in principle offer a story along these lines? It is unclear. However, 
we might worry, as above, that such an account will not be sufficient to secure 
the desired ontology of facts. We might also worry that a notion of truth which 
                                            
8 For example, Davidson (1969, 1973) and Lewis (1974a, 1975). 
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makes central concerns to do with belief will involve too much of a 
commitment to the sort of representational features of which Dyke wants to 
purge metaphysics. I take the central thought of Lewis’s and Davidson’s 
respective strategies to be that we only get a respectable notion of truth if is it 
bound to observable facts about assent. Truth is that thing that sentences are 
held to have when they are assented or believed. However, if the only way we 
can motivate a role for truth in theorising simpliciter is through this role in a 
theory of belief or meaning, then any role that it may play in metaphysics is 
going to need to be accordingly constrained by this primary function. This 
would then seem significantly at odds with the role that Dyke needs the 
concept to play. Minimally, I want to suggest that until we have a worked out 
theory which offers some kind of justification to underpin the work to which 
Dyke puts truth, it remains opaque as to why she can co-opt the notion of 
truth to serve her theoretical purposes. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have presented a number of arguments against Dyke’s 
philosophical project in Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. In this closing 
paragraph, I want to very briefly state what I take to be the important lessons 
to draw from the preceding discussion. First, we must be cautious that our 
desire to do serious metaphysics doesn’t rule out the possibility of robust 
metaphysical projects that are anti-realist. Second, we must not allow a move 
towards a ‘metaphysics-first’ methodology to rob us of the ability to actually 
prosecute metaphysical theorising. Third, we must be careful with the 
distinction between commitments of epistemological priority and metaphysical 
priority. Fourth, if we propose to make use of the concept of truth in a 
metaphysical framework that distances itself from the role assigned to truth in 
the theory of meaning, then we must have a story to tell about how that 
concept can play the role assigned to it.  
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Chapter Three: Ted Sider and Truth in a 
Metaphysical Language 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is interrogate a language-first approach to 
metaphysics, where the language in question is not natural language but rather 
a special metaphysical language. I take as my case study Ted Sider’s project in 
(2011) Writing the Book of the World. My interest in his project is that it offers a 
promising synthesis between approaches to metaphysics which take meaning 
and truth to be altogether orthogonal to metaphysical inquiry, and those which 
take metaphysics to be in some sense posterior to a satisfactory study of 
language. This method of metaphysics is therefore centrally concerned with 
meaning and truth, but not as these notions function in the theory of meaning 
for natural language. I argue that while the concept of truth plays an 
ineliminable role in metaphysics, both the concept itself and the assurance that 
it can actually play its assigned role, is inadequately articulated and motivated. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I offer a critical outline of the main 
objectives and methods of Sider’s project (§II). Following this overview, I take 
up some residual expositional matters regarding Sider’s realism and the status 
of metaphysics (§III). In these three sections I highlight, where appropriate, 
the points at which Sider offers any illuminating comments on the role of 
truth. I finally turn to offer an evaluation of Sider’s conception of the role of 
truth in metaphysics (§IV). I argue that there are two different ways that truth 
comes into the picture on Sider’s view: first, via the role that truth plays in 
connecting the nonfundamental to the fundamental, and second, via the idea 
of truth as a required feature of metaphysical theory. I argue that Sider 
insufficiently motivates these roles for truth and thus a central part of Sider’s 
project is worryingly opaque. 
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II. Sider’s project  
 
The primary claim of Sider’s book is that the world has a distinguished 
structure, and that the job of metaphysics is to discover it. The aim of this 
section is to critically unpack this claim.   
 
i. Structure and Metaphysics  
 
Sider tells us the following:  
“Discerning “structure” means discerning patterns. It means figuring 
out the right categories for describing the world. It means “carving 
reality at its joints”, to paraphrase Plato. It means inquiring into how 
the world fundamentally is, as opposed to how we ordinarily speak or 
think of it.” (Sider 2011, 1) 
As means of elucidating his concept of structure, Sider draws a comparison 
with Lewis. He claims that for Lewis there are certain predicates that are joint-
carving. These predicates pick out natural objective differences in the world. 
Sider tells us that structure is a generalization and extension of Lewisian 
naturalness. (Sider 2011, vii) He claims that “linguistically speaking, Lewis’ 
focus is on the predicate.” (Sider 2011, 85) For Sider, however, it is not just 
predicates, but quantifiers, predicate modifiers, sentential connectives, and 
expressions of other grammatical categories which can carve at the joints. 
These joint-carving notions are the fundamental ones, and Sider tells us that a 
fact, which I take to be an extra-linguistic entity, is fundamental when it is 
stated in joint-carving terms. (Sider 2011, vii) Fundamentality, then, is to be 
understood as a matter of structure. (Sider 2011, 5) Sider claims that the “truly 
central question of metaphysics is that of what is most fundamental”. (Sider 
2011, 5) To prosecute answering this central question of metaphysics we will 
need to employ perfectly fundamental concepts. Sider contends that these 
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concepts will be concepts of physics, logic, and mathematics. (Sider 2011, 6) So 
what Sider is after is a generalised form of Lewis’s approach to predicates: 
where “function symbols, predicate modifiers, sentence operators, variable 
binders, and so on, get at the world’s structure”. (Sider 20911, 85) Sider is clear 
that this doesn’t mean that we treat all these other grammatical categories as 
predicates, but that we ask a similar kind of question. (Sider 2011, 85) 
Sider’s talk of conceptual fundamentality presents our first expositional 
challenge. Sider moves from talking about metaphysical fundamentality to 
talking about conceptual fundamental, without really explaining what motivates 
such a leap. We can see why this might be problematic. Recall the previous 
discussion from Chapter One on the distinction between semantic and 
metaphysical reduction. I claimed that there are important ways in which 
metaphysical and semantic primitiveness can come apart, such that a semantic 
primitive may not be metaphysically basic or that something metaphysically 
basic may be semantically analysable. Given such a possible disconnect, we 
should be cautious with Sider’s seamless movement between talk of 
metaphysical and conceptual fundamentality. Is Sider employing a non-
common usage for ‘concept’? Is this some sort of special metaphysical notion 
of ‘concept’, where concepts are not purely representational things? Sider is 
not explicit about his usage of the term, however I think we should interpret 
his talk of concepts as still being squarely situated in realm of representation. 
For the notion of truth to get a grip at all, something must be a truth bearer. A 
more charitable interpretation of Sider’s slips between talk of metaphysical and 
conceptual fundamentality is that is signals an important point of departure 
from natural language. Concepts are the tools we use to articulate our 
metaphysical theories and problems. However, the concepts of primary interest 
to the metaphysician are not those of everyday thought and talk but are rather 
those that belong to some distinctly metaphysical language. More on this later.  
Sider claims that whilst we can take the comparison with Lewis on naturalness 
to help illuminate what structure is, he also maintains that he cannot 
reductively define ‘structure’. (Sider 2011, 9) Nonetheless, he thinks that a rich 
characterisation can be given. Sider asks us to question the extent and value of 
definitions; in particular, he does not think that many concepts of 
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philosophical interest can be reductively defined. He claims that, “we generally 
“understand” philosophical concepts to the extent that we know what role 
they play in our thinking”. (Sider 2011:9) Thus, Sider seems happy to say that 
we have a sufficient understanding of a concept if we know what theoretical 
role the concept in question is supposed to play. Sider admits that theoretical 
role is not all there is to meaning and reference, and as such even establishing 
an theoretical role for structure may not be sufficient to secure reference for 
the concept. However, he hopes that “this unhappy possibility is not realized”. 
(Sider 2011, 10) This isn’t a mere hope: Sider takes it as the purpose of the 
book to demonstrate how employing the concept of structure can improve our 
understanding of the world. He claims that “structure is a posit, a posit that is 
justified by its ability to improve our theories of these matters”. (Sider 2011, 
10) He claims that posits are justified when they unify theory, and makes a 
comparison with unification in Newtonian physics.  
I think this comparison is instructive, primarily as it reveals something about 
Sider’s method. Even though, as Sider acknowledges, metaphysics and physics 
are not the same enterprise, Sider seems happy to adopt similar epistemic 
practices in metaphysics as those in physics: talk of structure does important 
explanatory work, and as such we should believe that it is getting at something 
objective about the world. Note the two distinct stages here. First, although we 
cannot reductively define structure, we can delineate a theoretical role for it. 
We might therefore think of Sider as offering something like an implicit 
definition of structure. This shows that the concept isn’t empty of sense. 
Second, once we’ve got something of a handle on what the concept means, we 
should be content that the concept picks out some objective feature(s) of the 
world as the concept, so understood, can do important explanatory work. I 
suspect that there will have to be a particular conception of explanation at 
work here, in order to ensure that explanatoryness secures a referent for the 
concept.   
Sider notes a line of resistance to the idea that we can implicitly define 
structure in the way he suggests is that we do not have a rich enough 
conception of the theoretical role of structure. How it is we get a handle on the 
notion of joint-carving in the case of Lewisian naturalness is via the notion of 
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similarity. (Sider 2011, 88) For other grammatical categories it doesn’t seem we 
can make use of this notion. So, the thought goes, we don’t really understand 
what it is for these categories to carve at the joints. As Sider puts it: 
“As an undefined theoretical term, ‘natural’ is understood through its 
theoretical role. The theoretical role consists of principles specifying 
how naturalness relates to certain other notions, such as similarity. My 
term ‘structure’ has its theoretical role fixed by many of the same 
principles, and more besides. If the theoretical role of ‘structure’ is 
exhausted by its connection to similarity, and if this connection is 
restricted to predicates, then we have no understanding of how 
‘structure’ could apply to expressions in other grammatical categories.” 
(Sider 2011, 88) 
In the face of such a challenge, Sider’s claims is that the theoretical role of 
structure is not exhausted by its connection to similarity. (Sider 2011, 88) So 
we still have a way of understanding it, as its theoretical role is much richer. 
Sider contends that in addition to similarity, structure connects to many other 
useful theoretical notions, such as laws, explanation, metasemantics, 
epistemology, physical geometry, substantivity, epistemic value, etc. Such 
connections justify Sider’s view that we can understand the concept of 
structure, and how it can apply to other grammatical categories aside from the 
predicate. In addition, Sider claims that there is a way of understanding 
similarity such that it is still relevant to grammatical categories other than the 
predicate. He thinks that in addition to talk of property similarity we can talk 
about fact similarity, which turns on the notion of ‘real commonality’. Sider 
tries to elucidate this notion of real commonality by saying that some facts ‘go 
together’. (Sider 2011, 89) For example, consider the facts that (1) there exists 
an electron, and (2) there exists a rabbit. Sider thinks that there is something in 
common between these two facts, a ‘real commonality’, and this is that 
quantification is fundamental. (Sider 2011, 89) 
Let’s return to the Lewis comparison. Sider considers whether, like Lewisian 
sparseness, talk of structure requires talk of entities. Sider’s claim is that we do 
not need to cast talk of structure in terms of talk of entities. He claims that 
there is a gap between ways that we might talk and the underlying metaphysics. 
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For example, ‘is human’ gets associated with a semantic value, but my being 
human has nothing to do with semantic values. Sider claims that “structure 
facts do not concern semantic values”. (Sider 2011, 91) Sider motivates this by 
claiming that “semantics is, like other special sciences, not fundamental.” (Sider 
2011, 91) He goes on: 
“This is not to say that the statements of semantics are untrue, only 
that they are not fundamental. But if semantics isn’t fundamental, the 
facts about carving at the joints can’t fundamentally involve semantic 
entities.” (Sider 2011, 91) 
So, just because we might talk about some predicate carving at the joints, this 
should not be taken to reify semantic or linguistic entities. Sider therefore 
needs to find a way to talk about structure which does not involve 
commitment to entities. He suggests introducing a new locution which can be 
combined with expressions of any grammatical category to form new 
sentences. (Sider 2011, 92) Facts about structure will then be represented by 
this new operator, which tells us that the concept it appears in front of is a 
fundamental concept. For example, if φ is the new operator, then “φ (∧)” tells 
us that the conjunction is fundamental. Sider is not concerned that we do not 
know of any pre-existing locution with this grammar: 
“Some philosophers think we can understand only what can be defined 
using pre-existing resources of natural language; but this stultifying 
doctrine is inadequate to the evident fact of linguistic innovation within 
science, as well as to the initial emergence of natural language itself.” 
(Sider 2011, 92) 
This is important, and replicates the same overarching methodology we saw 
above. Sider thinks if we can make the novel expression “tolerably clear, and if 
the world contains structure corresponding to the new expression” then the 
introduction of the new expression is acceptable and, indeed, successful. (Sider 
2011, 92) But again, this is a two-stage enterprise. First we must successfully 
introduce the new vocabulary, and then, if this new vocabulary does important 
explanatory work, we can say that it corresponds to something worldly.  
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What are the features of the fundamental according to Sider? He tells us that 
the fundamental is complete, pure, subpropositional, absolute, determinate, 
and fundamental. (Sider 2011, 137) How does Sider understand these 
commitments? He tells us that a “formulation of completeness might run as 
follows: every non-fundamental truth holds in virtue of some fundamental truth.” (Sider 
2011, 105) In-virtue-of is not understood in terms of modality, truthmaking, or 
fact identity. (Sider 2011, 105) He understands purity as follows: “fundamental 
truths involve only fundamental notions”. (Sider 2011, 106) Purity leads Sider to hold 
that the in-virtue-of facts are not themselves fundamental. That is: facts about 
the relationship between the fundamental and the nonfundamental are 
themselves nonfundamental. (Sider 2011, 107) Sider takes structure to be 
subpropositional: “there are some fundamental “building blocks” – the 
“ultimate constituents of reality” – and the nature of reality is given by the 
arrangement of those building blocks.” (Sider 2011, 128) Claiming that the 
fundamental is determinate means something like there is no distinctive 
vocabulary of indeterminacy at the fundamental level and fundamental 
languages obey classical logic. (Sider 2011, 137) In addition, fundamentality is a 
fundamental notion, and some facts about fundamentality are fundamental 
facts. (Sider 2011, 137) 
In motivating his concept of structure, Sider considers the sceptic about 
structure. Such a sceptic challenges the idea that we can carve reality using the 
‘right concepts’ as there will be a plurality of (maybe infinitely many) ways of 
carving the world, and we are not in a position to say that any are better than 
any others. I take it this could be thought of as an epistemic claim that we 
aren’t in a position to know what the best ways are, or it could be thought of as 
a metaphysical claim that there just aren’t objectively better and worse ways of 
carving. What Sider needs to successfully respond to the sceptic is to make 
some kind of epistemically accessible distinction between those genuine 
features of the world, and the rest. (Sider 2011, 3) He needs to be able to make 
and motivate the claim that electrons are genuinely more similar to other 
electrons than to bison.  
Sider tells us the following:  
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“Structure… is to be understood as objective… Whether a property, 
word, or concept carves at the joints has nothing to do with the place 
of the concept in human languages, conceptual schemes, biology, or 
anything like that. Thus, “fundamental” (which I use more or less 
interchangeably with “joint-carving” and “part of reality’s structure”) 
signifies a metaphysical, rather than conceptual, sort of 
fundamentality.” (Sider 2011, 5) 
Sider contrasts what he takes to be the substantive metaphysical questions, 
with those that are merely conceptual. (Sider 2011, 6) The kind of answer we 
require for the latter sort of questions regard working out what sort of 
linguistic community we inhabit. (Sider 2011, 7) The former sorts of questions 
are not like this. They raise questions about whether the world has structure or 
not: whether the world has quantificational, modal, tensed, logical, etc. 
structure. Sider rightly points out that many metaphysicians talk about what is 
‘really’ or ‘genuinely’ the case, and that this talk needs a satisfactory explication. 
Sider says that he wants the notion of genuineness to be language-independent, 
(Sider 2011, 4) and thus that the right way to explicate such talk of genuineness 
is through talk about fundamental structure. He holds that “these claims are 
not merely about what is true; they are claims about what is true at the 
fundamental level”. (Sider 2011, 8)  
This echoes the discussion at the beginning of this section about the notion of 
‘concept’ that Sider employs. Perhaps we could think of the ‘merely 
conceptual’ questions as those that pertain to the concepts of ordinary thought 
and talk, whereas the deep metaphysical concepts belong to a language of 
fundamental metaphysics. We are then to prosecute the project of working out 
what is true at the fundamental level by turning our attention to the truths 
stated in the fundamental language. Sider claims that a fundamental language is 
one whose expressions carve at the joints, and that a realism about structure 
commits one to a realism about fundamental languages. (Sider 2011, 8) So, in 
response to the sceptic who says that there is no objectively better or worse 
ways to carve the world, Sider responds by offering us the notion of truth in 
the fundamental language, where a fundamental language is one which uses 
joint-carving concepts. It isn’t obvious how this would satisfy the sceptic who 
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is worried that even if there are genuine similarities in nature we cannot know 
about them. I will address Sider’s epistemology of structure in section three. 
 
ii. The Method  
 
Sider claims that the world has a privileged description. What it takes for a 
description to be privileged is not merely that it is true. The description must 
also use metaphysically perspicuous concepts, so that there is an appropriate 
kind of fit between the conceptual structure of a theory and reality’s structure. 
So we want more than coarse grained correspondence. Making sense of what 
more is required is at times exegetically challenging. Recall, Sider holds that 
when I claim that some expression is joint-carving, I am not claiming that its 
semantic value is joint-carving. (Sider 2011, 90) This suggests we need to careful 
with talk of about correspondence, and that it should perhaps not be thought 
of as isomorphism. For Sider, we shouldn’t explicate correspondence by taking 
every subsentential element of the theory to have a worldly counterpart, where 
this is understood in terms of entities.  
The notion of ideology is therefore important to Sider’s project. Just as much 
as ontology commits to ‘objective content’, so too does ideology. (Sider 2011, 
vii) He claims that a fundamental theory’s ideology is just as much a part of its 
representational content as its ontology, “for it represents the world as having 
structure corresponding to its primitive expressions.” (Sider 2011, viii) The pull 
in the other direction, i.e. to view ideology as psychological, linguistic, or 
conventional, Sider attributes to ‘psychologizing’ Quine. (Sider 2011, vii) Sider 
tells us: 
“The success of these conceptual choices justifies belief in the 
existence of corresponding structures in the world. Once “ideology” 
has been purged of its psychological connotations, there is no barrier 
to recognizing a theory’s logical ideology as a coequal part of that 
theory’s portrayal of the world, and thus as being as good a candidate 
for carving at the joints as the theory’s nonlogical vocabulary.” (Sider 
2011, 97) 
 80 
 
So the ultimate aim of metaphysical inquiry is to gain insight into structure: 
what the world is like at the most fundamental level. But, in order to do this, 
we must inquire into necessity (does the best theory contain modal operators), 
time (does the best theory contain tense operators), ontology (does the best 
theory contain quantifiers), etc. (Sider 2011, 1) Given that we should not 
understand talk of the representational content of our ideological 
commitments as talk about entities (i.e. there is not some entity that 
corresponds to our talk of tense operators), we should understand this talk of 
ideological representation as the claim that reality itself is, e.g., tensed. So it 
appears that we do have a strong correspondence claim, but one that should 
not be understood in terms of crude isomorphism. We must therefore be very 
careful with some of the inflated rhetoric employed: talk of theory ‘mirroring’ 
reality is best viewed as metaphorical. Of course, it is still a little opaque what 
should replace the metaphor and I will try and bring clarity to these matters in 
the final section of this chapter. Talk of, for example, fundamental tense 
operators corresponding to tensed reality should suffice for now for getting 
our heads around Sider’s correspondence claims.  
Sider offers an approach to metaphysics which places as central to inquiry a 
notion of what is fundamentally the case. This is understood in contrast to 
what appears to be the case. The former concerns reality and the latter 
concerns our representations of reality. Now, we may ask the question: what is 
the relationship between the fundamental and the nonfundamental? What is 
the relationship between the privileged description of reality, which only uses 
joint carving concepts, and our ordinary ways of thinking about the world and 
describing it? In what sense does the nonfundamental hold in-virtue-of the 
fundamental? What is the connection between them? As Sider notes, these are 
questions which confront any metaphysician who wants to deal in terms of 
fundamentality. Sider’s project, where fundamentality is understood in terms of 
structure, offers its own conception of the connection.  
For Sider, any conception of the nature of the connection between the 
fundamental and the nonfundamental must hold that the connecting truths are 
going to be themselves nonfundamental. (Sider 2011, 110) Sider thinks that 
considerations from purity provide some direction for how to answer the 
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question of the connection. We should not be attempting to answer the 
question by offering a metaphysical posit: a special fundamental relationship. 
(Sider 2011, 110) Instead, Sider wants to introduce an undefined 
nonfundamental notion to explicate the connection. Although it is undefined, 
he thinks that it could in principle be reduced (he seems to be treating these as 
the same thing), but he does not think we need to do so. (Sider 2011, 112) The 
notion that Sider offers us is that of a metaphysical semantics. (Sider 2011, 112) 
This is a close relative of the notion of ground, but Sider claims he offers a 
slightly different linguistic approach. (Sider 2011, 112)  
Sider claims that a metaphysical semantics is a semantic theory with two 
distinctive features. First, “meanings are to be given in joint-carving terms”. 
(Sider 2011, 112) So, if the metaphysical semanticist offers a truth theory, the 
right-hand side of the truth conditions must be given in purely joint carving 
terms.1 Second, its explanatory goals differ from linguistic semantics. (Sider 
2011, 112) On the one hand, metaphysical semantics seeks to explain how 
what we say fits with fundamental reality. On the other, it is not constrained by 
the sort of cognitive or syntactic data points that constrain linguistic semantic 
theory. (Sider 2011, 112-113) The metaphysical semanticist is “free to assign 
semantic values that competent speakers would be incapable of recognising as 
such, for she is not trying to explain what a competent speaker knows when 
she understands her language”. (Sider 2011, 113)  
There is an interesting question here about precisely what it is that a competent 
speaker could not recognise, and quite how this differs from natural language 
semantics. I take it the thought is that when assigning semantic values in the 
metaphysical semantics there is no requirement that such assignments be 
cognitively transparent. Of course, if we are talking about semantic value 
assignment in natural language it is far from clear that such assignment should 
be cognitively transparent. Perhaps the assignment of truth conditions needs to 
be in some way cognitively constrained, e.g. if I understand the sentence I 
should be able to recognise the truth conditions. But, in claiming there is 
                                            
1 Sider is open to the thought that there are other options for giving the meaning which don’t 
proceed truth theoretically, e.g. assertion-conditions etc. but claims that for factualist discourse, 
we should prefer a truth-theoretic approach. (Sider 2011, 113-114) 
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something significantly different going on in the metaphysical semantics from 
natural language semantics, such that the former is less constrained, I worry 
that Sider may be conflating the theory of sense and that of reference. If the 
claim is that in metaphysical semantics a competent speaker couldn’t recognise 
the extension of a term, then this seems innocuous and continuous with the 
natural language semantical project. If the claim about recognition is something 
more than this, it is not clear quite what it is supposed to be.  
Putting these concerns about cognitive transparency aside for a moment, with 
the shape of the project identified, Sider questions the degree to which we can 
expect ourselves to be able to actually offer metaphysical truth conditions. 
(Sider 2011, 116) In considering this, Sider makes some general claims about 
the failures of projects of conceptual analysis. (Sider 2011, 117) He thinks that 
the problems with conceptual analysis are exacerbated when we try to give 
truth-conditions in joint-carving terms.  But Sider thinks we can construct a 
‘toy’ metaphysical truth-conditions, for the purposes of getting a handle on 
what sort of shape they will have, without committing us to getting them to fit 
perfectly with usage and in purely fundamental terms. (Sider 2011, 117) The 
purpose of the toy metaphysical semantics “is not to be a real metaphysical 
semantics, but rather to convince us that there is a real metaphysical semantics, 
even if that metaphysical semantics is too complex for us to discover”. (Sider 
2011, 117)  
To close this section, I want to register that I find this stage of the dialectic 
challenging. Sider seems to be committed to the view that a central and 
indispensable part of his project may be impossible for us to execute. I take it 
he thinks that in principle such a project is possible, but maybe not for 
creatures like us. Sider has told us that the metaphysical semanticist is “free to 
assign semantic values that competent speakers would be incapable of 
recognising as such, for she is not trying to explain what a competent speaker 
knows when she understands her language”. (Sider 2011, 113) Whilst it does 
not seem that it should be a requirement that the semantic values be 
recognisable as such, Sider’s claim seems to be stronger than that: that, 
perhaps, we cannot even recognise the truth conditions. If the truth conditions 
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we need to assign to execute the project are inaccessible, then large parts of 
metaphysics will likewise be inaccessible.  
Now, perhaps this will not worry Sider. He is a committed realist (as I will 
discuss in the next section), so the fact that reality is going to outstrip our 
ability to theorise about it is perhaps not something he sees as a problem. But 
it is dialectically curious that Sider is arguing for a way of doing metaphysics 
which may be inaccessible to us. What I take this to highlight is the 
contingency of cognitive success when we attempt to offer theories about what 
the world is like. There are a great many philosophical and scientific projects 
which we want to be able to execute but, given our cognitive limitations, we 
may not be able to do so. Some might take our inability to execute such 
projects as demonstrating that there is something problematic with the project 
itself. Perhaps you might think that if metaphysical truth conditions are 
ineffable, then this points us in the direction of the impossibility of 
metaphysics. Here, again, Sider deploys the analogy with science. We are 
cognitively limited in physics, but we don’t generally take this to show that 
there is something wrong with the methods of physics.2 If you are happy to 
buy both realism and the contingency of cognitive success in physics, but you 
don’t want to accept that package deal in metaphysics, then it needs to be 
shown that metaphysics is by its nature worse off than physics. I will now turn 
to consider such questions about the status of metaphysics.  
 
III. The Status of Metaphysics  
 
In this section there are three residual expositional matters which I want to 
discuss, all of which pertain to Sider’s view of the status of metaphysics. First: 
his view on the epistemology of metaphysics. Second: his ‘knee-jerk realism’. 
                                            
2 Of course, it must be noted that a number of prominent philosophers of science have 
defended the view that our epistemic limitations with respect to fundamental physics should 
indeed impact what our metaphysical commitments should be. See, for example, van Fraassen 
(1980).  
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Third: his claim that something like his conception of metaphysics in 
unavoidable.  
 
iii. The Epistemology of Structure  
 
Sider urges that we adopt the Quinean view of ontological commitment and 
apply (something like) it to the epistemology of structure. (Sider 2011, 12)  
“As a general epistemology of metaphysics I prefer the vague, vaguely 
Quinean, thought that metaphysics is continuous with science. We 
employ the same criteria… for theory choice in metaphysics that we 
employ outside of metaphysics.” (Sider 2011, 12) 
We start by finding the best theory, which is the one that is most 
parsimonious, explanatory, coherent with other good theories, etc. Whilst we 
may have to accept that these criteria give us less guidance in metaphysics than 
they do in science, Sider thinks this follows from the speculative and uncertain 
nature of the discipline, and doesn’t seem worried. (Sider 2011, 12) Sider claims 
that the Quinean holds that we then “believe the ontology of your best 
theory”. (Sider 2011, 12) Sider motivates this by noting that the ontological 
commitment is a part of the theoretical success of the good theory. Sider then 
urges that we extend such a picture to include a non-psychologised view of 
ideology. So, we should believe the ideology of the best theory; in particular, 
we should take it to carve at the joints. (Sider 2011, 12) If you buy this story 
then, Sider thinks, we can have evidence for our claims about structure. The 
story about the epistemology of structure, however, goes beyond this vague 
Quinean picture. Sider thinks that when we search for the best theory we 
search “simultaneously for a set of concepts and a theory stated in terms of 
those concepts”. (Sider 2011, 13) So, metaphysical or empirical inquiry is about 
finding the best theory (according to the identified theoretical virtues) and 
about finding the best concepts to articulate that theory.  
Sider claims that this epistemological story provides further vindication for the 
concept of structure itself. He claims:  
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“To evaluate proposed trades of ontology for ideology – which we 
must do in order to choose which fundamental theory to believe – we 
need to speak of joint-carving for expressions other than predicates.” 
(Sider 2011, 87) 
So, the thought goes, if we do not extend our conception of structure beyond 
the predicate, we lose one of the most significant methods of adjudicating 
between competing metaphysical theories. I take the proposed insight here to 
be that part of the Quinean epistemology involves some kind of cost-benefit 
analysis where we weigh up competing articulations of theory. In order to do 
this we need to get a handle on which expressions are ideologically committing, 
and Sider’s framework purports to offer a method for doing this.  
We might worry, however, whether we actually need Sider’s special notion of 
structure to do this. To help to illustrate how we might resist this, it is worth 
reflecting on the degree to which Sider’s own proposal is any different from 
Quine’s. Although Quine is most explicit about offering an explication of 
ontology, he arguably intends this to be extended, mutatis mutandis, to other 
areas of classical metaphysics. Following Divers (2017), we can understand 
Quine’s modal anti-realism as deriving from his view that Best Theory does 
not contain any modal operators or connectives. Unlike respectable ontology, 
where we are concerned with quantifiers and variables, respectable modal 
metaphysics concerns itself with the question of whether quantified modal 
logic deserves a place in Best Theory. It is hard to see how in the details this 
Quinean research programme differs from Sider’s own. In both cases, 
questions of metaphysical interest are to be answered by attending to the 
logical constituents of the metaphysically salient discourse.   
I suspect the difference is not so much in the proposed methodology as such, 
but in the view taken of the alethic status of the subsequent theories. For Sider, 
the claim that best theory contains some ideological commitment is 
accompanied with a strong claim about how the structure of theory 
corresponds to the structure of the world. If best theory contains tense 
operators, then this reflects the tensed nature of reality. Truth for Sider, at least 
the type the metaphysician is interested in, has to do with a matching between 
the structure of the best theory, and the structure of the world. Quine, by 
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comparison, is not going to be happy with such a substantial, subsentential 
notion of correspondence given his view of the indeterminacy of reference.3 
Thus, although Sider thinks that his Quinean epistemological story provides 
motivation for the idea of structure itself, reflecting directly on Quine’s method 
seems to call into question any such motivation. To get Sider’s required 
motivation for the new theoretical notion of structure, we need a further 
commitment to a strong correspondence conception of truth.  
Sider considers an epistemological challenge to his concept of structure which 
follows from the primitivism he endorses. (Sider 2011, 11) The challenge 
proceeds as follows: how can we know about structure if we cannot get a 
handle on it in more familiar terms. This challenges our very understanding of 
the concept for if we cannot know any facts about structure, then we cannot 
isolate a theoretical role for it (as it will be cut off from our other concepts). 
Given Sider’s view of how theoretical terms get their meaning, this threatens 
our understanding of the concept itself. At this point, Sider encourages a 
fallibilist epistemology. (Sider 2011, 12) He concedes that this move may be 
resisted by those who think that the subject matter of metaphysics is so far 
removed from our normal fallible epistemic practices. But, to abate this 
concern, he suggests a comparison with mathematics, logic, and particle 
physics, where he claims that in these areas too our contact with them is unlike 
the world of middle sized dry goods. (Sider 2011, 12)  
Sider admits that his epistemological story is “superficial and birds-eye”, but 
claims this is not merely a problem with structure but a wider problem. (Sider 
2011, 15) Sider claims that many metaphysicians view their work as not being 
conceptual archaeology, but rather as being more akin to speculative science. 
(Sider 2011, 72) He seems to think that although epistemological concerns are 
serious matters to be considered, the metaphysician does not need to be any 
more worried than the mathematician or the particle physicist. As I suggested 
at the end of the last section, we might again question whether metaphysics is 
really any worse off than these other theoretical disciplines. In this context, at 
least, I think we have some reason to be sceptical of the comparison. It is not 
                                            
3 For Quine’s discussion of the indeterminacy of reference see Chapter Two of (1960).  
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clear to me that either of these other theoretical enterprises by themselves are 
committed to the sort of fundamental metaphysics Sider endorses. Indeed, 
whether they are such enterprises seems to be precisely what philosophers of 
physics and philosophers of mathematics might argue about. To assume that 
these are joint-carving enterprises, from which we can borrow epistemic 
practices, seems to put the cart before the horse.  
Of course, Sider is fully willing to concede that metaphysics is, in important 
respects, dissimilar from these other disciplines:   
“Some of the metaphysically deepest disputes… are conceptually 
shallow in that they have few implications outside rarefied 
metaphysics.” (Sider 2011, 74)  
He acknowledges that this might give one reason to think that there is 
something odd going on in metaphysical debates. Nonetheless, he is not 
worried about it, and is happy to maintain the comparison between 
metaphysics and other theoretical pursuits. (Sider 2011, 74) However, you 
might think that the above quotation shows that there is a more serious 
disanalogy. Think of a comparison: interpretations of quantum mechanics may 
be rarefied but particular views have consequences (even if it is not always 
clear what the formalism says about what the world is like). The fact that Sider 
acknowledges that some of the metaphysically deepest disputes may have little 
to no consequences outside of metaphysics may give us a reason to resist 
adopting the fallibilist epistemology he recommends, as it isn’t immediately 
obvious what would count as ‘getting it wrong’. 
 
iv. Knee-Jerk Realism 
 
This brings me on to the next topic for discussion: Sider’s realism. Sider tells us 
the following:  
“A certain “knee-jerk realism” is an unargued presupposition is this 
book. Knee-jerk realism is a vague picture rather than a precise thesis. 
According to the picture, the point of human inquiry – or a very large 
 88 
 
chunk of it anyway, the chunk that includes physics – is to conform itself 
to the world, rather than to make the world. The world is “out there”, 
and our job is the wrap our minds around it.” (Sider 2011, 18) 
An interesting thought to entertain regarding this admittedly vague formulation 
of realism, is that it is not clear that this way of thinking about realism can get 
Sider quite what he wants: knee-jerk realism is seemingly compatible with other 
more deflationary conceptions of metaphysical inquiry. For example, Amie 
Thomasson explicitly argues against Sider’s joint-carving project, but she still 
thinks that the world is “out there”. (Thomasson 2015, 296-317) Commitment 
to knee-jerk realism won’t alone get you realism about joint-carving. 
Nonetheless, Sider suggests that a consequence of knee-jerk realism is that “the 
physical description of reality be objectively privileged. And a natural account 
of the privilege is that physical notions carve at the joints.” (Sider 2011:20) It is 
not entirely clear what motivates this jump. Sider acknowledges that going 
realist in this way means the epistemological question then confronts us ‘head 
on’. (Sider 2011, 42) However, Sider further claims that we have a standard 
way of addressing such problems as underdetermination of theory by 
observation: we use our theoretical virtues to adjudicate. I take it then, that 
Sider’s brand of realism and his epistemological story are very tightly 
intertwined.4  
 
v. Unavoidable Metaphysics  
 
The final point to discuss in this section is what Sider thinks about the 
unavoidable nature of metaphysics. For Sider, metametaphysical critiques are 
metaphysical in nature. (Sider 2011, 82) I take the thought to be that in order 
to forward some kind of anti-metaphysical thesis, we need to claim that the 
debate is in some sense nonsubstantive. For Sider, to say of a question that it is 
nonsubstantive, is to say that there are different answers to the question each 
                                            
4 Of course, this invites similar questions to the previous section about the relationship 
between Quine’s and Sider’s project. Even equipped with his preferred epistemological story, 
this still doesn’t seem to be enough to get Sider quite the brand of realism he wants.  
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of which come out true on different interpretations of the salient terms, and no 
candidate interpretation carves at the joint better than any other. (Sider 2011, 
74) Thus the machinery Sider gives us to assess nonsubstantivity is whether or 
not a theory  is cast in joint-carving terms. So, Sider claims, merely reflecting 
on language and reasoning cannot tell us whether a debate is nonsubstantive as 
we actually need to know something about the structure of the world in order 
to claim that a debate is nonsubstantive. He claims:   
“There is no ametaphysical Archimedean point from which to advance 
deflationary metametaphysics, since any such metametaphysics is 
committed to at least this much substantive metaphysics: reality lacks a 
certain sort of structure.” (Sider 2011, vii) 
Sider claims that some of the challenges to metaphysics as an enterprise rest on 
oversimplified conceptions of language or knowledge, and, since they threaten 
the science of unobservables as much as metaphysics, he is not worried about 
them. (Sider 2011, 67) What he takes to be a more serious threat to 
metaphysics comes from what he terms metaphysical deflationism, which 
holds that answers to specific metaphysical questions comes from reflecting on 
linguistic or conceptual rules, rather than facts about “the world”. (Sider 2011, 
67) It isn’t clear that facts about linguistic rules aren’t about the world, but I 
take it that Sider’s claim is rather that facts about linguistics are not 
fundamental. The particular brand of deflationism that Sider seems to have in 
mind is one which holds that for a metaphysically contested sentence, there are 
multiple equally good ways of interpreting the sentence such that we can all 
agree that the sentence is true. (Sider 2011, 68) Sider suggests the following as a 
rough summary of the go-to move for this type of deflationist: “there’s a 
perfectly good way to talk under which S is clearly true”. (Sider 2011, 68)  
Sider notes that the guiding thought behind this move is that meaning is largely 
determined by use. (Sider 2011, 68) So the thought is that there are going to be 
a range of candidate interpretations of the sentence, and the sentence will 
come out true under each interpretation, but that usage does not settle which 
of the interpretations is correct, so the question itself is merely conceptual. 
(Sider 2011, 69) Sider claims that in the case of fundamental metaphysics “the 
most straightforward way to resist deflationism is to claim that the crucial 
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expressions in the debate carve perfectly at the joints”. (Sider 2011, 71) Here 
again, Sider reinforces the idea that the serious metaphysician is not merely 
after truth, but after truth in the right terms. This of course assumes that such 
a metaphysician can help themselves to structure in the first place. However, 
Sider seems to think that if the deflationist has no conception of structure at all 
then, like the attacks on metaphysics above, they are not in a position to make 
a distinction between metaphysics and the science of unobservables. (Sider 
2011, 69) Consequently, we needn’t worry about such critiques.  
The claim that Sider makes is that there is no way out of metaphysics; there is 
no ametaphysical high ground, where we can avoid making distinctly 
metaphysical claims. Sider tells us: we cannot avoid metaphysics. (Sider 2011, 
83) This is not to say that a deflationary position will never be attractive, but 
rather that that is just more grist to the metaphysical mill. If the various 
candidate meanings are all just as good as each other, then the world lacks a 
certain kind of structure. If it didn’t lack this kind of structure, the terms would 
pick out the joint-carving meanings. In order for the deflationist to make their 
case they need to deny some kind of structure. So the options for the anti-
metaphysician are, according to Sider, (1) to deny that there is any sensible 
notion of structure at all, but in so doing preclude a robust view of the science 
of unobservables, or (2) to deny that some particular kind of structure exists, 
but this is still to make a substantive claim about the nature of reality.  
This conception of the options for the anti-metaphysician seems to me to be 
not exhaustive. More precisely, Sider implicitly presents the options of endorsing 
some commitment and rejecting that commitment as being exhaustive. But it 
seems like there is another attitude we can take to that commitment: I can 
refuse to assert it without denying it. This ‘anti-metaphysics’ position is 
epistemic in nature, and opens the possibility of adopting a quietism about 
particular metaphysical debates. It is unfortunate that Sider doesn’t consider 
such a position as it seems like a simple example of how metaphysics can be 
avoided.  
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IV. Language Truth and Metaphysics  
 
With a comprehensive picture of Sider’s project on the table, in this section I 
want to try to elucidate Sider’s views on the role of truth in metaphysics. Much 
of what Sider says about these matters are suggestive, so I will be engaged in 
quite a constructive exegesis. There are two different ways that truth comes 
into the picture on Sider’s view. First there is the role that truth plays in 
connecting the nonfundamental to the fundamental. Second, there is truth as a 
required feature of metaphysical theory. Both of these deployments of the 
concept trade in a conception of truth as correspondence to reality. In this 
section I want to evaluate what motivates both of these deployments and say 
something about the relationship between them.  
 
 
vi. Metaphysical and Linguistic Analysis  
 
In the context of his discussion of toy metaphysical truth conditions, Sider 
comments on the failures of projects of conceptual analysis. He offers the 
following comment:  
“Conceptual analysis is out of fashion in metaphysics, but there is 
uncertainty about what its replacement should be. Reduction? 
Supervenience? Realisation? The proposed replacements have tended 
to be either inadequate or unilluminating (or both). The recent trend is 
to think in terms of a kind of purely metaphysical analysis. There’s a 
bad idea in here mixed in with good one. The bad idea is that we 
should posit a fundamental gizmo for the relationship between 
analysans and analysandum (truthmaking, necessity, fact identity, 
ground). The good idea is Armstrongian: metaphysical analysis is not 
linguistic analysis. But that leaves a big gap: if not linguistic analysis 
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then what? I say: metaphysical truth-conditions – toy models of them 
at any rate.” (Sider 2011, 118) 
Sider notes the tradition in the philosophy of language to view metaphysical 
and linguistic inquiry as tightly constraining each other, and points to Davidson 
as an example of a philosopher who holds that metaphysics is constrained by 
linguistic theory. In particular, a good semantic theory should where possible 
take sentences to be true. Sider suggests that the order of priority should run 
the other way: metaphysics should constrain the philosophy of language. (Sider 
2011, 122) Metaphysical arguments can have a serious impact on how we 
semantically analyse. Sider claims that one advantage of viewing things this way 
is that there can be a looser connection between metaphysics and semantics 
than on Davidson’s account. So, the linguistic semantics can take ordinary 
sentences as true but this needn’t ontologically commit them, as ontology 
concerns fundamental existence. (Sider 2011, 122) Sider is open to the thought 
that human thought and talk can influence metaphysical theorising, but only 
inasmuch as this is because they are real phenomena and so must fit into the 
final metaphysical picture. What Sider does not want is a mere “reading off 
one’s fundamental metaphysics directly from the structure of thought and 
talk”. (Sider 2011, 123) 
We should pause here to think about Sider’s challenge to Davidson. In 
particular, we should question what motivates those who think that 
metaphysics is going to be constrained by linguistic theory. I take the basic and 
central commitment here to be that semantic concepts only earn their keep if 
they play some role in empirical theories, e.g. of behaviour, mind, sociality. 
This requires that there have to be discernible connections between the 
application of these concepts and observable facts. So, in the case of truth, 
truth earns its keep in an empirical theory of communication. Adding the 
concept of truth to our conceptual repertoire makes an explanatory different 
when we are trying to give empirical theories of understanding, 
communication, belief, and interpretation. In particular, we only get a 
respectable notion of truth if it is bound to observable facts about assent. 
Truth is that thing that sentences are held to have when they are asserted or 
believed. If the only way we can motivate a role for truth in theorising 
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simpliciter is through its role in the theory of meaning, then any role that it 
may play in metaphysics is going to need to be accordingly constrained by this 
primary function. If we cut truth off from the linguistic analysis, we render it 
undermotivated at best or unintelligible at worst. If this is the way you are 
thinking about the concept of truth, it is not implausible to hold that switching 
the order of priority would bankrupt truth as an important concept for 
metaphysics.  
Another consideration which should make us question the switching of the 
order of priority that Sider recommends here, is that he doesn’t satisfactorily 
disambiguate the different ways in which linguistic theory may have claim to 
priority. As we saw in the last chapter, there is an important distinction to be 
mindful of when discussing metaphysical method and priority. Just because I 
may have to methodologically proceed from language to world, this does not 
commit me to the view that the language is in anyway metaphysically prior to 
the world.  
A plausible explanation for why Sider rejects the Davidsonian project is that 
Sider is committed to a very different conception of natural language 
semantics. Sider claims that adopting his view of structure can help to answer 
the radical semantic sceptic. He makes two important claims. First that 
reference relations are explanatory relations, and second that explanatory 
relations are joint-carving ones. He takes these two views together to defend a 
reference magnetism response to permutation arguments for radical semantic 
indeterminacy. The thought being that, as reference is an explanatory relation, 
a view of reference determination which allows for crazy permuted models is 
an explanatorily useless view, and as such should be rejected in favour of one 
which gives reference the right kind of explanatory role. (Sider 2011, 28) He 
claims that “reference must have the right sort of basis in the fundamental if 
it’s to be explanatory.” (Sider 2011, 29) Sider concedes that ‘the right sort of 
basis’ requires clarification, but thinks we can see in a clear cut way when the 
wrong sort of basis is present. (Sider 2011, 29)  
So, reference magnetism answers the radical semantic sceptic. This is because 
reference is an explanatory relation and explanatory theories must be stated in 
joint-carving terms. We therefore need structure to answer the radical semantic 
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sceptic. Sider claims that a “more reasonable metasemantics will allow a role 
for a non-observational and externalist determinate of meaning: the world’s 
structure.” (Sider 2011, 42) He claims we can thus reject empiricist conceptions 
of meaning. This perhaps explains why Sider does not helpfully engage with 
why certain kinds of projects think that the theory of meaning constrains 
metaphysics. Sider is theoretically very far away from such empirical semantic 
projects, and thus does not appear to try to understand why, starting from such 
a position, you might think that linguistic analysis is tightly bound to 
metaphysics. That is: because of the role afforded to truth in both enterprises. 
Sider’s claims about the relationship between metaphysics and linguistic 
analysis extend further than his claim that metaphysics may depart from 
projects of linguistic analysis. He doesn’t merely think that we shouldn’t read 
off our metaphysics from the structure of thought and talk, Sider suggests that 
often we should not conduct metaphysics in ordinary language at all. As the 
ordinary language expressions may not carve at the joints, such theorising 
would lead to nonsubstantive debates. In such cases he suggests the following:  
“But we could discard ∃, and enter the metaphysics room, so to speak. 
We could replace the ordinary expression ∃ with an improved 
expression ∃* that we stipulate is to stand for the joint-carving 
meaning in the vicinity. The question we ask in the metaphysics room, 
cast in terms of ∃* rather than ∃, is substantive. Indeed it is superior to 
the original question, for it concerns reality’s fundamental structure, 
rather than its merely conventional or projected aspects.” (Sider 2011, 
74) 
Sider is appropriately sensitive to the fact that even though we have moved 
into a ‘superior’ language for theorising, we need to be able to tell a story about 
how the new terms of the discourse derive their meanings. In ordinary 
language we have a story, perhaps something about use, so when we leave 
ordinary language we need an alternative: 
“Abandoning ordinary language is indeed often a bad idea, but when it 
is, that is because there is no other way to anchor the debate, no other 
way to explain the meanings of the crucial words without trivialising 
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the debate. But joint-carving meanings give us another anchor.” (Sider 
2011, 75) 
So, joint-carving meanings are to give us our required anchor. Sider provides 
us three conditions which must be met in order to legitimately introduce a new 
term. Take a new term ‘Cause*’. This new term “should stand for a meaning 
which i) carves at the joints (perfectly); ii) fits our use of ‘cause’ better than any 
other joint-carving meaning; and iii) fits our use of ‘cause’ well enough”. (Sider 
2011, 76) Sider considers the thought that such successful stipulations are not 
possible; perhaps because reference magmatism is false or some non-referential 
account of meaning is true. Sider thinks that if this were the case then these 
views must nonetheless allow for something like successful stipulation to be 
true in science or else this would be a reductio of the view. (Sider 2011, 76) 
Given that successful stipulation is allowed in science, Sider thinks the case will 
be parallel for metaphysics.  
At this point we might wonder what the relationship is between the already 
discussed metaphysical semantics and Ontologese (the name he gives to our 
new and improved language for metaphysical theorising). In Ontologese, all 
expressions are joint-carving. Likewise, the metalanguage for the metaphysical 
semantics needs to be perfectly joint carving. I therefore take the best 
interpretation of the relationship to be that Ontologese provides the 
metalanguage for the metaphysical semantics. When offering some 
metaphysical truth condition for a sentence pertaining to the realm of 
appearance, the right-hand side of this truth condition is to be stated in 
Ontologese. It may help to work through an example. Take a toy metaphysical 
truth condition like the following:  
            ‘x’ is true iff x* 
The sentence on the left-hand side stands for an ordinary derivative 
representation. The right-hand side stands for a sentence of Ontologese. So if 
we take the left-hand side to be the sentence ‘there used to be dinosaurs’, then, 
if tense is fundamental, the sentence of Ontologese will contain a tense 
operator. Further, truth plays an important explanatory role here in connecting 
the nonfundamental to the fundamental. 
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There is an interesting tension between the different sets of demands placed on 
the metaphysical semantics from a natural language theory of meaning, a 
tension which comes up many time in Sider’s book. On the one hand, given 
what Sider says about how the introduction of new terms in Ontologese is 
constrained to some extent by ordinary usage, then the metalanguage of the 
metaphysical semantics is going to be accordingly constrained. Of course, his 
magnetism picture of reference assignment suggests that there are going to be 
competing metasemantic constraints: naturalness and ordinary usage. But it still 
seems of note that to some extent at least the articulation of metaphysical truth 
conditions is constrained by ordinary usage. Sider also claims that “a 
metaphysical semantics must successfully explain the linguistic behaviour of 
the population in question. (Sider 2011, 114)  
On the other hand, however, Sider is explicit that it is not important for 
metaphysical theory and linguistic theory to “neatly mesh”. (Sider 2011, viii) I 
take the thought to be that the fundamental metaphysics underlying a 
discourse might have a structure that is very different from that suggested by 
the discourse, so sometimes our introduced terms will not have a close cousin 
in ordinary English. Another comment that Sider makes on the separation of 
natural language semantics from metaphysical semantics is that one traditional 
problem for semantics that the metaphysical semanticist need not concern 
herself with is that of Frege’s puzzles about belief. (Sider 2011, 11) 
It is initially challenging to see how these two sets of commitments fit together. 
The metaphysical semantics is such that it is both constrained by existing 
language use and semantic knowledge, but also it does not have to be able to 
explain certain semantic puzzles or perfectly map into natural language 
semantics. I suspect that some of the previous discussion about the 
requirements of cognitive transparency for the metaphysical semantics may 
help here. In what sense does the metaphysical semantics need to explain 
linguistic behaviour? Sider is not maximally perspicuous about what he intends, 
so I suggest that the best way to think about it is as the claim that although the 
metaphysical truth conditions need not be cognitively transparent, they are 
nonetheless constrained by established patterns of dissent and assent.  
 
 97 
 
vii. The Role of Truth in Metaphysics  
 
We saw that one of the central mechanisms of Sider’s fundamentality story is 
that of metaphysical truth conditions, and in the previous section I attempted 
to elucidate this notion, and explain how it relates to linguistic analysis. We saw 
how truth plays a role in connecting the nonfundamental with the 
fundamental. In this section I want to unpack quite what this concept of truth 
is, and what enables it to play the role that it does in Sider’s framework. 
Although Sider does not dedicate much space to the explicit discussion of 
truth, when he does talk about it, it is often in terms of the truth of a whole 
theory. I take it that the relationship between these two deployments of the 
concept is the following: the metaphysical truth conditions which are satisfied 
collectively compose the metaphysical theory.  
When introducing the notion of structure in the first section, I drew attention 
to Sider’s claim that “for a representation to be fully successful, truth is not 
enough; the representation must also use the right concepts, so that its 
conceptual structure matches reality’s structure.” (Sider 2011, vii)5 We are to 
understand the ‘betterness’ of some representations over others not in terms of 
truth, which we take for granted that we want from a representation, but in 
terms of joint-carving terms. (Sider 2011, 19) Sider’s most salient and repeated 
claim about the role that truth plays in metaphysics is the following:  
“What we care about is truth in joint-carving terms, not just truth.” 
(Sider 2011, 63) 
What should we make of this claim? Sider suggests that good scientific theories 
must be cast in joint-carving terms. He suggests that a useful way of 
understanding this is in terms of explanation: “theories based on bizarre, non-
joint-carving classifications are unexplanatory even when true.” (my italics, Sider 
2011, 23)6 What I take to be salient about this is that truth just isn’t the primary 
                                            
5 Of course, I previously cautioned we need to the wary of this talk of mirroring or matching. 
6 There is another salient question here about quite what role explanation is playing in Sider’s 
framework. We might wonder why something being explanatory carries any deep metaphysical 
significance. It seems that the important metaphysical question is what the telling discourse is. 
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notion of concern in metaphysics; truth is still required, but we need more than 
that. One interesting thing about this is that it takes the concept of truth itself 
as a given, and then builds on top of it.  
However, we might wonder why Sider is permitted to do this. What gets us the 
concept of truth in the first place? I conjecture that the most natural way to 
think about Sider’s conception of truth is something akin to Putnam’s 
suggestion in the early papers of Meaning and the Moral Sciences. We have a fairly 
minimal, Tarskian view of the truth predicate, which we then situate in a story 
about science and success. We then get a picture where truth has the formal 
properties we want, but is fit to play a role in realist scientific theory and 
explanation. So we have an empirical conception of truth and then we project 
this notion we get from the empirical project onto this metaphysical one. Sider 
certainly takes truth to be an explanatory relation, however, he is not explicit 
about whether it is explanatory in this Putnamian sense. Nonetheless, I think 
such a commitment is in the background. It seems to me the most expedient 
way to get him a scientifically respectable notion of correspondence.  
From here, we should now question how should we understand Sider’s talk 
that ‘truth isn’t enough’? It is clear that in addition to truth Sider also wants 
joint-carving. It seems like there could be two different ways of understanding 
this dual requirement. First, perhaps there is some kind of truth pluralism in 
the background: there are multiple concepts of truth (or perhaps one concept, 
but multiple properties) and Sider is then specifying that the concept/property  
he wants is a joint-carving one. Second, perhaps there is a fairly minimal 
conception of truth, and then Sider wants to place certain joint-carving 
restrictions on the statement of the truth conditions. However, we might worry 
that this kind of requirement on truth does not sit well with the Putnamian 
empirical conception of truth I previous suggested. It doesn’t prima facie seem 
like Putnam’s arguments in Meaning and the Moral Sciences will motivate the fine-
                                                                                                               
Sider’s answer seems to be that the most explanatory discourse is the telling discourse. What 
does Sider have to say to someone who maintains that explanation has to do with mode of 
presentation, not worldly stuff? For some interesting discussion of the non-objectivity of 
explanation, see Thompson (2016). 
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grained correspondence relation that Sider wants, and the kind of metaphysical 
restrictions he wants to place on the specification of the truth conditions. 
Perhaps then my suggestion that we should understand Sider’s conception of 
truth in (early) Putnamian terms, was too quick. However, given that he does 
not offer any comment on how he is thinking about it himself, and if the 
Putnamian view is not up to the theoretical task that Sider assigns it, what are 
his alternatives?  
The most promising place to look for an alternative conception of truth which 
is compatible with placing such restriction on the specification of the right-
hand side of truth condition comes in his discussion of substantivity. This 
contains his most explicit discussion of truth. Sider makes a case for 
understanding notions of substantivity, conventionality, and subjectivity in 
terms of joint carving. He claims that understanding the nature of the 
connections between these concepts can be understood as uniting under a 
single thesis about epistemic value: “it’s better to think and speak in joint-
carving terms”. (Sider 2011, 61) The reason for this rests on a very general 
claim about the nature of inquiry. Sider claims that the goal of inquiry isn’t 
simply to believe true things, but rather to have the content of one’s beliefs 
reflect the structure of the world. He claims that “wielders of non-joint-carving 
concepts are worse inquirers”. (Sider 2011, 61) This isn’t merely a claim about 
the practical value of joint-carving beliefs; Sider thinks that it is a constitutive 
aim of belief, along with truth. (Sider 2011, 61) That belief has this aim does 
not have to be acknowledged by all the members of an epistemic community, 
but it is the standard by which belief should be evaluated nonetheless. (Sider 
2011, 61)  
What reason do we have to posit this extra norm of belief? Sider gives two 
reasons. First, he claims that, like truth, beliefs aim to conform to the world. 
(Sider 2011, 62) Second, Sider takes scientific inquiry as a paradigm of good 
inquiry because it is conducted in joint-carving terms. (Sider 2011, 61) Sider 
motivates these two claims by considering the alternative. He claims that: 
“If there is no sense in which the physical truths are objectively better 
than the scrambled truths, beyond the fact that they are propositions 
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that we have happened to have expressed, then the postmodernist 
forces of darkness have won.” (Sider 2011, 65) 
Rhetoric aside, it seems that Sider’s thought here is that if we only have truth, 
but not the special joint-carving kind, we may as well give up on the whole 
metaphysical enterprise (or perhaps inquiry tout court). That is, if we have 
truth but no joint-carving, this “diminishes the value of truth.” (Sider 2011, 62)  
We might wonder what to make of this. Sider doesn’t really tell us anything 
about the concept of truth, apart from the fact that it is correspondence. If you 
started out sceptical of philosophers helping themselves to a conception of 
truth as correspondence to reality, Sider doesn’t provide anything to assuage 
those concerns. What he does try and do is motivate the idea of truth in joint 
carving terms. He does this by grappling with some fundamental issues about 
the general purpose of inquiry. In order for a metaphysical theory to be 
legitimate it must be both true and articulated in joint carving terms. The 
reason for this is because the epistemic, and perhaps practical, value of theories 
which are both true and joint carving are greater than any rivals. However, if 
I’m thinking about the demands of inquiry and about truth, I’d be inclined to 
think that what grounds the epistemic and practical value of such theories is 
that they increase success. I’ve already suggested that a Putnamian empirical 
conception of truth won’t get you Sider’s joint carving restriction on truth, and 
it isn’t obvious that there is a notion which could satisfy all the demands he 
places on it.  
It should be clear that truth does play an important role for Sider, but that not 
any old conception of truth will do. I have claimed that it is a conception of 
truth where there are restrictions placed on the specification of the truth 
conditions. The theoretical task is to then articulate what motivates this 
conception. I conclude this chapter claiming that Sider has not adequately met 
that task. Truth is required to play a role in Sider’s project that it is not obvious 
that it can play. And this should be worrying, given the central role assigned to 
truth via the metaphysical semantics. Sider dedicates a lot of time and care to 
motivate the concept of structure. However, the lack of similar motivation for 
the concept of truth renders his approach incomplete. Where does this leave 
us? Either with a central part of Sider’s picture remaining worryingly opaque 
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and unmotivated, or perhaps with some kind of background commitment to a 
rationalist conception of truth which, without argument, seems equally 
unmotivated.  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have shown that Sider presents a robustly realist conception 
of metaphysics, where the epistemological status of the enterprise of 
metaphysics should be seen as on par with that of natural science. I have 
argued that truth play a significant role in Sider’s proposed method for 
metaphysics, first, via the role that truth plays in connecting the 
nonfundamental to the fundamental, and second, via the idea of truth as a 
required feature of metaphysical theory. I concluded that Sider insufficiently 
motivates these roles for truth and thus a central part of Sider’s project is 
worryingly opaque. In a similar spirit to the conclusion of the previous chapter, 
the important take away from this chapter is that if we propose to make use of 
the concept of truth in a metaphysical framework then we must have a story to 
tell about what legitimises this use. 
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Chapter Four: Donald Davidson, and Semantic 
and Ontological Indeterminacy  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically evaluate Donald Davidson’s 
conception of the role of truth in metaphysics, and the status of the 
consequent metaphysical inquiry.1 Davidson’s project presents an interesting 
case study. A semantic conception of truth is his central theoretical notion, 
which earns its keep through the role it plays in the theory of meaning. 
Metaphysical commitments are generated when the true sentences of the 
language are analysed to reveal quantificational structure. Davidson’s project 
bears many similarities to Lewis’s project: a necessary prerequisite to 
metaphysics is the analysis of language. However, unlike Lewis, Davidson is 
not committed to the view that there is subsentential semantic determinacy, 
and this has a rather radical impact upon the status of the metaphysical 
enterprise. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline Davidson’s theory of meaning 
(§II). This has two distinct components. I address the role of truth in the 
theory of meaning, and the project of radical interpretation, focussing on how 
the methodological presuppositions of radical interpretation introduce some 
notion of correspondence. Second, I construct a picture of Davidson’s 
metaontological views (§III). Again, this has two dimensions. I present his 
explicit views on the proper methodology of metaphysics, and then I show 
how Davidson, like Quine, is committed to ontological relativity. Third, given 
the previous discussion, I evaluate the conception of metaphysics with which 
Davidson’s project leaves us (§IV). As a means of evaluating Davidson’s 
                                            
1 The discussion of Davidson in this chapter is restricted to his early (pre-1980s) work.  
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project with respect to the themes of this thesis, I first contrast Davidson’s 
project with Lewis’s. Whilst there are many commonalities, their respective 
views of the status of metaphysics are very different. I argue that the reason for 
this is that Davidson’s revisionary views about the determinacy of 
interpretation invite a certain kind of structuralism about the content of 
metaphysical theories. Having established a robust role for truth in 
metaphysics, and a ‘language-first’ approach to metaphysical inquiry, 
Davidson’s project demonstrates how the status of this metaphysical project 
can be transformed depending on claims made about other semantic concepts. 
  
II. Truth, Meaning, and Interpretation  
 
i. The Theory of Truth and the Theory of Meaning 
 
In this section I first need to identify the scope of and constraints on 
Davidson’s theory of meaning. Davidson holds that the primary aim of the 
philosophy of language it to understand natural language. (Davidson 1973a, 71) 
Davidson wants to offer a descriptive semantics for natural language. The aim 
of the theory of meaning is to be able to pair speaker’s utterances with what 
they mean, in such a way that the meaning of complex expressions are 
composed out of the meaning of the simpler ones. The project is descriptive in 
that Davidson does not think that: “the task for a theory of meaning as I 
conceive it is not to change, improve, or reform a language, but to describe and 
understand it.” (Davidson 1967, 29)  
Davidson takes it as condition on the acceptability of any candidate theory of 
meaning that it should be able to naturalistically explain how language is 
learnable. That is: how language speakers can understand complex statements 
given the apparent poverty of the empirical data to which they are exposed.  
Whilst Davidson thinks we should construct the theory of meaning in a way 
that starts from these reflections about learnability, Davidson does not think it 
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is appropriate to allow purely a priori considerations dictate our theories of 
language learning. (Davidson 1965, 3) How language is actually acquired 
Davidson rightly considers a matter for empirical study. However, he does 
think that philosophers are entitled to consider the conceptual matter of what 
gets to count as ‘knowing a language’. (Davidson 1965, 7-8) Thus his 
arguments are intended to provide a framework for describing what language 
must be like if it is to be learnable, whilst leaving the actual process open for 
discovery by empirical linguists. In separating the empirical question from the 
conceptual one he is effectively demarcating what he sees as the limits of the 
empirical. (Davidson 1965, 3) A presupposition of this type of empirically 
orientated project is that Davidson does not think it is permissible to assume 
any sort of semantic knowledge of the sort we are trying to explain. 
The primary consequence of this is that the semantic theory must be 
compositional. Language speakers are in principle able to understand 
indefinitely many sentences, but they only have finite cognitive capabilities and 
experience. Davidson holds that the best explanation for this is that language 
must have a recursive structure. So, the theory of meaning must account for 
the meaning of every sentence of the language by analysing it as composed “in 
truth relevant ways, of elements drawn form a finite stock”. (Davidson 1970, 
56) Davidson thinks that the best way to account for compositionality is to 
give an analysis of language structure, and that the best way to analyse structure 
is by offering a theory of truth:  
“I suggest that a theory of truth for a language does, in a minimal but 
important respect, do what we want, that is, give the meanings of all 
independently meaningful expression on the basis of an analysis of 
their structure.” (Davidson 1970, 55)  
For Davidson, giving an account of compositionality does not then mean 
giving an account of the individual meanings of all expressions of the language. 
He claims that we should not think that individual words have meaning in any 
sense that transcends the fact that they have a systematic effect on the 
meanings of the sentences in which they occur. (Davidson 1967, 18) What 
Davidson wants to avoid is the view that an adequate theory of meaning must 
find entities to serve as the meanings of all the expressions in a language. 
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(Davidson 1970, 61) There are two motivations for this. First, Davidson thinks 
that any such entities are explanatorily superfluous, in that giving adequate 
rules for combination provides a sufficient basis for compositionality. He 
claims that this is done by offering a definition of truth in a language: “A 
theory of meaning for a language L shoes ‘how the meanings of the sentences 
depend on the meanings of words’ if it contains a (recursive) definition of 
truth-in-L.” (Davidson 1967, 23) The second motivation is more 
methodological. In the spirit of an empirical semantics project, Davidson 
wants to situate the theory of meaning as closely aligned with an epistemology 
of linguistic understanding, and he doesn’t think that making sense of how a 
community of language users interpret and understand one another requires 
recourse to an ontology of intensional entities.  
Having outlined Davidson’s aims and constrains on the theory of meaning, I 
now want to outline his positive proposal. The task for Davidson is to provide 
a semantic theory which is compositional and does not require antecedent 
understanding of semantic notions. So how does the Davidsonian project 
proceed? Davidson wants to take a semantic concept of truth and use it to 
“throw light on meaning, interpretation, and translation.” (Davidson 1977a, 
204) So what kind of theory of truth does Davidson have in mind? He tells us:  
“By a theory of truth, I mean a theory that satisfies something like 
Tarski’s Convention T: it is a theory that by recursively characterising a 
truth predicate (say ‘is true in L’) entails, for each sentence of L, a 
metalinguistic sentence got from the form ‘s is true in L if and only if p’ 
when ‘s’ is replaced by a canonical description of a sentence of L and 
‘p’ by a sentence of the metalanguage that gives the truth conditions of 
the described sentence. The theory must be relativized to a time and a 
speaker (at least) to handle indexical expressions. Nevertheless I shall 
call such theories absolute to distinguish them from theories that (also) 
relativize truth to an interpretation, a model, a possible world, or a 
domain. In a theory of the sort I am describing, the truth predicate is 
not defined, but must be considered a primitive expression.” 
(Davidson 1977b, 215-216) 
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A couple of comments on the notion of truth at work here is required. First, 
Davidson says that his theory is concerned with an absolute notion of truth, 
and indeed that this is the notion with which philosophers of language should 
be concerned. (Davidson 1973a, 69) He claims that those philosophers of 
language who aim to characterise a relativised concept of truth (e.g. T in a 
model, possible world, interpretation, etc.) are engaged in a different project. 
(Davidson 1973a, 68) The reason for this is that model theoretic accounts need 
to be able to take the intended model as a primitive of the theory, which 
imports the kind of semantic machinery to which Davidson doesn’t think we 
should help ourselves. By contrast, Davidson’s preferred satisfaction theoretic 
account takes truth to be satisfaction in all sequences, and so does not need to 
relativise truth to an intended model. Saying this, however, he wants to allow 
that Convention T may be partly relativised if it is to be applicable to natural 
language. (Davidson 1970, 58) Truth in a given language is “a relation between 
sentences, speakers, and dates.” (Davidson 1969, 43) So whilst he wants an 
absolute notion of truth, which is characterised with only resources from the 
sentences of the language itself, he allows that, when applied to natural 
language, truth must be relativised to a speaker and a time. He maintains, 
however, that this notion of relativised truth differs from truth in a model, as 
the verification instances of the T-sentences "remains respectably empirical”. 
(Davidson 1973a, 75) 
The second significant thing of note about this semantic conception of truth, is 
that a semantic theory of truth is not a metaphysical theory of truth. Unlike a 
correspondence theory, which defines truth as a robust relation between 
representational stuff on one side and worldly stuff on the other, the semantic 
theory of truth does not tell us what truth is. Rather, it characterises a predicate 
which applies to a sentence in a language (true-in-L) just in case the truth 
conditions of a sentence in L depend upon the sentence’s structure and the 
properties of its component parts. That is: a semantic theory of truth shows us 
how to generate for any sentence of a language, a T-sentence:  
 (T)  ‘S’ is true iff P 
So how do we get a theory of meaning out of this? Davidson thinks that 
understanding a language consists in knowing what it is for a sentence to be 
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true. (Davidson 1967, 24) Whilst truth conditions are not the same things as 
meanings, Davidson thinks that by giving the truth conditions of a sentence we 
give its meaning. (Davidson 1970, 56) The type of truth conditions that 
Davidson is after are not theoretically complex. He holds that the T-sentence 
must state “the truth conditions of a sentence using resources no richer than… 
those of the sentence itself.” (Davidson 1973b, 132) Thus, unless the original 
sentence mentions possible worlds, intensional entities, properties, or 
propositions, the statement of its truth conditions should not. Given that we 
antecedently understand the concept of truth, Davidson’s proposal is that we 
use this understanding to give the meaning theory. So, instead of something of 
the form: 
 (M) ‘S’ means that P 
We rather have: 
 (T) ‘S’ is true iff P 
Where ‘S’ is a sentence of the object language, and P is a sentence of the 
metalanguage. So, to substitute in a sentence of English:  
 (T1) ‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white 
To see how this adequately gives the meaning of ‘S’ it helps to consider a 
heterophonic case, where the object language and the metalanguage are 
different. So: 
(T2) ‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true iff snow is white 
Two comments on this proposal are required. First, I claimed above that 
Davidson takes the primary constraint on a theory of meaning to be 
compositionality. We therefore require a theory where the meaning of whole 
sentences is dependent on the parts that make it up. Davidson makes good on 
this constraint because the Tarskian conception of truth employs a notion 
called satisfaction. Satisfaction is a recursive concept which stands to open 
sentences as truth stands to closed sentences, in that the satisfaction conditions 
of complex sentences depend on the satisfaction conditions on simpler 
sentences.  
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Second, Davidson thinks that it is important that we have some way of relating 
expressions of the language to things in the world in a way that “yields 
acceptable results with respect to the truth conditions of sentences.” 
(Davidson 1977b, 224) He thinks that the relations between names and 
predicates and objects are given content indirectly when the T-sentences are 
given. (Davidson 1977b, 223) Thus whilst our semantic theory may use terms 
like ‘refers’, we should not take this mere theoretical posit to be doing any 
important empirical explanatory work. As long as we have some way of 
relating language to the world (and he thinks this will be in terms of the T-
sentences) we have retrieved everything that we want from the notion of 
reference without introducing some kind of external semantically special 
relation. One of his motivations for this is that he thinks it is required for an 
empirically respectable theory. He thinks that we should account for the 
meanings of expressions not by trying to find referents for the individual 
words, but rather by considering the role played by the expressions in the 
whole language. (Davidson 1977b, 225) 
The test of adequacy for the theory of meaning is then that it must be able to 
provide a T-sentence for every sentence of the language. (1969:46, 1973b:132) 
That is: for each sentence of the language we must generate a sentence which 
offers a statement of the condition under which the sentence is true. Davidson 
takes it that empirical verification of the meaning theory is a matter of 
demonstrating that the T-sentences are true. (1973b:133) This is therefore a 
holistic conception of linguistic understanding: the unit of empirical 
significance is the whole meaning theory.  
 
ii. Radical Interpretation  
 
In the last section I outlined the structure for Davidson’s theory of meaning. A 
requirement of the theory of meaning for Davidson isn’t merely that we can 
discern which expressions are meaningful, but that we can, for any arbitrary 
sentence of the language, determine what that sentence means. Davidson’s 
project of radical interpretation is an attempt to offer an account of this sort of 
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linguistic meaning in a language. In this section I outline Davidson’s project of 
radical interpretation, and highlight two significant consequences of the 
project.  
The challenge of radical interpretation is that we cannot determine the 
meaning of speaker utterances if we do not know what speakers believe, but in 
order to identify belief contents we need to presuppose a theory of meaning. 
The radical interpreter addresses this challenge by providing a theory of 
meaning and a theory of belief at the same time. A methodological assumption 
on the behalf of the interpreter is the principle of charity. Davidson claims that 
speakers hold “a sentence to be true because of what the sentence (in his 
language) means, and because of what he believes.” (Davidson 1973b, 134) 
Charity can roughly be thought of a commitment to two further principles: 
coherence and correspondence. Coherence holds that when we are interpreting 
speakers of an alien language we should take them to reason in accordance 
with classical logical laws. Correspondence says that the interpreter should take 
there to be a relationship between the beliefs and utterances of speakers of a 
language and their environment. What these two principles amount to is that 
attributions of belief and assignments of meaning must be both consistent with 
one another and with the speaker's behaviour, and they must also be consistent 
with the evidence afforded by our knowledge of the speaker's environment. 
Davidson claims that if the interpreter cannot find a way of interpreting 
utterances in such a way as to reveal “a set of beliefs largely consistent and true 
by our own standards, then they have no reason to count that creature as 
rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything.” (Davidson 1973b, 137)  
An empirically adequate theory of meaning must generate a T-sentence for 
every sentence of the object language, whilst respecting the principle of charity. 
Radical interpretation then proceeds by holding belief fixed to work out 
meaning. (Davidson 1973b, 137) A toy example of the how radical 
interpretation might proceed is as follows. First the interpreter begins with 
observations such as:  
(1) x belongs to a community of speakers of a common language, K, 
and she holds “Gavagai!” true on Saturday at noon, and there is a 
rabbit visible to x on Saturday at noon,  
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By observing K-speakers’ verbal behaviour, the interpreter gathers more 
evidence and infers that 
(2) If x is a K-speaker, then x holds “Gavagai!” true at t if and only if 
there is a rabbit visible to x at t. 
Having gathered an adequate sample of instances of K-speakers holding 
“Gavagai” true when and only when rabbits cross their paths, the interpreter 
takes (2) to be confirmed. In turn, then, the interpreter takes (2) as evidence 
that (partly) confirms the following T-sentence of a Tarski-style truth theory 
for K: 
(3) “Gavagai!” is true when spoken by x at t if and only if there is a 
rabbit visible to x at t. 
The interpreter continues adjusting this biconditional in light of new data, 
aiming to maximise agreement, whilst constrained by the formal requirements 
of the theory of meaning. Davidson takes this maximisation of agreement as a 
legitimate method as he thinks that we cannot attribute mass error or else we 
risk “depriving the subject of his subject matter.” (Davidson 1977a, 200) 
Whilst the interpreter cannot attribute mass error, they will need to make 
allowances for explicable error or else run the risk of interpreting a speaker as 
only having true beliefs. Therefore, adjusting (3) consists in part in admitting 
that x may have some false beliefs, where the explanation for this may invoke 
environmental factors.  
This invites a comment on two important things to note about this project and 
its set up. First, because of the methodological presuppositions for radical 
interpretation, we can, if we like, talk about the content of belief or sentences 
as corresponding to the way the world is. Built into the principle of charity was 
the claim that there is a relationship between the content of beliefs and 
utterances and the speakers’ environment. Thus, in negotiating an 
interpretation to make allowances for explicable error, the interpreter will bring 
in environmental factors as explanans. This is absolutely not to say that 
Davidson offers a correspondence theory of truth. Rather, the position is that 
when we use the theory of truth to give the theory of meaning (in a 
Davidsonian style) and we are engaged in a radical interpretation project, a 
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result of these commitments is that there is a correspondence between the 
content of our utterances and the worldly things they are about. The 
motivation here is not hefty metaphysical considerations to do with the nature 
of truth, but rather naturalistically respectable constraints on the theory of 
interpretation.  
A second point to note, that will become important in the next section, is that 
Davidson does not think it necessary to construct a theory of meaning which 
totally eliminates indeterminacy. He thinks that there can be a serviceable 
theory which does not uniquely pick out a best interpretation of speakers 
utterances. (Davidson 1974, 284) However, although he does not think we will 
always be able to identify a unique interpretation, he does not seem worried 
that this will lead to unacceptable indeterminacy. (Davidson 1977b, 224) I 
address whether Davidson’s optimism about the acceptability of indeterminacy 
is well placed below.  
 
III. Davidsonian Metaontology  
 
iii. Reference and Ontology  
 
In this section I offer a reconstruction of Davidson’s approach to metaphysics. 
Davidson is explicit in several places about his view on the proper method of 
metaphysics. Whilst Davidson’s views on truth, meaning, and first-order 
metaphysics (e.g. the metaphysics of action) have generated a large amount of 
secondary literature, there is little discussion of his metaontological views. In 
addition to helping forward the overall goal of this chapter, then, this section 
helps to fill a lacuna in the commentary on Davidson’s work.  
Davidson’s views on the nature and method of metaphysical inquiry are 
inseparable from his views of truth and language. The background motivation 
for this view is that “successful communication proves the existence of a 
shared, and largely true, view of the world.” (Davidson 1977a, 201) The central 
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notion at the work in Davidson’s view of metaphysics is that of truth. He tells 
us that to say of a statement that it is true, is to say that is it true to the facts, 
where this is to be explained by means of an “appeal to a relation between 
language and the world”. (Davidson 1969, 37-38) He claims that: 
“Statements are true or false because of the words used in making 
them, and it is words that have interesting, detailed, conventional 
connections with the world. Any serious theory of truth must therefore 
deal with these connections, and it is here if anywhere that the notion 
of correspondence can find some purchase.” (Davidson 1969, 43) 
This talk of correspondence is not to be explicated in terms of reference. 
Davidson explicitly eschews talk of reference, but does not think that his 
rejection of reference is to dispense with ontology: “doing without reference is 
not at all to embrace a policy of doing without semantics or ontology.” 
(Davidson 1977b, 223) Thus although he thinks that we do not need a notion 
of reference, there is room for a notion of correspondence, and he thinks that 
Tarski’s semantic conception of truth can serves this purpose “because of the 
part played by the concept of satisfaction.” (Davidson 1969, 48) He holds that 
the role played by ‘corresponds to’ and ‘satisfies’, although not identical, serves 
his metaphysical purposes as they both express a relation between language 
and the world, and both are equivalent to ‘s is true’ when s is a (closed) 
sentence. (Davidson 1969, 48) Davidson claims that “in explaining truth in 
terms of satisfaction, all the conceptual resources of the language in relation to 
its ontology are brought to bear.” (Davidson 1969, 49)  
The positive proposal for how we should prosecute answering metaphysical 
questions is that we should proceed by a systematic study of language. 
Davidson tells us that: 
 “One way of pursuing metaphysics is therefore to study the general 
structure of our language.” (Davidson 1977a, 199)  
The proposal is then that we should attend to the logical structure of the 
sentences about entities rather than attending to the entities themselves. How 
does this work? First, Davidson tells us that if we want to derive metaphysical 
conclusions from the theory of truth, our approach to language must be 
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holistic. (Davidson 1977a, 203) We must attend to what is required for a 
sentence of the language to be true but we need to do this for the whole 
language, not in a piecemeal way which proceeds sentence by sentence. 
Davidson’s strong metaphysical claim is that “if the truth conditions of 
sentences are placed in the context of a comprehensive theory, the linguistic 
structure that emerges will reflect large features of reality.” (Davidson 1977a, 
201) We arrive at specific ontological commitments when the structure 
exposed is quantificational. That is: when the truth conditional analysis requires 
quantifiers and domains of quantification which include entities. If the 
sentences are true, then we are ontologically committed to the entities in 
question. (Davidson 1977a, 210)  
This bears an interesting similarity to Sider’s view of how ontological inquiry 
should proceed. There are of course differences, which I want to quickly 
highlight. Although they both think that a thoroughgoing analysis of the 
structure of language is the best method for deriving our metaphysical 
commitments, Sider is interested in the fundamental commitments. Sider is in a 
position to make this distinction between the superficial commitments and the 
fundamental ones as he thinks that when doing metaphysics we should not be 
analysing ordinary language, but rather pursuing inquiry in a precise language 
of metaphysics. Here, then, is the most significant difference between Sider 
and Davidson’s proposals. Davidson is urging that the language that we need 
to analyse is the natural language of communities of language users. As we saw 
above, how he motivates the notion of correspondence is by considerations to 
do with the interpretation of the utterances of linguistic communities. In one 
sense then, Davidson is actually making a stronger claim than Sider about the 
relationship between the analysis of language and metaphysics: it is the 
language that we all actually speak from which we derive our metaphysical 
commitments, whereas Sider holds that if we are to work out our metaphysical 
commitments from language, we need to move our focus from natural 
language to a metaphysical language.  
Davidson does not think that his proposed method will settle all matters of 
metaphysical interest. He claims that the: 
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“Merit of the method of truth is not that it settles such matters once 
and for all, or even it settles them without further metaphysical 
reflection. But the method does serve to sharpen our sense of viable 
alternatives, and gives a comprehensive idea of the consequences of a 
decision.” (Davidson 1977a, 214)  
When discussing the abstract issues of the methodology of metaphysics 
Davidson does not give much indication of how the ‘further metaphysical 
reflection’ should be understood. However, if we consider his first-order 
metaphysical theorising, I suggest that the further metaphysical reflection does 
not consist in an independent metaphysical method. Instead, this will consist in 
reflecting on which statements we should accept as true (where this enterprise 
is continuous with the natural sciences), and on the proper method for 
analysing those statements.  
 
iv. Semantic Indeterminacy and Ontology Relativity  
 
Davidson wants his theory of meaning to be empirically respectable. The T-
sentences are the empirical testable consequences of the theory of meaning, so 
if his theory of meaning is going to have empirical verification, it is purely in 
virtue of the verification of the T-sentences. Verification of the T-sentences 
(sentences such as “‘snow is white’ is true iff snow is white”) happens when 
there is mutual agreement of a linguistic community. Any foundational 
semantic machinery only gets verification inasmuch as the T-sentences do. For 
example, he tells us that, “meanings of words, reference, and satisfaction are 
posits we need to implement a theory of truth. They serve this purpose 
without needing independent confirmation or empirical basis.” (Davidson 
1977b, 222) 
An interpretation of language must be an interpretation of the whole language, 
and that interpretation gets verified only in so far as the T-sentences are. 
Davidson does not think that the constraints that we place on interpretation 
are sufficient for generating a best interpretation of the language. (Davidson 
1974, 284) However, although he does not think we will always be able to hit 
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on a unique interpretation, he does not seem worried that this will lead to 
unacceptable indeterminacy:  
“I do not for a moment imagine that such uniqueness would emerge. 
But I do think that reasonable empirical constraints on the 
interpretation of T-sentences (the condition under which we find them 
true), plus formal constraints, will leave enough invariant as between 
theories to allow us to say that a theory of truth captures the essential 
role of each sentence.” (Davidson 1977b, 224) 
Whilst Davidson does not appear to be concerned about the lack of 
uniqueness of interpretation, I will show in this section that Davidson’s brand 
of indeterminacy, coupled with his view of how we generate ontological 
commitments, entail that he is committed to a type of Quinean ontological 
relativity. Davidson often acknowledges his philosophical debt to Quine. So, to 
understand Davidson’s brand of indeterminacy, I first must outline the 
Quinean brand of indeterminacy.  
In Quine’s ‘Ontological Relativity’ a certain conception of meaning comes 
under attack. It is one according to which “Uncritical semantics is the myth of 
a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the words are labels”. 
(Quine 1969, 27) Quine’s claim is not merely an epistemic thesis that we 
cannot know what our words refer to, but rather the stronger claim that there 
is no fact of the matter about what our words refer to. (Quine 1969, 47) Quine 
writes: 
“When. . . we turn toward a naturalistic view of language and a 
behavioral view of meaning, what we give up is not just the museum of 
figure of speech. We give up an assurance of determinacy. Seen 
according to the museum myth, the words and sentences of a language 
have their determinate meanings... For naturalism the question whether 
two expressions are alike or unlike in meaning has no determinate 
answer, known or unknown, except insofar as the answer is settled in 
principle by people's speech dispositions, known, or unknown. If by 
these standards there are indeterminate cases, so much the worse for 
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the terminology of meaning and likeness of meaning.” (Quine 1969, 
28-29)  
To arrive at his conclusion Quine relies on the radical translator we meet in 
Word and Object. (1960) Quine invites us to consider how, starting from a 
position where we have only non-semantic evidence, we might come to know 
what the expressions of a given language mean.  The radical translator’s job is 
to translate the language L of a distant linguistic community, whose history she 
knows nothing at all about, and whose linguistic practices and conventions 
may, for all she knows, be very different from hers, into her native language.  
The radical translator thus starts off from a point of complete ignorance about 
the community and its language.  Since there are infinitely many expressions of 
L, she cannot specify them individually, but will have to provide (i) a 
translation manual which assigns meanings to each of the atomic parts of the 
language, together with (ii) a set of compositional semantic rules, that show 
how the meaning of complex expressions can be computed on the basis of 
their structure, and the meaning of their component parts.   
The translator encounters a problem. That is: “a whole rabbit is present when 
and only when an undetached part of a rabbit is present; also when and only 
when a temporal stage of a rabbit is present.” (Quine 1960, 30) So, when the 
translator tries to translate ‘gavagai’, she has a number of eligible candidate 
translations available. There is no way to tell the candidate translations apart by 
ostension; there is no way to tell, purely on the basis of observing overt 
behaviour, how the alien language speaker is individuating. We may well prefer 
one interpretation over another, but this decision is purely at the level of 
pragmatics: “the maxim is [her] own imposition, toward settling what is 
objectively indeterminate. It is a very sensible imposition, and I would 
recommend no other. But I am making a philosophical point.” (Quine 1960, 
34) 
The moral to be learned from Quine’s radical translator is that we can’t talk 
about the absolute translation of an expression.  Relative to one translation 
manual ‘gavagai’ means ‘rabbit’, relative to another ‘gavagai’ means ‘undetached 
rabbit parts’. There is no further fact which makes it the case that one or 
another of these translations is really getting it right. The only sort of facts that 
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could be the constitutive facts about meaning do not exist. The point Quine is 
trying to make is not about translation, but rather that viewed correctly our 
words are just as indeterminate as those of the alien linguistic community: 
“Radical translation begins at home”. (Quine 1969, 46) What legitimates the 
move from the indeterminacy in translation (from an alien language to our 
own) to indeterminacy about our own language itself is that the data we have 
available in the first-person case is just the same as the data we have in the 
third-person case. In both cases the ‘facts’ about meaning are exhausted by the 
behavioural facts. Quine claims that semantic reality disappears when one 
descends below the level of whole sentences. There is no fact of the matter as 
to which entity, out of the range of possible candidates, a particular term 
refers.  
Quine claims we require a metalanguage in which to conduct our semantic 
inquiry. But of course, now situated in the background language, we can always 
probe more, and ask of the terms if this language: do the terms really refer to 
this or that. These questions, yet again only make sense to relative to a further 
background language. (Quine 1969, 49) We therefore regress, and we end up, 
according to Quine, back at direct ostension. As we found that ostension could 
not provide us with determinate answers in the case of the translator, we 
cannot expect any more satisfying answers now. Making an analogy with 
velocity, Quine makes the point that, like with questions pertaining to absolute 
velocity, questions about absolute reference do not make sense. Only relative 
to some specified system can we get a handle on an answer, or indeed a 
sensible question. (Quine 1969, 50) To ask such questions absolutely does not 
make sense.  
However, it is crucial to understand that Quine is not saying that it is nonsense 
to talk sensibly and distinctively about rabbits and rabbit parts. What is 
fundamental to understanding Quine’s remarks is that such talk only makes 
sense relative to a frame of reference, or co-ordinate system. We can talk of 
meaning one thing rather than another once we have decided on a frame of 
reference. But this decision is pragmatic, and in some sense arbitrary. Quine 
tells us that this method is “laudable in practice and the best we can hope for”, 
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nonetheless, it does not provide us with a factual base for meaning. (Quine 
1969, 33)  
The lesson to be learned from the inscrutability of reference according to 
Quine was that it only made sense to talk of reference in terms of a system. 
However, what starts out as a concern with the (non)factuality of meaning 
develops into a concern about ontology. He writes: 
“In the language of the theory there are predicates by which to 
distinguish portions of this universe from other portions, and these 
predicates differ from one another purely in the roles they play in the 
laws of the theory. Within this background theory we can show how 
some subordinate theory, whose universe is some portion of the 
background universe, can by a reinterpretation be reduced to another 
subordinate theory whose universe is some lesser portion. Such talk of 
subordinate theories and their ontologies is meaningful, but only 
relative to the background theory with its own primitively adopted and 
ultimately inscrutable ontology.” (Quine 1969, 51)  
What should be seen as the metaphysical significance of Quine’s comments 
here is that theories can never be fully interpreted, except in the relative sense. 
(Quine 1969, 51) A theory, according to Quine, is a fully interpreted set of 
sentences. However, for the theory to be fully interpreted, the values of the 
bound variables must be settled. How do we settle this? If we accept what 
Quine has already told us, we cannot fix the objects of a theory absolutely. We 
do so only relatively. Whilst we can talk of ontology, we can only do so relative 
to some background theory, which can itself, in turn, be questioned and 
explained in terms of some other one. That is: “There is no absolute sense in 
speaking of an ontology of a theory.” (Quine 1969, 60) 
Davidson explicitly agrees with Quine that this type of semantic indeterminacy 
occurs:  
"Quine is right ... in holding that an important degree of indeterminacy 
will remain after all the evidence is in; a number of significantly 
different theories of truth will fit the evidence equally well." (Davidson 
1970, 62)  
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However, there is a significant divergence between Davidson’s and Quine’s 
views on the consequences of this indeterminacy. Davidson says he is not 
worried about the indeterminacy; that it is not a type of indeterminacy that we 
should be worried about. He draws a comparison with measurements of 
temperature. We have three distinct ways of measuring temperature (and 
indeed there could be more). In the temperature case and in the case of 
interpretation, there are some empirically observable phenomena, and there are 
different theories that assign different values to the objects at issue. However, 
there is no difference in the empirical adequacy of those theories. What 
matters, Davidson claims, in the overall pattern of assignments, rather than 
individual cases.  
If all we are concerned with is getting the right distribution of truth values for 
the sentences that make up a theory, then perhaps we can agree with Davidson 
that such indeterminacy is not problematic. However, if when doing 
metaphysics we care about more than mere verificational equivalence, then I 
think we have reason to be concerned. Recall, we incur ontological 
commitments when we engage in a systematic study of the language, and when 
this study reveals true quantified statements and a domain of quantification. 
The sort of subsentential indeterminacy that Davidson admits into his theory 
of interpretation means that we cannot talk absolutely or determinately about 
the values of the bound variables in the scope of the quantifiers.  
If we favour Davidson’s approach to metaphysics are we compelled to accept 
some kind of non-realist position about the things to which we are 
ontologically committed? Maybe we must just accept that there isn’t a fact of 
the matter about whether we are committed to rabbits or undetached rabbit 
parts. This isn’t devastating if you are happy with the thought that metaphysics 
should not be in the business of offering theories which tell us what the world 
is determinately like. A possible alternative which I think merits further 
investigation is whether we could think about Davidson as being committed to 
a realism about certain ontological structures. What matters is the overall pattern 
of assignments, so if you favour ontological realism perhaps this could be 
explicated as a sort of structural realism. Ontic structural realism is the view 
that the world has a certain structure, “in the sense of not supervening on the 
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intrinsic properties of a set of individuals”, and it is that structure to which we 
are ontologically committed.2 (Ladyman & Ross 2007, 104) It would take me 
too far afield to fully develop this structuralist reading of Davidson, but it 
nonetheless gestures towards a potentially fruitful avenue of investigation for 
anyone who likes Davidson’s approach to metaphysics but wants to resist any 
non-realist implications of ontological relativity.3 What matters for my current 
purposes is that however the implications of ontological relativity are 
understood, Davidson’s metaphysics cannot provide the sort of fundamental 
and realist metaphysical theories at which the projects in the previous three 
chapters aim. 
 
IV. Truth and Metaphysics  
 
v. Comparisons with Lewis  
 
The purpose of this section is to critically compare the semantic and 
metaphysical frameworks offered by Davidson and Lewis. I argue that both 
philosophers give a central and integrated role to truth in their semantic and 
metaphysical theorising. However, whilst their big picture commitments 
display similarities, there is much divergence in the detail. The purpose of this 
section is to help to understand how the space of possible responses to 
Davidson’s indeterminacy and consequent ontological relativity is constrained 
by his views on interpretation. 
                                            
2 Debates about ontic structural realism are almost exclusively situated in the philosophy of 
physics. The application of this approach to the kind of metaphysical project I am considering 
here would therefore require some substantial work.  
3 In his (2008) paper, Ritchie develops a position he calls ‘semantic structuralism’ which draws 
on Davidson’s theory of meaning. Whilst Richie’s project is directed at a different set of 
concerns from those I consider here, this paper provides a good basis for thinking about 
structuralist readings of Davidson.  
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Davidson and Lewis share a commitment to a truth conditional theory of 
meaning. They agree that the best handle we have on ‘meaning’ is in terms of 
truth conditions; that we should give the meaning of expressions in the 
language by offering their truth conditions. But their projects come apart. 
Whereas Davidson thinks the truth conditions should take the form of a Tarski 
style T-sentence, Lewis is in the business of offering world invariant truth 
conditions. However, whilst there is significant divergence on the proper 
specification of the truth conditions (Tarski T-sentences versus world-invariant 
truth conditions), they agree that to give an account of meaning you must be 
dealing with truth conditions. In addition to truth conditions playing a 
substantial role in the theory of meaning, they agree that truth conditions also 
play a role in metaphysics. In both cases, the truth conditions specified by the 
semantic theory orientate the metaphysical inquiry: the metaphysics is in some 
sense constrained by the semantics.  
Despite these similarities, Davidson and Lewis end up with markedly different 
conceptions of the status of metaphysical inquiry. They agree both that the 
analysis of language is a prerequisite to metaphysical inquiry and that having 
offered a satisfactory analysis of the true statements of the language there will 
be things of metaphysical interest left unsettled. However, how Davidson and 
Lewis think we settle those outstanding issues of metaphysical interest is a first 
place to note that they come apart. Lewis thinks that we need to offer an 
independent metaphysical methodology for building the metaphysical theories 
which act as the satisfiers of the analysis of the language. There is no 
suggestion in Davidson that he wants to employ such methods. The primary 
dissimilarity which I want to exercise in the section, however, is their respective 
views about the determinacy of content. Although they also have different 
conceptions of how metaphysics unfolds, the more significant difference in 
their metaphysical projects stems from their different views on interpretation.  
Davidson and Lewis engage in a similar interpretationist project. To exercise 
the differences in their approaches, I want to look at the constraints they place 
on radical interpretation. I take it this highlights fairly fundamental differences 
in how they think it is permissible to generate an interpretation of a language. 
They both agree that some narrowing down of the space of possible 
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interpretations is necessary, and therefore introduce constraints on what can 
count as an acceptable interpretation. However, these broadly empirical or 
behaviouristic constraints still aren’t sufficient to land on a best interpretation. 
There is still room for indeterminacy (as we saw in the discussion in the last 
section). Davidson is happy to allow this indeterminacy, whereas Lewis wants 
to introduce a further constraint to eliminate what he sees as problematic 
indeterminacy.   
Lewis claims that “there are various ways for a system of belief to make a belief 
sentence true.” (Lewis 1986b, 32) Lewis doesn’t side with Davidson that the 
interpreter should interpret as many beliefs/utterances as possible as coming 
out true. Lewis, by contrast, thinks that interpretations should rationalise agents. 
We should interpret someone so as many of their beliefs as possible some out 
rational. He wants to rule out cases where a subject is surrounded with 
misleading evidence, where we should, he thinks, interpret them as having false 
beliefs rather than just being epistemically lucky. Lewis thinks that the content 
of belief is determined according to the principles of instrumental rationality. 
(Lewis 1986b, 36) This claim for Lewis, similarly to Davidson, isn’t merely 
about weeding out unacceptable interpretations of a speaker. He takes the 
principles of instrumental rationality to be part of what it is to have a belief. He 
tells us: “We should take this principle of instrumental rationality to be neither 
descriptive nor normative but constitutive of belief. It enters into the implicit 
definition of what it is for someone to have a certain system of beliefs.” (Lewis 
1986b, 36) 
So far I have claimed that Davidson and Lewis introduce constraints on what 
gets to count as an acceptable interpretation. In both cases, although the 
constraints themselves differ, they think that their constraints characterise what 
it is to have a belief. However, even with these constraints in place, they both 
also agree that the kind of evidence available to the interpreter will seriously 
underdetermine content. Lewis tells us that: “Constitutive principles of fit 
which impute a measure of instrumental rationality leave the content of belief 
radically underdetermined.” (Lewis 1986b, 38) In the face of this 
indeterminacy, they once again diverge. As I discussed in the previous section, 
Davidson thinks that this degree of indeterminacy can be accepted. As long as 
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we are getting the right kind of pattern of truth across the language and 
delivering the T-sentences for each sentence of the object language, then we 
have done all we need to do. We can accept that content will be 
underdetermined.  
Lewis, however, disagrees. Lewis introduces some metaphysical machinery to 
help deal with the problem. He tells us that some candidate interpretations are 
more natural than others, and are thus more eligible interpretations: 
 “These beliefs and desires are unreasonable; though if twisted desire is 
combined with correspondingly twisted belief, then it may be that the 
failing lies entirely outside the purview of the department of 
instrumental rationality. So I say that other departments of rationality 
also may have a constitutive role. What makes the perversely twisted 
assignment of content incorrect, however well it fits the subject’s 
behaviour, is exactly that it assigns ineligible, unreasonable content 
when a more eligible assignment would have fit the behaviour equally 
well.” (Lewis 1986b, 38-39) 
It should be noted that to secure determinacy Lewis has not resorted to some 
like ‘the semantic intentions of speakers’, but rather claims that the world has a 
robust role in determining the content of beliefs. It is in part his commitment 
to reference which enables him to make this move. Lewis thinks that reference 
isn’t merely a matter of what we do in language or thought when we refer, but 
also consists in eligibility of the referent. (Lewis 1983b, 47) Lewis’s means of 
securing determinacy therefore requires commitment to a metaphysical thesis 
that there are natural properties and that these properties are more eligible to 
serve as the referents of our utterances. Having secured determinacy Lewis can 
then go on and talk sensibly about the content of metaphysical theories. 
Davidson, however, in the absence of a method for determining the intended 
interpretation of a language or theory, can only talk about the verificational 
adequacy of metaphysical theories. In sum: Davidson’s project bears many 
similarities with Lewis’s project. A necessary prerequisite to metaphysics is the 
analysis of language. However, unlike Lewis, Davidson is not in a position to 
secure subsentential semantic determinacy, and this has a rather radical impact 
upon the status of the metaphysical enterprise. 
 125 
 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have articulated Davidson’s view of the role of truth in 
metaphysics, and the subsequent status of metaphysical inquiry. I argued that 
Davidson assigns an important role to truth in metaphysics. Davidson 
advocates for an approach to ontological inquiry according to which we derive 
ontological commitments when the truth conditional analysis of the true 
sentences of the language requires quantifiers and domains of quantification. 
The concept of truth that plays this robust role in metaphysics is one which is 
shaped with the demands of an empirical semantics project in mind. 
Importantly, the nature of Davidson’s empirical semantics project is such that 
we cannot ensure subsentential semantic determinacy. Thus, we cannot 
absolutely talk about the ontological commitments of our best theory.  
I take Davidson’s project to illuminate how the status of metaphysical inquiry 
can be transformed depending on claims made about other semantic concepts. 
If you think both that a truth conditional analysis of language is a prerequisite 
for generating metaphysical commitments, and that the interpretation of that 
language is indeterminate, then these commitments together have a serious 
impact upon the type of metaphysical project in which you can engage. In 
particular, you cannot make claims about the ontological commitments of a 
theory. For approaches to metaphysics which take the study of language to be 
in some sense authoritative, Davidson’s project is instructive in demonstrating 
how assumptions about the nature of truth and the theory of meaning can 
transform the limit or status of metaphysics. In particular, in this context, the 
claim that content is determinate is not metaphysically innocent. 
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Chapter Five: Bob Hale, Amie Thomasson, and 
Truth for Metaontological Deflationists 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter investigates the prospects for a deflationary approach to the 
project of ontology. The approach here considered, which I’ll call metaontological 
deflationism, promises significant epistemological and methodological virtues. 
On the one hand, the approach aims to demystify the method of metaphysics. 
Unlike many of the other approaches to ontological inquiry considered thus 
far, metaontological deflationism does not require the use of any distinctly 
metaphysical machinery to answer ontological questions. Further to this virtue, 
and indeed because of it, these methods often put us in a position to give 
definitive answers to ontological questions. Thus, if a viable approach, 
metaontological deflationism demonstrates how we can have a realist ontology 
with a transparent epistemology.  
Truth plays a significant role in the metaontological deflationist framework: 
truth is that feature which the sentences from which we derive our ontological 
commitments must have. I argue that for the metaontological deflationist 
approach to be viable, for it to be able to deliver on all it promises, it must 
articulate an adequate conception of truth. I contend that as it stands the 
approach is lacking such an articulation. Whilst a significant theoretical role is 
assigned to the concept of truth, in order to sustain this role, the 
metaontological deflationist needs to provide some kind of story about how it 
is that truth can perform the function required of it. My discussion focuses on 
two approaches to metaontological deflationism: the neo-Fregeanism of Bob 
Hale and the neo-Carnapian project of Amie Thomasson. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I consider Hale’s neo-Fregeanism. (§II) 
I situate the neo-Fregean approach to the metaphysics of mathematics, and 
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then articulate Hale’s development of this approach into a general approach to 
ontological inquiry. Second, I consider Thomasson’s neo-Carnapianism. (§III) 
I introduce her project as a direct response to ‘hard’ approaches to ontology, 
and then outline her proposed ‘easy’ method and its consequences. Finally, I 
turn to assess the role of truth in their projects. (§IV) I argue that both 
approaches to ontology are unified by their endorsement of three constraints 
on the metaontological deflationist approach: first, that truth must be capable 
of playing a robust theoretical role; second, that the ontological commitments 
delivered by such an approach be construed realistically; and third, that the 
ontological commitments should not be metaphysically explanatory. In trying to 
adhere to these constraints, I argue that truth has an even more important role 
to play in these approaches than initially appears to be the case: it is only when 
the metaontological deflationist has spelled out an adequate conception of 
truth that these commitments can be maintained together. I close by 
recommending a way of thinking about truth for the metaontological 
deflationist that satisfies their requirements.  
 
II. Hale  
 
i. Introducing neo-Fregeanism  
 
Hale and Wright (2009) set up neo-Fregeanism as a response to an 
epistemological challenge in the philosophy of mathematics. As they present it, 
the problem is this: how can our mathematical knowledge fit into a naturalistic 
conception of knowledge acquisition? (Hale & Wright 2009, 178) Given the 
abstract nature of mathematical entities, we need some kind of story about 
how we can come to know truths pertaining to mathematical entities, even 
though we cannot enter into direct causal relationships with them.1 The move 
                                            
1 One needs to be sensitive with this claim. The neo-Fregean does not mean to endorse a 
radically naturalistic epistemology of mathematics. Given that they hold that mathematics is a 
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proposed by the neo-Fregean in the face of such a challenge is to claim that 
mathematical knowledge is essentially logical knowledge. Hale and Wright 
argue that we can achieve this kind of justification of mathematical knowledge 
by attending to the semantics of such mathematical statements. They claim: 
“It is not that, before we can understand how knowledge is possible of 
statements referring to or quantifying over the abstract objects of 
mathematics, we need to understand how such objects can be given to 
us as objects of acquaintance or how some other belief-forming 
mechanisms might be sensitive to them and their characteristics. Rather 
we need to tackle directly the question how propositional thought 
about such objects is possible and how it can be knowable. And this 
must be answered by reference to an account of how meaning is 
conferred upon ordinary statements that concern such objects, an 
account which at the same time must be fashioned to cast light on how 
the satisfaction of truth conditions it associates with them is something 
that is accessible, in standard cases, to human cognitive powers.” (Hale 
& Wright 2009, 178-179) 
Their claim is that we have made a mistake if we request prior justification of 
mathematical knowledge. Rather, it is via attending to the semantics for 
statements which contain mathematical vocabulary that an adequate 
epistemology can be offered. This claim is found explicitly in Frege, and it 
finds its home in the context principle. It is by attending to the semantic 
contribution made by number terms to the sense of propositions that we can 
gain an understanding of how such objects can be given to us as objects of 
knowledge. As Frege says:  
 “How, then, are numbers to be given to us, if we cannot have any 
ideas or intuition of them? Since it is only in the context of a 
proposition that words have meaning, our problem becomes this: To 
                                                                                                               
priori, a naturalism which only tolerated a posteriori knowledge would preclude the possibility 
of knowledge of mathematics. They therefore accept that there can be a priori warrant for the 
claims of mathematics, but what must be naturalised is how this mathematical knowledge can 
be applied to gain knowledge of the empirical world. Thus, the challenge for the neo-Fregean 
is to offer a theory which accounts for the fact that mathematics in both a priori, and can be 
used to produce knowledge about the natural world.  
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define the sense of a proposition in which a number word occurs.” 
(Frege 1980, §62) 
Hale and Wright claim that “abstraction principles are the key device in the 
epistemological project so conceived.” (Hale & Wright 2009, 179) An 
abstraction principle is a stipulative implicit definition of a new operator, the 
∑-operator, where ∑- terms are new terms introduced into the language.2 
(Hale & Wright 2009, 179) An abstraction principle takes the following form:  
(∀a) (∀b) (∑(a) = ∑(b) ↔ E(a,b)) 
The abstraction principle is intended to show that the truth-conditions of ∑-
identities are coincident with the truth conditions for a kind of statement that 
we have prior understanding of and already know how to use. (Hale & Wright 
2009, 179) The thought is that we can use this prior ability to gain knowledge 
of the identities of the referents of the ∑-terms, where the existence of those 
entities is guaranteed by the truth of the abstraction principle. Hale and Wright 
claim that it is, 
“Permissible to fix the truth-conditions of one kind of statement as 
coinciding with those of another – ‘kind’ here referring to something 
like logical form – in such a way that the overt existential implications of 
the former exceed those of the latter, although the epistemological status 
of the latter, as conceived in advance, is inherited by the former.” (Hale 
& Wright 2009, 180-181) 
Whilst some mathematical terms can be explicitly defined, the cases in which 
the abstraction principle needs to do work are where this cannot be done. The 
salient principle is an implicit definition of the cardinality operator, Hume’s 
Principle: 
HP: (∀f) (∀g) (N(f) = N(g) ↔ E(f,g)) 
                                            
2 One initial potential concern that Hale and Wright consider pertains to the general status of 
implicit definition. Hale and Wright take it that such concerns are concerns for implicit 
definition in general, rather than anything to do with abstractions in particular. They claim, 
then, that they will take “implicit definition [to be a] default  legitimate practice.” (Hale & 
Wright 2009, 192) For the purposes of this chapter I follow them in this assumption.  
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Or:  The number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if and only 
if F and G are equinumerous. 
Hume’s Principle fixes the sense of the cardinality operator by stating the 
conditions under which statements involving the related singular terms are 
true. So, how does this answer the epistemological worry with which we 
started? We know that every instance of the biconditional is true, and, when we 
know that the right-hand side of the biconditional is true we therefore know 
that the left-hand side is true, because of the logic of biconditionals. So, the 
knowledge that Hume’s principle is true, together with the knowledge that the 
right-hand side is true, provides the requisite justification for our knowledge 
that the left-hand is true.  
Hale and Wright consider a challenge according to which the success of the 
implicit definition cannot be secured without some kind of metaphysical 
assistance. We are supposed to imagine a possible scenario where a particular 
abstraction will fail because the world just isn’t the way it needs to be for the 
abstraction to be true. Thus, the challenge goes, it is not sufficient to simply 
stipulate the implicit definition, the world must be a certain way. (Hale & 
Wright 2009, 193) They claim that such a view is mistaken: a good abstraction 
alone is sufficient to undermine this “epistemically metaphysical possibility”.3 
(Hale & Wright 2009, 193) This is because the truth of the right-hand side of 
an instance of a good abstraction is conceptually sufficient for the truth of the 
left-hand side. Hale and Wright, therefore, claim that there is no metaphysical 
assistance required. (Hale & Wright 2009, 193) 
The abstraction principle alone is sufficient for providing truth conditions for 
the introduced term. Thus, they claim, the implicit definition is sufficient for 
giving the new term a sense. (Hale and Wright 2009, 196) We may now ask: 
what secures the reference of the new operator? Hale and Wright claim that 
the “the abstraction operator refers (to a function) only if the singular terms it 
enables us to form refer (to objects).” (Hale & Wright 2009, 201) So what 
guarantees that that the singular terms refer? Hale and Wright claim that all 
                                            
3 The question of what counts as a good abstraction is a serious and fraught question, and one 
with which I shall not engage here.  
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that is required for a singular term to refer is that it appears in a statement 
where it occupies a “reference-demanding position.” (Hale & Wright 2009, 202) I 
take ‘reference-demanding’ to require two conditions are met. First, that the 
singular term appears in a statement where it functions as a singular term, and 
second that that statement in question is true. The latter requirement is crucial. 
This is what secures the independence of truth conditions and existence.  
The question then becomes: how can we guarantee that objects of the relevant 
kind exist?4 All instances of Hume’s Principle are true, and the left-hand side 
of the biconditional will be true in all those cases where the right-hand side is 
true. When the right-hand side of the biconditional is true, referents are 
secured as the interpreted second order logic that Hale and Wright endorse 
comes with a rich ontology of functions. Thus, the metaphysical question is 
answered as the truth conditions for the identity statements containing the 
singular terms formed from the cardinality operator (left-hand side) are 
coincident with those on the (right-hand side) which comes prepared with the 
needed ontological commitments. We might wonder whether this is sufficient. 
However, Hale and Wright characterise any further demand for reason to 
believe in the truth of the abstraction principle to be sceptical in spirit. (Hale & 
Wright 2009, 204) Whilst I suspect that this may not be sufficient to dispel any 
such sceptical worries in the philosophy of mathematics, I will now leave these 
matters and turn to examine how such an approach to the metaphysics of 
mathematical entities can be generalised into a unified approach to ontological 
inquiry.  
 
ii. Neo-Fregeanism Generalised  
 
In this section I consider how the neo-Fregean approach outlined above 
generalises into an all-purpose approach to ontology. Hale claims:  
                                            
4 There are going to be multiple ways to respond to this question (i.e. multiple interpretations 
of second order logic) but all that I consider here is the proposal in Hale and Wright (2009).  
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“I… defend a broadly Fregean version of the view that questions about 
what kinds of things there are are inseparable from, and in one way 
posterior to, questions about the logical analysis of language.” (Hale 
2013, 8-9) 
According to Hale the central question of ontology is what kinds of things are 
there? (Hale 2013, 9) To ask what kind of things there are requires, according 
to Hale, that we have a prior categorisation of expressions of the language. 
(Hale 2013, 10) The motivation for thinking of ontology in this way stems 
from a desire to have a neutral and general conception of what objects and 
properties are from which we can begin inquiry. There is a particular 
methodological challenge here. Hale is interested in how we are to understand 
the general category of object and property. He suggests that if we are to get a 
handle on these general concepts in a non-question begging way, we need to 
consult the logical structure of language. (Hale 2013, 18-19)  
Imagine, for example, that we define ‘object’ as that which has only material 
parts or that which is apt to enter causal relations. We can see immediately that 
this would bias any subsequent metaphysical inquiry as it would force us to 
judge that there can be no objects which are causally isolated from us (like, for 
example, numbers). Hale, therefore, takes the neo-Fregean approach to this 
question of categorisation to be the only viable one, which won’t prejudge the 
outcome of ontological inquiry. This is clearly a very strong commitment. 
Given that Hale is claiming that this is the only acceptable approach to 
ontological inquiry, then, if it turns out that this neo-Fregean project cannot be 
prosecuted, it seems we must conclude that ontological inquiry itself cannot be 
sensibly conducted.  
Hale’s recommended approach transforms the structure of how such inquiry 
precedes: “under the Fregean approach, questions about the existence of 
entities of this or that kind are transformed into questions about truth and logical 
form.” (Hale 2013, 14) So how do we decide what objects are? Hale tells us that 
“objects are the (typically) non-linguistic correlates of the devices of singular 
reference.” (Hale 2013, 11) Extending this thought to the case of properties 
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and relations, properties and relations are what (one-or more-place) predicates 
stand for. 5,6 (Hale 2013, 12)  
All we are committed to thus far is that we are going to derive the categories of 
ontological interest from the logical structure of language. There is going to be 
an outstanding question of what the particular objects and properties are to 
which we are going to be committed. That is: which given species of entities 
fall under those categories. Hale takes it that a Fregean answer to the question 
of categorisation suggests a Fregean answer to the latter question of what kinds 
of things exist. (Hale 2013, 13-14) He claims:  
“If entities belonging to a certain ontological category just are what 
expressions of the corresponding logical category stand for, then we 
can argue for the existence of entities of that kind by arguing that there 
are true statements involving expressions from that category.” (Hale 
2013, 14) 
The thought here is that it is sufficient for a singular term to refer to 
something, if it functions as a singular term in a token statement, and that that 
statement is true.7 (Hale & Wright 2009, 185) Such statements could not be 
true, so the thought goes, unless their ingredient expressions successfully 
discharge their semantic function. Discharging their semantic function consists 
in having reference, and for a singular term to have reference it must refer to 
an object. (Hale 2013, 36) 
You might worry about the potential expressive limitations of natural language 
for an approach such as this. If we want to say that objects are what the 
singular terms stand for, then we might be inclined to think that all objects 
                                            
5 Hale offers a reformulation of this in light of the concept horse objection. Thus: “Objects are 
what are or could be primary semantic values of singular terms. Properties are what are or could 
be primary semantic values of predicates and so on.” (Hale 2013, 32) 
6 It is worth noting that Hale claims to be happy with the thought that we may be able to carve 
out other conceptions of objects or properties from this general one. For example, we may 
restrict ourselves to talking just about the properties with which fundamental physics is 
concerned. Importantly though, this must be seen as a restriction of the general category and 
not the identification of a more fundamental kind of category.  
7 There is going to be some kind of restriction here on logical form of such expressions, for 
example, cases of negative existentials.  
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have names. It seems plausible that not all objects have actual names. Hale 
manoeuvres around this concern by offering a modal account of language, 
which “transcends the contingent limitations of actual languages by drawing 
upon their possible extensions.” (Hale 2013, 20) Given this, the final position 
is: 
“There exist objects of the specified kind if and only if (i) there are or 
could be singular terms which would, if non-empty, refer to objects of 
that kind and (ii) if there were such terms, there would be true atomic 
statements containing them.” (Hale 2013, 37) 
You might also worry that that this way of thinking about the ontological 
project necessitates some kind of anti-realism. That because we require the 
prior logical categorisation of the language before we can say anything about 
the ontological categories, that this makes the categorisation in some sense 
language dependent and so, in turn, mind-dependent. Hale thinks this would 
be a mistake. Whilst our identification of certain expressions as being of a 
particular type (e.g. singular term, n-place predicate, etc.) is derivative upon the 
logical analysis of language, the truth-values of statements containing such 
expressions need not be, and mostly won’t be, language dependent. (Hale 
2013, 19) It is because we require the truth of the relevant statements that the 
entities to which we are committed need not be language dependent.8   
Finally, you might worry that whilst the ontology to which we are committed is 
not mind-dependent in any sense, there is something lightweight about these 
commitments. Hale himself claims that such a view of ontological inquiry is 
metaphysically deflationary and lightweight. (Hale 2013, 41) We need to be 
careful with this claim. I suggest that we must separate two kinds of ways that 
we could say that ontology is lightweight: we might think that the things to 
which we are ontologically committed are themselves lightweight, or we might 
think that the conception of the project of ontology is lightweight. Part of what 
                                            
8 One point worth mentioning here is that although the project does not commit us to anti-
realism, it is compatible with it. So, for example following Dummett, we could think that the 
correct truth-predicate for the language is a non-bivalent one, and that this is sufficient to 
make a view anti-realist. If we endorse this epistemically constrained notion of truth, merely 
saying that the sentences of the language are true won’t get you to realism. More on this later.  
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the neo-Fregean programme was supposed to embrace was mathematical 
Platonism, which is certainly not a ‘lightweight’ position (in the former sense). 
Thus, I take it that Hale takes a deflationary attitude towards the project of 
ontology, in that there is no distinctly metaphysical, autonomous methodology 
for ontology. Indeed, Hale’s claim is stronger than this: there could not be a 
viable method for ontology other than the deflationary neo-Fregean account 
he proposes.  
 
III. Thomasson  
 
iii. Situating ‘Easy Ontology’  
 
Amie Thomasson advocates a view of ontological inquiry according to which 
ontological questions are not deep questions. She claims:  
“I call this the ‘easy’ approach to existence questions, since it entails 
that those existence questions that are meaningful are not deep and 
difficult subjects for metaphysical dispute, but rather questions to be 
resolved straightforwardly by employing our conceptual competence, 
often combining this with empirical investigations.” (Thomasson 2015, 
20) 
Consider a particular disputed class of entities. We start by taking an 
“uncontroversial truth… and reasoning by what seem like trivial steps… to 
reach ontological conclusions.” (Thomasson 2015, 21) The uncontroversial 
truth might be: (1) there are two mugs on the table. From (1) Thomasson 
thinks we can derive (2) analytically: (2) the number of mugs on the table is 
two. Thus, we are going to be committed to numbers. The thought driving this 
commitment is that we cannot be committed to the literal content of (1) and 
deny that (2) is entailed by it. I will further elucidate this conception of 
ontological inquiry in the next section, but first I want to situate Thomasson’s 
project relative to both neo-Fregeanism and what might be seen as a more 
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dominant methodology of contemporary analytic metaphysics, and to explain 
the Carnapian inheritance of her approach.   
Thomasson says that neo-Fregeanism as it stands is a manifestation of easy 
ontology.9 She also presents Stephen Schiffer on 'pleonastic entities' as another 
already-existing case of easy ontology. (Thomasson 2015, 132-134) An 
approach to ontology is easy if it has these two features: (1) all well-formed 
existence questions may be answered by conceptual and/or empirical methods, 
and (2) some disputed existence questions may be answered by means of trivial 
inferences from uncontroversial premises. (Thomasson 2015, 128) Thomasson 
charts the differences between these views as follows: the neo-Fregean requires 
true identity statements, Schiffer requires uncontroversial true statements, 
Thomasson requires that we use our conceptual competence and empirical 
skills. (Thomasson 2015, 141) So each approach is a more generalised form of 
the last. Her claim is that both of "these approaches have seldom been seen as 
part of a unified approach to existence questions, nor have the relations among 
these views been made clear". (Thomasson 2015, 20) Trying to make good on 
both these limitations is her ambition for her proposed methodology.  
Thomasson claims that in the latter half of the 20th Century there has been a 
proliferation of ontological questions and theories. She attributes this trend to 
the growing dominance of what she terms the neo-Quinean approach to 
metaphysics.10 This neo-Quinean approach takes it that “the enterprise of 
ontology is that of developing the best ‘total theory’, where that involves 
choosing the theory with the most theoretical virtues.” (Thomasson 2015, 2) 
Thomasson claims that such a view of metaphysics has become so dominant as 
to seem “natural, even inevitable”. (Thomasson 2015, 3) It is Thomasson’s 
contention that such an approach to metaphysics is not inevitable, neither 
historically nor philosophically. She wants to return, therefore, to a pre-
                                            
9 It is worth noting here that Thomasson is talking about Hale and Wright’s neo-Fregean 
programme in the philosophy of mathematics, not Hale’s more general programme outlined 
above.  
10 The ‘Quine’ in ‘neo-Quinean’ isn’t supposed to commit her to a view about the correct 
exegesis of the historical Quine.  
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Quinean conception of metaphysics, which sees metaphysics as primarily 
engaged in conceptual work. (Thomasson 2015, 11) 
Thomasson presents a pressing question for a metaphysician: given the success 
of natural science as a means of explaining the world, what are the proper tools 
and aims for metaphysics? She claims that the historical division of labour 
between philosophy and science is one according to which philosophy and 
science are viewed as being distinct and complimentary. Such a view takes it 
that philosophy is primarily engaged in conceptual work, whereas science 
employs empirical methods and concerns matters of fact. (Thomasson 2015, 7) 
Favourably quoting Wittgenstein, she suggests that “we must do away with all 
explanation, and description alone must take its place.” (Thomasson 2015, 8) 
The putative virtue of this move towards a metaphysics concerned with 
description rather than explanation is that it provides a clearer and more 
modest conception of the methods, roles, and epistemology of metaphysics. 
(Thomasson 2015, 11) Thomasson positions her preferred project as neo-
Carnapian. One point worth noting, however, is that whilst Carnap is primarily 
concerned with more formal languages, Thomasson is interested in ordinary 
English.11 (Thomasson 2015, 44) This focus on ordinary language means that 
conceptual analysis (i.e. working out what the rules that govern our terms 
actually are) plays an important role in Thomasson’s project. (Thomasson 
2015, 44)  
Given that Thomasson is making use of a Carnapian approach she assigns an 
important role to the distinction between internal and external questions. 
(Carnap 1950) She follows Price (2009) in claiming that the best way to 
interpret the Carnapian internal/external distinction is in term of the use-
mention distinction. (Thomasson 2015, 36) So, when we ask internal questions 
we must use the relevant vocabulary, whereas when we ask external questions 
we merely mention such terms.  
                                            
11 It is worth noting that this move to ordinary language presents a particular kind of 
challenge. Ordinary language is an incredibly complex phenomena, and some have argued that 
this makes Thomasson’s project unworkable. I do not engage this challenge at present, but see 
Button (2016) for some interesting discussion.  
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On internal questions, Thomasson says that we can deliver simple answers to 
such questions. She claims: 
“The very rules for introducing property language (combined with 
‘customary deductive rules’) licence us to infer from an ordinary truth 
like ‘the house is red’ that ‘the house has the property of being red’ and 
so to provide an easy affirmative answer to the general existential 
question (asked internally) ‘Are there properties?’” (Thomasson 2015, 
37) 
She urges that we interpret the Carnapian claim as the claim that in order to 
use terms meaningfully there must be rules governing their use. (Thomasson 
2015, 39) That is: to ask an existence question, the suspect term must be 
associated with some rules for use in a language. However, once we’ve got a 
context in which to ask and answer the existential (internal) question, the truth 
of the existential statement need not be thought of as truth-in-a-framework. 
(Thomasson 2015, 39) Once we adopt a language in which to ask existential 
questions, the answers that we derive, the existential statements that we hold to 
be true, are neither arbitrary nor language dependent. (Thomasson 2015, 43) 
By contrast, the metaphysician who asks the external question attempts to cut 
those terms off from the internal rules which govern their use, and they 
therefore render the question meaningless. (Thomasson 2015, 40) But we can 
recover some sense for the external question if we understand them as 
questions which mention the suspect terms and ask whether we should adopt 
such terms with their associated rules for use. (Thomasson 2015, 40) 
Thomasson claims that this is a charitable interpretation of hard ontologists 
like the neo-Quinean, as we do recover some reason to engage in those 
debates. The question of which linguistic framework to adopt is itself a 
practical question, but Thomasson claims that it may be influenced by 
theoretical considerations. (Thomasson 2015, 42) So, “the rules we adopt need 
not be arbitrary, given our purposes, since some rules may serve the purposes 
better than others.” (Thomasson 2015, 43) But, importantly, the debate about 
which linguistic framework best serves our theoretical or practical purposes 
should not be viewed as a debate whether or not there really are entities of a 
particular kind.  
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I take it that the kind of argumentative move that Thomasson is trying to avoid 
here is the following. Imagine that all parties agree that some discourse is 
useful, and further they agree that the true sentences of that discourse commit 
us to, for example, the existence of properties. What Thomasson wants to 
preclude is that there could be some further metaphysical question, which is 
distinct from whether the discourse is useful (external) or whether there are 
true statements containing the suspect terms (internal). The metaphysical 
question is already settled once we’ve identified true sentences which use 
property talk. Once we accept that properties exist, there isn’t a meaningful 
further question about whether they really exist. This italicised ‘really’ adds no 
content to the question, and any sensible question in the vicinity is going to be 
answered by the relevant external or internal questions already identified.12  
 
iv. The Easy Approach and Its Consequences  
 
Thomasson understands questions of existence as questions about terms and 
their application conditions. (Thomasson 2015, 85) To understand the 
relationship between application conditions and existence she offers the 
following biconditional:  
“Ks exist iff the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’ are 
fulfilled.” (Thomasson 2015, 86) 
Thomasson claims that application conditions “are certain basic rules of use 
that are among those that are meaning-constitutive for that term.” (Thomasson 
2015, 89) They “are among the semantic rules for use for the terms we master 
when we acquire language.” (Thomasson 2015, 90) She provides the following 
features which application conditions must have: 
 “1. They are semantic rules of use which speakers master, but these 
rules needn’t take the form of necessary and sufficient conditions, and 
needn’t be statable.  
                                            
12 I imagine that some may not be happy with this response. I consider it further below.  
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2. They are not merely conditions under which we would have evidence 
that the term applies, but rather conditions under which the term would 
be correctly applied (entitling us to truly say ‘there is a K’). 
3. They need not be descriptive, and may involve deference to experts 
and to the world… 
4. Application conditions must not take the following form: ‘K’ applies 
iff Ks exist. (While this will always be true, it will not count as an 
application condition, in our terms.)” (Thomasson 2015, 91 & 96) 
Thomasson includes (4) as if we could build that biconditional into the 
application conditions we would need to antecedently establish that Ks exist. 
What the easy approach cannot require is that we have to have established 
existence before we can introduce a new term, as this would make the proposal 
circular. Application conditions form part of the rules of use for a term, and 
their satisfaction is sufficient to guarantee that an entity of that kind exists. 
(Thomasson 2015, 221)  
We might worry that the entities we end up committed to from this approach 
may lack the features we think that they should have. (Thomasson 2015, 221) 
Thomasson’s solution is to state that, in addition to application conditions, 
concepts also require coapplication conditions. She claims:  
“Application conditions are… not the only rules of use for the relevant 
sortal terms. It is a basic part of my view that, in addition to the 
application conditions, for a term to be a sortal term (or name) at all, it 
must also come associated with coapplication conditions: conditions 
determining when the term may be reapplied in a way that will entitle 
us to say it’s applied “to one and the same S” – thus establishing 
identity conditions for Ss (if any there be).” (Thomasson 2015, 222-
223) 
The thought is that a sortal term has two different types of rules of use. On the 
one hand it has application conditions which tell us the conditions under 
which there is something of that kind. On the other hand, it has coapplication 
conditions which fix the identity conditions for the things the term refers to. 
(Thomasson 2015, 224) Coapplication conditions “establish what we are 
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talking about in talking about Ss at all and establish what it means to say ‘this is 
the same S as that’ and what the truth conditions are for that claim.” 
(Thomasson 2015, 225-226)  
Thomasson considers a worry according to which there might be worlds where 
Ks exist but the term ‘K’ does not. (Thomasson 2015, 87) Given this concern, 
Thomasson opts to rigidify the application conditions for ‘K’: we stick with the 
application conditions for ‘K’ at the actual world. I suspect that this fix may 
not ameliorate all concerns in the region. Whilst rigidification will help for 
worlds where Ks exist, but the term ‘K’ does not, it will not help if we are 
inclined towards the thought that there are objects for which we have no actual 
associated term. Perhaps given that she is concerned with general existence 
questions, where we are interested in whether a certain kind of entity exists, e.g. 
properties, numbers, propositions, event, etc. she may want to hold that the 
only kinds of things are ones for which we already have terms. I find this 
option flat footed and in need of motivation. Perhaps then, more plausibly, 
Thomasson could follow Hale in adopting a modal account of language.13 
Whatever form an adequate response to this concern about the expressive 
limitations of language takes, I proceed by assuming that Thomasson can make 
good on this concern somehow.  
All that is required to answer ontological questions is (1) to have mastered the 
relevant rules for use for the term in question, and (2) to have access to the 
relevant conceptual and empirical information. (Thomasson 2015, 113) So: an 
example. We can start from an uncontroversial truth such as: (1) there are two 
mugs on the table. From (1) we can derive (2) analytically: (2) the number of 
mugs on the table is two. Thus, we are going to be committed to numbers. 
Thomasson therefore thinks that ontological knowledge can be gained by 
conceptual competence. (Thomasson 2015, 235) Sometimes this is through 
conceptual competence alone (in the case of an undisputed conceptual truth) 
and sometimes we also require empirical knowledge. The kind of conceptual 
competence that Thomasson wants consists in a normative claim, about what 
                                            
13 For an indication of how this might go, see Hale (2013, 20). 
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speakers are entitled to infer, not a descriptive one about what they actually do 
infer. (Thomasson 2015, 239) She claims: 
“Speakers who master the relevant conceptual/linguistic rules are 
entitled to make the relevant inference, and to accept the conceptual 
truth (and are open to reproach if they refuse to).” (Thomasson 2015, 
240) 
The relevant kind of conceptual competence is intimately tied to use. 
(Thomasson 2015, 243) The thought is that a speaker must have mastery of 
certain core constitutive rules of use in order for those terms to be used at all. 
(Thomasson 2015, 250) Those may be changed, but in choosing to change the 
rules we do so for pragmatic reasons, not because we discover “that what 
seemed like conceptual truths or valid inference in the old system really 
weren’t.” (Thomasson 2015, 252) 
Thomasson’s claim here seems to preclude the possibility that we can revise 
the rules for use of a term for empirical reasons. Consider: upon the discovery 
that space-time is curved, some things we thought to be analytic of space 
turned out not to be. Thus, the analytic entailments from which we derive 
ontological commitments would have had to change. Perhaps we should 
interpret such change as pragmatic, and thus we moved to a new framework 
where instead of using term ‘space’ we now use the term ‘space*’. This seems 
too radical. It seems that we can alter the meaning of terms without ‘changing 
the subject’. I suspect that Thomasson’s motivation in making this seemingly 
radical claim is that she wants to preclude the possibility that metaphysical 
considerations can force us the change the rules for use. However, I think she 
can and should allow that communities of language speakers can revise the 
rules for use for a term in light of new empirical information, without 
committing to the view that distinctly metaphysical considerations can force us 
to revise rules for use.  
Given the view of ontological inquiry that is being proposed, a few comments 
about how Thomasson is thinking about existence is merited. Thomasson 
treats the quantifier as having a fixed, formal rule for use. (Thomasson 2015, 
82) Her deflationary conception of ‘exists’ holds that we grasp the concept by 
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“grasping certain trivial platitudes governing the concept.” (Thomasson 2015, 
88) Consequently, the deflationist rejects heavyweight attempts to give a 
substantive theory about the nature of the concept. Thomasson claims that this 
view is compatible with thinking that there is a relevant concept, but how we 
acquire this concept means that it cannot serve an explanatory function. 
(Thomasson 2015, 88-89)  
In arguing against a substantive conception of existence Thomasson claims 
that given how it is we determine our ontological commitments, there cannot 
be a unified substantive or material criterion for existence. (Thomasson 2015, 
117) As there are not general application conditions, so there will not be a 
general shared criterion of existence. (Thomasson 2015, 89) The mistake is to 
think that we can take the features of some kinds of existing things and 
generalise. This commitment in turn generates scepticism about approaches to 
metaphysics that propose to eliminate entities of a certain kind because they do 
not satisfy a certain criterion (e.g. mind-independence, etc.) (Thomasson 2015, 
121) She holds that there is something wrong with metaphysical disputes 
which proceed by arguing that entities of a certain sort fail to meet some 
criterion of existence.  
With a comprehensive picture of Thomasson’s proposal on the table, I now 
turn to consider how she thinks about the status of her proposed method for 
ontology. Thomasson claims that the easy approach to ontology commits one 
both to a first-order simple realism and to a form of metaontological 
deflationism. I take these commitments in turn.  
Thomasson is committed to a “simple realism” about philosophically disputed 
entities. (Thomasson 2015, 22) If we seem to be uttering true sentences about 
a certain subject matter, we can then proceed as above and derive an 
ontological commitment to the entities in question, and we are committed to 
realism about those entities. Thomasson wants to resist the claim that the fact 
that our ontological commitments are arrived at in the way she recommends, 
entails that the things to which we are committed are somehow reduced in 
ontological standing. The things to which we are ontologically committed are 
not “mere shadows of language.” (Thomasson 2015, 145) We should not 
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understand their existence in a deflationary manner, but rather we should 
adopt a simple realism about them. (Thomasson 2015, 146) She claims that: 
“The fact that we come to know of the existence of certain things by 
undertaking trivial inferences does not show that the entities themselves 
are in any way epistemically diminished or ontologically shallow – or 
that there is some crucial difference between them and regular old 
concreta like trees.” (Thomasson 2015, 148) 
There is still a difference between trees and propositions, but Thomasson does 
not want such a distinction to made along the lines of ‘ontological depth’. 
(Thomasson 2015, 150) The difference is rather with respect to which truths 
we infer the existence of which entities (i.e. conceptual or empirical truths). 
Whether we start from a conceptual or an empirical truth will likewise have 
some effect on how the inquiry proceeds. We may need to engage in empirical 
work in the case of an empirical claim, to discern what follows from what. 
Whereas, “inferences made from a conceptual truth are genuinely something-
from-nothing inferences, for the truth of their premises requires nothing of the 
empirical world.” (Thomasson 2015, 151) In the case of a conceptual truth, we 
should view these as articulations of the rules of use for the concept in 
question. (Thomasson 2015, 152-153) Thus she claims: 
“Easy ontology leads to the realism about the questioned entities in 
affirming that there are properties, propositions, numbers, and so on, 
in the only sense these terms have.” (Thomasson 2015, 153) 
However, this realism is to be distinguished from other forms of realism (e.g. 
Platonism) in that while all parties are signed up to the idea that the entities in 
question exist, the easy ontologist does not think that these entities are 
metaphysically explanatory. (Thomasson 2015, 155) Thomasson distances her 
project from what she terms ‘explanatory realism’. She claims that the easy 
ontologist cannot appeal to the explanatory power of the entities in question 
and claims that: “if an existence claim is derived by trivial inferences from an 
uncontroversial claim, it cannot contribute any more explanatory power than we 
got from the uncontroversial claim itself (and it can’t explain the truth of the 
uncontroversial claim).” (Thomasson 2015, 156) So, on the simple realist view 
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we can say happily that the disputed entities exist, but they should not be taken 
to be explanatory ‘posits’ which are part of a metaphysically explanatory 
theory, and our commitment to them should not be viewed as being justified 
by their explanatory power. (Thomasson 2015, 157)  
I take it that the sense in which ontological commitments are not explanatory 
is subtle and open to misunderstanding, so let’s consider a toy example. 
Imagine two forms of ‘explanatory realism’ in mereology: compositional 
nihilism and compositional restrictivism.14 Let’s imagine further that all parties 
agree that the chair is responsible for me not falling on the floor. Now, the 
nihilist thinks that what explains why I do not fall on the floor is that there are 
simples arranged chair-wise. Contra this, the restrictivist thinks that what 
explains why I do not fall on the floor is that there is a composite object. These 
are the sort of explanatory claims that Thomasson precludes on her approach 
to realism. The relevant empirical explanatory claim is made clear in the 
statement that we start inquiry with, that the chair is responsible for me not 
falling in the floor, and there is no more metaphysically explanatory work to be 
done by saying that the chair is really simples arranged chair-wise, or really a 
composite object.  
I’m sure we can imagine a hard-ontologist pushing back on this and claiming 
that this simple realism just isn’t what is intended by realism. Part of what it 
means to be a realist is to think that ontological commitments are explanatory 
in just the sense denied. I think that there is something of a dialectical impasse 
at this point, but in Thomasson’s defence it is worth considering exactly what 
useful sense of explanation her view fails to capture. Her approach doesn’t 
preclude causal explanation, scientific explanation, historical explanation, 
psychological explanation. What her approach rules out is that there is some 
distinct and weighty kind of non-empirical explanation. I suspect a simple 
realist would simply say that this form of explanation is not a form worth 
having.  
                                            
14 Very minimally, I’m taking mereological nihilism to be the thesis that objects with proper 
parts do not exist, and mereological restrictivism to be the thesis that objects with proper parts 
exist.  
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This brings us to the sense in which Thomasson’s view is deflationary. What is 
deflated for Thomasson is not the entities, but rather the debates about the 
existence of those entities. (Thomasson 2015, 154) Given that if the 
ontological questions are well formed, we can have answers to ontological 
questions, Thomasson thinks that protracted disagreement shows that 
something is wrong with these debates. (Thomasson 2015, 213) However, she 
does think that we can still make sense of some kind of disagreement between 
Platonists and nominalists, and this disagreement can be serious. The 
important thing is that we locate their disagreement as being on pragmatic 
rather than factual grounds. (Thomasson 2015, 175) 
Thomasson considers a challenge according to which the easy approach makes 
ontology unacceptably language dependent. However, Thomasson claims that 
her deflationary view does not commit us to such language relativity. So, for 
example, if one part of the language (e.g. the language of fundamental physics) 
commits us to some kinds of entities, and another part of the language (e.g. the 
language of organic biology) commits us to other kinds, we don’t need to say 
that those commitments are just relative to the relevant part of the language. 
Her thought is that “whether the (well-formed) noun terms appear as the basic 
terms of a language or as terms introduced via other parts of speech, they refer 
just in the case the actual application conditions for those terms are fulfilled.” 
(Thomasson 2015, 283) So long as the application conditions are fulfilled, this 
is sufficient to say that the things of the relevant kind exist, and this is not 
dependent on the part of the language with which we are dealing.  
 
IV. Truth for Metaontological Deflationism 
 
v. An Important Role For Truth 
 
The approach to ontological inquiry considered in this chapter is appealing to a 
philosopher who is sceptical of distinctly metaphysical methods. The 
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metaontological deflationist approach demystifies the methods and the 
epistemology of ontology. Nonetheless, there are a number of concerns that 
have been raised about both of the approaches examined so far. However, 
whilst these concerns are interesting I do not revisit them here. Rather, I will 
limit my discussion to the work that truth is doing in their frameworks.  
Neither Hale nor Thomasson make much explicit reference to the concept of 
truth. Thomasson claims that we cannot be committed to the literal content of 
the utterances without also thereby being committed to the existence of the 
suspect entities. I take it that the reason for this is that the two statements are 
making the same demands on the world, and given that the statement we start 
with is true, the entities must exist. Whilst Thomasson’s view commits her to 
the notion of application conditions being fulfilled (rather than satisfaction of 
truth conditions), the notion of analytic entailments further secures a pivotal 
role for truth. Hale claims that names and predicates successfully discharging 
their semantic functions requires that they refer. I take it that there is a broadly 
Fregean theory of meaning in the background of this commitment, which 
commits Hale to a truth conditional theory of meaning. What I take to unite 
their approaches is the following: truth is a feature of the sentences from 
which we start ontological inquiry, and by successfully semantically analysing 
these sentences we derive our ontological commitments.  
I think that it is interesting at this point to note the similarities with Lewis’s 
approach. Whilst Lewis offers a more sophisticated conception of semantic 
analysis, the idea that the semantic analysis of the true sentences of the 
language is what determines (up to a point) ontological commitments is a view 
that all parties share. The important difference, however, is that for the 
metaontological deflationist, semantically analysing the true sentences of the 
language is sufficient for fully delivering ontological commitments. There is no 
further metaphysical work to be done. Whereas for Lewis, there is a distinct 
metaphysical project that kicks in at this point, where we use metaphysical 
methods to discover what the nature of these commitments are.  
Having identified this theoretical role for truth, I want to make explicit just 
how significant a role truth plays in this conception of ontological inquiry. 
Articulating the distinction between the different kinds of deflationism makes 
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this clear. Consider an interlocutor who thinks that the deflationary approach 
that Hale and Thomasson advocate must deflate ontology. Although all that is 
intended is to deflate the project of ontology, not the things to which we are 
ontologically committed, perhaps this leaves room for the question of whether 
metaphysics done in this way nonetheless delivers entities which are in some 
sense not robust. If the only way to prosecute answering ontological questions 
is via logical or conceptual methods (i.e. no distinct metaphysical method) then 
perhaps it follows that the deliverances of such methods are in some way 
language dependent or mind-dependent.  
We can imagine how this charge would go. When I engage in ontological 
inquiry I want to know what kinds of things there are. What we can and cannot 
say about the world, and how our language functions, is orthogonal to this 
question. The intuition driving a more committal conception of ontological 
inquiry is that when we engage in this kind of metaphysical inquiry we want to 
get behind/below the level of representation, to what there is. By claiming that 
all there is to ontological inquiry is semantically analysing language, Hale and 
Thomasson fail to get behind/underneath/outside of the level of 
representation, and consequently cannot do justice to our metaphysical 
aspirations.  
Hale and Thomasson both have the same answer to this worry. It is because 
we require the truth of the relevant statements from which we begin logical or 
conceptual inquiry that the entities to which we end up committed are not 
language dependent. Semantically analysing language is not alone sufficient to 
determine ontological commitments. Whilst our identification of certain 
expressions as being of a particular type, and the articulation of the application 
conditions for terms, is derivative on the analysis of language, the truth-values 
of statements containing such expressions need not be. What ensures that we 
only deflate the project of ontology, and not the entities, is that we require the 
truth of the statements from which we start semantic analysis. The motivation 
for assigning this robust role to truth is that it ensures some worldly 
connection for language. So, in response to the challenge above, the 
metaontological deflationist ensures that the ontological commitments 
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themselves are not deflated by insisting on the truth of the statements from 
which we begin inquiry.  
 
vi. Three Commitments of Metaontological Deflationism  
 
I argued that truth plays an indispensable role in the metaontological 
deflationist approach to ontology. It is that feature which the statements from 
which we start semantic analysis must have in order to guarantee that we only 
deflate the project of ontology and not the entities to which we are committed. 
Given that it plays such a robust role in the approach, it is important to 
articulate just what conception of truth such an approach requires. You might 
think that if you want to adopt the metaontological deflationist approach to 
ontology you can just slot in your preferred theory into the role identified. This 
is not so. In the course of outlining their approaches, very little is said by either 
Hale or Thomasson about how they are thinking about the concept. What I 
want to do in this section is twofold. I identify and articulate three important 
constraints on the concept of truth to which the metaontological deflationist 
must adhere, and I concurrently show that a significant number of the extant 
conceptions of truth cannot adhere to these constraints. 
The first constraint is that whatever the concept of truth is, is must be such 
that it can play the robust theoretical role assigned to it. Given the role 
identified in the previous section, the aim of this constraint is to merely make 
sure that whatever we say about the concept of truth, it is capable of playing 
this role. I take it that this constraint is sufficient to rule out a redundancy 
theory of truth. There is a much subtler matter about the degree to which this 
constraint is compatible with deflationism about truth. Hale and Thomasson 
have both expressed their preference for a deflationary conception of truth.15  
Whether this is a tenable position will depend in large part on how the relevant 
kind of deflationism is understood. It is worth noting that there is very little 
philosophical consensus about just what deflationism about truth commits you 
                                            
15 For example, see Thomasson (2014).   
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to. You might think that a ‘deflationary conception of truth’ can be explicated 
along the following lines: the cognitive equivalence of “P” and “‘P’ is true”, 
minimal introduction and elimination rules, perhaps some other more minimal 
Wrightian platitudes.16 Further, it seems plausible that this way of thinking 
about deflationism is compatible with thinking that truth is explanatorily 
potent (at least inasmuch as the role identified here demands). I will adopt 
something like this conception of deflationism in the following section. 
However, it is worth noting that there that are other conceptions of 
deflationism which argue for deflationism by drawing attention to the putative 
explanatory impotence of the concept. I take it that if this is the type of 
deflationism that you favour, then this type will be ruled out by the first 
constraint.  
The second constraint is that whatever the concept of truth is, it must not yield 
an anti-realist metaphysics. You might think that this is too strong. Take a 
standard characterisation of realism to be a commitment to two theses: a claim 
about existence (i.e. objects of the relevant kind exist) and a claim about 
independence (i.e. the existence of those objects is not dependent on human 
minds, languages, theories, etc.). On the metaontological deflationist approach, 
existence is secured easily. What of independence? Both Hale and Thomasson 
explicitly commit themselves to views which appear to require independence: 
part of the Neo-Fregean project is to show how we can embrace Mathematical 
Platonism, and Thomasson aims at a ‘Simple Realism’. I suspect that the drive 
behind their commitment is that in the face of challenges to their approach 
they want to reject certain anti-realist platitudes. Hale and Thomasson reject 
the view that ontological commitments derived in the way they suggest: (1) 
depend for their existence on human language or minds, (2) only exist because 
we have a language to describe them, (3) would cease to exist if we did, etc. 
Whether this is a robust enough conception of ‘independence’ to count as a 
really realist position, I leave to the reader to decide. What is important for my 
present purposes is that given this constraint, some epistemically constrained 
conceptions of truth will not do. Again, explicating what the commitments of 
                                            
16 See Wright (1992). 
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epistemically constrained conceptions of truth are requires subtly. There 
certainly are, however, conceptions of epistemically constrained truth which 
will be ruled out. For example, this constraint will rule out some conceptions 
of truth where, for example, being true is analysed as holding true. I remain 
silent on whether there are more sophisticated forms of alethic anti-realism 
which are compatible with metaontological deflationism, but radical 
constructivist positions are ruled out. 
The third constraint is that whatever the concept of truth is, it must not yield 
an explanatory metaphysics. The ontological commitments generated by the 
approach should not be taken to be explanatory ‘posits’ which are part of a 
metaphysically explanatory theory. Thomasson says: we do not get to say that 
our ontological commitments “explain what it is that makes our sentences 
true.” (Thomasson 2015, 157) We need to be very careful with this constraint. 
I think that the commitment motivating this constraint is the following: it must 
be the case that we are permitted to start from the truth sentences of the 
language in order to determine the ontological commitments. Think about the 
fourth feature that Thomasson claims application conditions must have: 
“Application conditions must not take the following form: ‘K’ applies 
iff Ks exist. (While this will always be true, it will not count as an 
application condition, in our terms.)” (Thomasson 2015, 96) 
What we need to be able to do if we are metaontological deflationists is take 
legitimate uses of the truth predicate to not require antecedent metaphysical 
assurance. A consequence of this way of thinking about truth requires that we 
don’t want a conception of truth where we will be able to go back and 
consequently say that the statements we thought were true are in fact false. 
Imagine the following. We start with some class of statements that we take to 
true, say moral discourse. We semantically analyse the statements and 
determine that the truth of these statements requires commitment to moral 
properties. Now, what cannot happen for the metaontological deflationist is 
that we discover that actually the world contains no such properties and so the 
class of statements we started with is really false. There is a general rejection of 
error theories for the metaontological deflationist.  
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I can imagine some resistance to this claim. Consider phlogiston. It seems like 
we have a case of a meaningful term, which at one time appeared in statements 
which were thought to be true. Then, scientists discovered that there was 
actually no such thing as phlogiston, and so the statements that were 
previously believed to be true, were in fact false. Isn’t this an acceptable case of 
error theory? I suspect that the metaontological deflationist needs to say no. 
What happened in the case of ‘error theory’ about phlogiston is that science 
progressed and this altered the class of statements from which we derived 
ontological commitments. It was not by metaphysical reflection on the nature 
of the world that we arrived at the conclusion that phlogiston does not exist, 
and thus the phlogiston involving statements are false.  
I think that Reichenbach’s distinction between the direction of discovery and 
the direction of justification can help to illuminate this more. (Reichenbach 
1938) The direction of epistemological explanation and the direction of 
metaphysical explanation do not have to run in the same direction. For the 
metaontological deflationist, given that they are deflating the project of 
ontology, the only direction of explanation with which they are concerned 
(inasmuch as metaphysics in concerned) is the epistemological one. We have 
no access to facts about the direction of metaphysical explanation, and so talk 
of ontological commitments explaining the truth of statements with which we 
start cannot do justice to the desired deflationism. Given this constraint, 
conceptions of truth in terms of truthmaking are ruled out cannot do justice to 
this constraint.  
 
vii. Truth for Metaontological Deflationists 
 
I have argued that truth plays an indispensable role in the metaontological 
deflationist framework, and that there are three constraints on how the operant 
notion of truth can be understood. I argued that this rules out a number of 
approaches to truth. In this section I offer a constructive proposal for how the 
metaontological deflationist could articulate the conception of truth that they 
need.   
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Before I start it is important to acknowledge a dialectical tension. I contend 
that we aren't going to be able to get a handle on the right way to think about 
truth in the metaontological deflationist framework by engaging with questions 
about what truth is. If the metaontological deflationist aims to deflate the project 
of ontology by showing how we needn’t use metaphysical methods to answer 
ontological questions, then approaching the question of what the right 
conception of truth is for this project by asking questions about the nature of 
truth which cannot be answered easily would undermine the very aspirations of 
the metaontological deflationist project. It is therefore my contention that the 
metaontological deflationist should rather look to the theoretical role assigned 
to truth in the theory of meaning and interpretation to articulate the notion 
that they require. In what follows I make a suggestion for an approach to 
thinking about truth that I take to be fruitful for the metaontological 
deflationist.  
Consider Davidson’s metasemantic project of radical interpretation that I 
outlined in Chapter 4. Recall that a methodological assumption on the behalf 
of the interpreter is the principle of charity. Davidson claims that speakers hold 
“a sentence to be true because of what the sentence (in his language) means, 
and because of what he believes.” (Davidson 1973b, 134) We saw that charity 
can be thought of a commitment to two further principles: coherence and 
correspondence. Importantly for my present purposes, correspondence says 
that the interpreter should take there to be a relationship between the beliefs 
and utterances of speakers of a language and their environment. Thus, 
attributions of belief and assignments of meaning must be consistent with the 
evidence afforded by our knowledge of the speaker's environment.  
The goal of the interpreter is to generate a T-sentence for every sentence of the 
object language, whilst respecting the principle of charity, and radical 
interpretation proceeds by holding belief fixed to work out meaning. 
(Davidson 1973b, 137) On such an approach, truth then gets into the picture 
by playing an explanatory role in the theory of interpretation: it is that feature 
which we take sentences to have when we assert or believe them. Further, 
because of the methodological presuppositions for radical interpretation, we 
can, if we like, talk about the content of belief or sentences as corresponding to 
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the way the world is. Built into the principle of charity was the claim that there 
is a relationship between the content of beliefs and utterances and speakers’ 
environment, and, in negotiating an interpretation to make allowances for 
explicable error, the interpreter will bring in environmental factors as 
explanans. Thus, when we use the theory of truth to give the theory of 
meaning in Davidsonian style, and we engage in a radical interpretation project, 
this commitment results in the empirical claim that there is a correspondence 
between the content of our utterances and the worldly things they are about. 
Importantly, given my purposes in this chapter, the motivation is not hefty 
metaphysical considerations to do with the nature of truth, but rather 
naturalistically respectable constraints on the theory of interpretation.  
Returning to the constraints that I articulated in the last section, we can see 
how the way of thinking about truth that I advocate here conforms to these 
constraints. First, this ‘interpretationist’ conception is capable of playing a 
robust theoretical role. In addition to this, because of the principle of 
correspondence it gives us something principled to say about why and how it 
can play this role. Second, it doesn’t furnish us with an anti-realist view, at least 
in principle. Whether this way of thinking about truth requires alethic anti-
realism will in part depend on what you think the right notion of truth is for 
the theory of interpretation. So, for example, if you are convinced by 
Dummettian arguments that the right way to understand the conception of 
truth at work in the theory of interpretation is such that it is not bivalent, then 
perhaps the way of thinking about truth that I advance here will not deliver 
alethic realism. However, given that the status of the metaontological 
deflationist independence condition is in need of further articulation, I am 
confident that a consistent picture can be constructed. Third, and finally, my 
recommendation articulates a way of thinking about truth which does justice to 
the sense in which metaontological deflationism requires that ontological 
commitments are not metaphysically explanatory. The interpretationist strategy 
pursued recovers some notion of correspondence, but without committing us 
to the short of heavy duty truthmaking that the metaontological deflationist 
wishes to avoid.  
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V. Conclusion  
 
I have argued that if the metaontological deflationist approach to ontological 
inquiry is to be workable, it needs to be furnished with an adequate account of 
truth. Further, I claimed that as it stands, an adequate account of truth has not 
been sufficiently articulated. Given the significant theoretical role that truth 
plays, this should be worrying. On the one hand, making good on the 
epistemological and methodological virtues of the approach is held hostage to 
the development of such an account. On the other hand, and more 
importantly for my current purposes, for the metaontological deflationist’s 
conception of the role of truth in metaphysics to be compelling, they need to 
be able to provide some kind of story about how it is that truth can play the 
role assigned to it. Nonetheless, I suggested that an adequate notion could be 
articulated, and I have gestured towards an approach I believe to be a fruitful 
in attempting to do just that. Of course, the acceptability of this way of 
thinking about truth is going to depend on whether it is an acceptable way of 
thinking about the role of truth in the theory of meaning. 
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Chapter Six: Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, 
and The Metaphysical Consequences of 
Epistemically Constrained Truth  
 
I. Introduction  
 
This chapter investigates how commitment to an epistemically constrained 
conception of truth can affect the possibility and nature of metaphysical 
inquiry. I consider two historically influential arguments for the claim that truth 
is epistemically constrained: one from Dummett, according to which we must 
hold that truth is epistemically constrained once we do justice to the role that 
truth plays in the theory of meaning; and one from Putnam, according to 
which considerations from model theory show us that truth cannot be such 
that it is epistemically unconstrained. Like Lewis, Dummett and Putnam each 
aspire to a univocal conception of truth: whatever truth concept plays a role in 
metaphysical inquiry, it is identical to the one that plays a role in the theory of 
meaning. Contra Lewis, however, both Dummett and Putnam take it to be the 
case that once we articulate the demands placed on the concept by the theory 
of meaning, this requires that we reject a certain conception of the 
metaphysical enterprise. Whilst different sets of considerations motivate 
Dummett’s and Putnam’s respective arguments for epistemically constrained 
truth, they both take this alethic commitment to preclude the possibility of 
realist metaphysics.  
Before commencing the discussion, it is useful to provide some provisional 
clarifications about two salient notions in this chapter. First: epistemically 
constrained truth. Neither Dummett nor Putnam define truth in terms of some 
epistemic notion or capacity. The predicate ‘is true’ is not defined as the 
predicate (e.g.) ‘is warrantedly assertible’. I dedicate some time to elucidating 
this distance between Dummett’s project and definability in the next section. 
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In addition to this point about definability, it is important to register that 
neither philosopher holds the obviously false belief that all truths are known. 
Rather they reject what I’ll term alethic realism (following Künne 2003, 20): the 
view that some truths are evidence transcendent. The alethic realist thinks that 
for domains which aren’t effectively decidable there could be a kind of 
inevitable ignorance; that there are some sentences which human beings are 
capable of understanding, but which could never the be content of a justified 
belief. Those who hold that truth is epistemically constrained deny this and 
claim that truth cannot outrun what it is in principle possible for some human 
(i.e. cognitively finite) being to be justified in believing. Dummett and Putnam 
argue against slightly different manifestations of alethic realism: Dummett 
argues that truth is not bivalent, and Putnam argues against the view that there 
could be undetectable error.  
By way of a second clarification, it is useful to make precise the sense in which 
Dummett’s and Putnam’s arguments impact upon the status and nature of 
metaphysical inquiry. In both instances, their discussion of metaphysics does 
not concern first-order metaphysical theses, but rather pertains to what might 
be called second-order metaphysics: the disagreement between realism and 
anti-realism. This is a divergence from the sort of issues which have 
preoccupied previous chapters. Whilst all the other philosophers and 
approaches I have considered offer a particular method which makes use of 
their particular conception of truth, Dummett’s and Putnam’s programs aim to 
rule out the possibility of a certain kind of metaphysics directly. So, for 
example, the metaphysical method advocated by Thomasson further commits 
her to a type of metaontological deflationism. Likewise, the method offered by 
Davidson further commits him to a type of structuralism. They offer a 
particular method for answering metaphysical questions and this method has 
implications for the subsequent status of metaphysics. Dummett and Putnam, 
however, each present specific arguments against metaphysics having a 
particular status.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I consider Dummett. (§II) I outline his 
theory of meaning, the central role assigned to the concept of truth in this 
project, and how this role constrains the nature of the property which can play 
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this role. In turn, I explain how this commitment precludes evidence 
transcendent truths, and requires the rejection of realism. Second, I consider 
Putnam. (§III) I briefly trace the development of his thought about truth from 
the Putnam we encountered in Chapters Two and Three to the Putnam of the 
model theoretic argument. I outline the model theoretic argument, and how 
this argument aims to establish both the impossibility of realist metaphysics 
and the epistemically constrained nature of truth. Finally, I close this chapter 
by making some general remarks on the relationship between metaphysics and 
epistemically constrained truth. (§IV)  
The aim of this chapter is not to establish that truth is in fact epistemically 
constrained. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the supposed connection 
between truth and realism. Dummett and Putnam each think that it is a 
constitutive thesis of realism that truth is not epistemically constrained. So, 
when they show that truth is epistemically constrained, we have to reject 
metaphysical realism. One way of resisting this argument is to show that truth 
is epistemically unconstrained. Another route is to undermine the connection 
between truth and realism. This is the approach that I investigate here. In 
particular, I want to defend the following conditional: if truth is epistemically 
constrained, then this has unavoidable metametaphysical consequences. 
Defending this conditional requires some significant revision of what 
Dummett and Putnam take to be the realist/anti-realist consequences of their 
respective arguments.  
  
II. Dummett 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline Dummett’s case for epistemically 
constrained truth and explain how this commitment rules out a certain kind of 
metaphysics. Dummett provides a clear statement of what he takes to be the 
insight of his position: 
“The whole point of my approach to these problems has been to show 
that the theory of meaning underlies metaphysics.” (Dummett 1978, xl) 
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This section attempts to unpack this claim. There are two interconnected 
components: a conception of the theory of meaning, and a view about the 
nature of metaphysics. I claim that truth, for Dummett, is operationally 
constrained by the role that it must play in the theory of meaning, which is in 
turn constrained by the nature of linguistic understanding. That truth is thus 
constrained precludes a realist metaphysical enterprise.   
 
i. Truth and Meaning  
 
There are two clear influences on Dummett’s thinking about truth and 
meaning, which he explicitly acknowledges: Frege and Wittgenstein17. 
Dummett thinks that the central notions for a theory of meaning are going to 
be notions of truth, truth-conditions, and compositionality.18 How these 
notions should be foundationally understood is going to turn on facts about 
language acquisition and manifestation. So we must offer a theory of meaning 
which has a formal structure such that we can explain how the truth values of 
syntactically complex sentences depends on the truth values of the composite 
parts, but the relevant notion of truth must be constrained by facts about how 
we use language, how we make and justify assertion, etc. Dummett therefore 
proposes a theory of meaning which consists in giving epistemically 
constrained truth conditions. In this subsection I explain what this meaning 
theory is, and what motivates it.  
It is worth noting, in the interests of clarity, that Dummett’s thinking about the 
role that truth should play in the theory of meaning changed quite 
substantially. There is a popular reading of Dummett according to which he 
eschews the notion of truth in the theory of meaning altogether. In its place, he 
rather favours a theory of meaning in terms of assertibility conditions. 
(Williamson 2014, 22) Whilst it is correct that at one point Dummett did 
                                            
17 Although he emphasizes that post-1960, he wouldn’t have identified as a ‘Wittgensteinian’. 
(Dummett 1978, xii) 
18 Throughout this section where I talk about Dummett’s theory of meaning I am focussing on 
his theory of sense. 
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favour an assertibility conditional theory of meaning, by Truth and Other 
Enigmas the mature Dummettian position is that the meaning of a sentence 
should be given in terms of its truth conditions. Thus, what is revisionary 
about this mature Dummettian position is not the rejection of a truth 
conditional theory of meaning, but rather a substantial revision of what the 
permissible conception of truth must be. 
Dummett is signed up to the idea that linguistic understanding consists in 
knowledge of the conditions under which a statement would be true. Whilst he 
takes it as philosophical orthodoxy that this relationship between meaning and 
truth conditions holds, he claims that the nature of this relationship is often 
left insufficiently elucidated. Specifically, he thinks that those philosophers who 
think that merely offering something like a Tarskian truth definition19 is 
sufficient for capturing the conceptual and theoretical role of truth are 
mistaken. (Dummett 1978, xxi) As he says: “the problem is not whether 
meaning is to be explained in terms of truth-conditions, but of what notion of 
truth is admissible.” (Dummett 1978, xxii) What’s wrong with the Tarski 
definition according to Dummett is that it doesn’t do justice to the theoretical 
role of truth. In fairness to Tarski, the explicit definition he gives of truth in 
terms of satisfaction by all sequences isn’t intended to have the sort of 
theoretical significance which Dummett takes an adequate elucidation of the 
concept to require. Dummett thus accepts the T-schema, but thinks that 
further elucidation of the concepts of truth is required.  
Whilst truth plays a central and indispensable role in his semantic theorising, 
Dummett does not think that it is a fundamental notion. (Dummett 1978, xxiii) 
Satisfactorily explicating Dummett’s claim that truth is not a fundamental 
notion requires subtlety. Dummett is committed to the Fregean thesis that 
truth is somehow conceptually basic. In different places Frege claims that truth 
is irreducible, indefinable, and not explainable. (Künne 2003, 16) In trying to 
articulate Dummett’s precise view about the relative fundamentality of the 
concept of truth by pointing to his Fregean commitment, it would be messy of 
me to seamlessly elide reduction, definition, and explanation. All of these 
                                            
19 See Tarski (1936). 
 162 
 
claims say slightly different things about truth, and it is important to 
distinguish them. I suggest therefore that we should interpret the Fregean 
thesis as a claim about definition: truth cannot be conceptually analysed into 
more basic concepts. However, in addition to this claim that truth cannot be 
defined, Frege also holds that “in the laws of truth the meaning of the word 
“true” is spelled out.” (Frege, quoted in Künne 2003, 17-18) So, whilst the 
concept of truth cannot be analysed, we can say informative things about the 
concept by looking to the role it plays in logic: truth is that which is preserved 
by valid deductions.  
There is of course much more to say with regards to these exegetical subtleties 
in Frege. However, this is enough to get a handle on Dummett’s view. When 
Dummett claims that truth is not fundamental we should take this claim to 
pertain to explanatory rather than conceptual priority. That is: to get a handle 
on the kind of concept truth is, we do not offer an account of it in more basic 
terms, but rather we must look at the theoretical role that it plays. Dummett 
thinks that the primary role for the concept of truth is in the meaning theory.  
So, what role does truth play in the meaning theory? Dummett holds that the 
meaning of sentences of our language can only be given when there is a 
method for determining their truth values that we are in principle able to carry 
out. The relevant notion of truth for Dummett is one which is to be explained 
in terms of the success of assertion. (Dummett 1978, xvii) Truth and falsity are 
therefore inextricably tied to our linguistic and epistemic practices. Dummett 
urges that to explain why this is so we need to start from a question about 
what the meaning theory is supposed to do. (Dummett 1993, 16) He thinks 
that an answer to this question is given by reflecting on the nature of linguistic 
understanding. He claims: 
“A semantic theory is not a complete meaning-theory but only a 
preliminary outline sketch of one; and it cannot be judged correct or 
incorrect until it has been expanded into a meaning-theory which 
displays the connection between the meanings of the sentences, as 
represented by the theory, and the practice of using the language.” 
(Dummett 1993, 18) 
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Dummett offers two arguments to the effect that truth must be epistemically 
constrained, both of which trade on claims about what is required for linguistic 
understanding. First: the acquisition argument. As I have said, Dummett is 
committed to the Fregean thesis that to understand a statement, we must know 
its truth conditions. Dummett holds the prima facie plausible constraint on 
knowledge ascriptions that in order for knowledge ascriptions to be legitimate 
it must at least in principle be possible for that speaker to have acquired that 
knowledge. Since we could not acquire knowledge of evidence transcendent 
truth conditions, truth conditions must in principle be knowable. Second: the 
manifestation argument. Starting from the same Fregean assumption, 
Dummett adds to this the Wittgensteinian thought that understanding does not 
consist some kind of inner state, but rather consists in a kind of practical 
ability. Thus, if we ascribe knowledge of truth conditions to a speaker, it must 
in principle be possible for that speaker to manifest that knowledge in their use 
of the language. Knowledge of evidence transcendent truth conditions cannot 
be manifested in our use of a language. So, again, given these considerations to 
do with linguistic understanding, truth conditions must in principle be 
knowable. 
The claim that truth conditions must be in principle knowable requires 
exegetical subtly. It is clear there is some kind of verificationist commitment 
here and so the important question is how much verificationism. Following 
Putnam, Dummett concedes that:  
“It is misleading to concentrate too heavily, as I have usually done, on a 
form of anti-realist theory of meaning in which the meaning of a 
statement is given in terms of what conclusively verifies it; often such 
verification is not to be had”. (Dummett 1978, xxxviii) 
In this spirit, then, a mature Dummett rejects what he describes as extreme 
constructivism:  
“[to deny] that there are true statements whose truth we do not at 
present recognise and shall not in fact ever recognise… would appear 
to espouse a constructivism altogether too extreme. One surely cannot 
equate truth with being recognised… as true”. (Dummett 1993, 446) 
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In these passages Dummett wants to resist the thought that epistemically 
constrained truth requires that all truths are in fact known.  
Let’s consider an example. Take two arbitrary numbers, say 3573624 and 
3695827. These two numbers have a product, but let’s imagine that no one has 
ever actually multiplied these numbers together before. Thus, there is a 
sentence, ‘the product of 3573624 and 3695827 is x’ of which no-one knows 
the truth value. Further, is it possible that no-one may ever know the truth 
value of this sentence. However, the reason for this is merely that no one 
bothered to find out. If someone wanted to find out whether this sentence is 
true, there exists a method for determining its truth. Contrast this with the 
sentence ‘every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two 
primes’. The explanation of our ignorance about the truth of this claim seems 
significantly different to the previous claim. There isn’t a procedure for 
ascertaining the truth of this sentence. All of this is to say that there is a 
significant distinction between the truth of a sentence being known and it 
being knowable.  
So, understanding a particular statement involves knowing its truth condition. 
We require knowledge of truth conditions to do compositional semantics. But 
what it is to know the truth condition for that statement is to know whether it 
could be correctly asserted or correctly denied. The modal distinction (i.e. 
between the truth of a sentence being known or knowable) needs to be spelled 
out in terms of verification procedures. To do this, without falling into the sort 
of extreme constructivism that Dummett rejects, we need to use 
counterfactuals.20 The thought is that if we have actual or counterfactual 
procedures for ascertaining the truth of the sentence under consideration then 
we can say that the statement is either corrected asserted or correctly denied. 
Where there exists no procedure for determining the truth value for a 
statement, even counterfactually, we must refuse to assert that the statement 
has a truth condition. Consequently, the statement in question cannot be said 
to be determinately true or determinately false. The requirement that all truth 
                                            
20 This isn’t to give an analysis of verification procedures in terms of counterfactuals, but rather 
to just help elucidate the notion. See Dummett (1993, 215-247) for details.  
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must be knowable proves to have consequences for Dummett’s view of which 
logical laws to accept, which, in turn, has consequences for the metaphysical 
question of realism. The next section is devoted to elucidating these 
commitments.   
 
ii. Truth and Realism  
 
Dummett claims that the debate between realism and anti-realism as it has 
been traditionally conceived is misguided. In the Preface to Truth and Other 
Enigmas he claims that when considering a certain domain of inquiry we have 
two questions to ponder. First, we might wonder how we settle a dispute over 
the ontological status of the objects in question. Second, we might wonder 
what bearing either metaphysical view (realist or anti-realist) has on the forms 
of reasoning employed within the debate. (Dummett 1978, xxv-xxvi) In posing 
these two questions, we start to get an idea of the fact that Dummett thinks the 
questions of metaphysics and the questions of what logical laws to accept are 
importantly connected. Indeed, he claims that as they normally proceed, 
debates about realism obscure that there is a single issue at stake:   
“There could, indeed, be said to be a single higher-order issue: under 
what circumstances are we entitled to assume the principle of bivalence 
for some class of statements?” (Dummett 1978, xxxi) 
It is important to distinguish the two distinct components of Dummett’s views 
about metaphysics. There are ontological questions: questions about what 
kinds of things exist. The Fregeanism in Dummett allies him with the neo-
Fregean view explored in the previous chapter, according to which ontological 
questions are in some sense easy to answer. We are committed to a candidate 
object existing when the corresponding singular term occupies a reference 
demanding position in a true sentence (and the same mutatis mutandis for 
predicates and properties). There is thus no further ontological question to be 
answered once we know which statements are true. The other dimension of 
metaphysics is concerned with objectivity of the subject matter. Whether the 
objects to which we are committed are ‘independent’. Dummett holds that 
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independence is not “a possible object of discovery alongside the propositions 
it proposes to interpret: it is a doctrine concerning the status of those 
propositions.” (Dummett 1993, 8) So how should this independence thesis be 
understood? Dummett thinks that the non-metaphorical understanding of 
independence is bivalence. Realism is thus concerned with whether the 
statements pertaining to a particular ontological debate are determinately truth 
or determinately false. (Dummett 1978, xxxii)  
We might wonder why we should hold that the fight between realism and anti-
realism should be over whether truth is bivalent. Dummett conceives of two 
ways in which we might try to tackle the question of realism. We might 
approach it from the top down; that is, we might proceed by attempting to 
deliver an answer to the metaphysical question first, and from there discern the 
correct conception of truth and meaning, and “hence to deduce the logic we 
ought to accept as governing them”. (Dummett 1993, 12) Dummett thinks, 
however, that such an approach cannot be viable. He thinks it is 
methodologically opaque how we would even start trying to answer the 
metaphysical questions. In particular, that evaluating the metaphysical 
arguments independently of considerations to do with the appropriate notions 
of meaning and truth, cannot help but be metaphorical. Dummett claims that 
conceptions of realism which hold that what is at issue is what is ‘basic’, 
‘grounded’, ‘fundamental’, etc. makes the debate hopelessly obscure. Instead of 
this top down method, Dummett prefers a method that starts with the 
question of the correct model of meaning for the disputed class. Once we have 
ascertained the correct model of meaning for the language (or for a part of the 
language), we are in a position to elucidate the concept of truth in play for that 
language (or part of it). (Dummett 1993, 14; 1978, 146) Thus, for Dummett if 
we want the debate between the realist and the anti-realist to be tractable, we 
need to make sense of what is at issue by focussing on the appropriate notion 
of truth for the language. (Dummett 1978, xix)  
The issue of realism for Dummett, therefore, is an issue of whether the truth 
values of the statements are fully determinate. (Dummett 1978, xxix) That is: 
does bivalence hold? Importantly, the method we use to answer this question 
must take as its starting point the theory of meaning: 
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“Thus the answer to the question how is it possible to call a basic 
logical law in doubt is that, underlying the disagreement about logic, 
there is a yet more fundamental disagreement about the correct model 
of meaning, that is, about what we should regard as constituting an 
understanding of a statement.” (Dummett 1993, 17) 
Why might you think bivalence holds for a particular domain of discourse? 
You might think it holds because there is an effective decision procedure or an 
effective method of verifiability for determining whether a statement is true or 
false. Statements have a determinate truth value in virtue of their having some 
effective method for determining their truth value. The conception of truth 
relevant is thoroughly epistemic constrained. By contrast, you might think that 
truth transcends available evidence; that statements are either true or false 
independently of our ability to recognise them as such. In sum, we get 
bivalence one of two ways: (1) because there is evidence transcendent truth, or 
(2) because we have an effective method for ascertaining truth. Accordingly, 
the argument between the realist and the anti-realist is a dispute about whether 
all truths are knowable. 
To settle whether truth is bivalent, therefore, we have to determine whether 
truth can be evidence transcendent. If you were of the persuasion where you 
thought that truth is epistemically unconstrained, it would be a consequence of 
this concept that truth can outstrip what is knowable. However, Dummett of 
course thinks that we should reject the view that there can be evidence 
transcendent truth, as this cannot do the theoretical work we require of the 
concept of truth in an empirical theory of understanding. What we learn from 
the manifestation and acquisition arguments is that the proper analysis of the 
concept of truth delivers an implicit definition where it is an analytic truth that 
what is (actually or counterfactually) warrantedly assertible is true. Where we 
have no idea of what would count as warrant, talk of determinate truth or 
falsity does not make sense. The anti-realist does not have to come up with 
examples where bivalence fails – if there is no gap between warranted 
assertibility and truth then it is possible that it does and therefore we entitled to 
reject bivalence. This way of understanding the dispute makes it a modal 
dispute about the consequences of the concept of truth. The anti-realist 
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maintains that there shouldn’t be a gap between the concept of truth and the 
laws of truth – hence bivalence does not follow.  
The law of bivalence says that for any sentence of the language, that sentence 
is either true or it is false. In light of the manifestation and acquisition 
arguments, Dummett thinks we must reject the law of bivalence, and that this 
will settle the metaphysical controversies over realism “without residue”. 
(Dummett 1993, 14) Thus, Dummett is committed to a global form of anti-
realism once we realise that bivalence must go. This global anti-realism claim 
requires some care. In some ways, Dummett represents the methodology of 
choosing a side in the realist / anti-realist debate as a piecemeal approach. We 
must work through the individual domains of inquiry and determine whether, 
for this specific field of inquiry, it is such that the statements are determinately 
true or determinately false. (Dummett 1978, xxxix) Now, it may be the case 
that as a matter of fact there is some restricted domain of discourse for which 
every statement is determinately true or determinately false. However, the 
reason why this is so is because all the sentences in this restricted domain have 
some effective method for determining their truth or falsity, not because their 
truth is evidence transcendent. So, Dummett is a global anti-realist in the 
following sense: (1) he denies the law of bivalence and (2) if for some restricted 
class of sentences all those sentences are determinately true or determinately 
false, it is only so because all the sentences have an effective method for 
determining their truth or falsity. 
In sum, given that Dummett is in the business of compositional truth-theoretic 
semantics, we get to metaphysics in some sense merely by the disquotational 
property of truth. However, Dummett forwards a sceptical position about 
classical semantics. Once we take the manifestation and acquisition arguments 
seriously, we see that there could not be evidence transcendent truth, which 
means we need to reject bivalence, and this means we need to reject realism.  
 
III. Putnam  
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In Chapters Two and Three when considering what motivates the talk of truth 
in Dyke and Sider’s respective projects, I suggested a Putnamian conception of 
truth. I claimed that the Putnam of Meaning and the Moral Sciences forwards a 
kind of empirical realism about truth. According to this conception, we 
essentially have a correspondence theory, but what Putnam deems an 
empirically satisfactory one. He claims that the primary constraint on what 
counts as a good truth-definition for a language is that it should be the one 
which enters into the best explanation of the behaviour of a speaker. (Putnam 
1978, 41) Rationalising the behaviour of a speaker is to offer an explanation, 
and in order to offer this explanation we need to have an adequate handle on 
the connections between understanding, truth conditions, belief, action, etc. 
(Putnam 1978, 41) This is how correspondence gets into the picture: 
“‘Correspondence’ between words and sets of things… can be viewed as part 
of an explanatory model of the speakers’ collective behaviour.” (Putnam 1978, 
123) Putnam thinks that the fact that there is such correspondence is what 
explains the success of what we can do with language, and the success of 
natural science. (Putnam 1978, 111)  
The Putnam that I discuss in this section offers a different view of the role of 
truth in meaning and metaphysics. Putnam’s views about truth and 
metaphysics changed (more than once, but we’ll only be concerned with the 
first of his transformations), and they did so in part in response to Dummett’s 
insights. (Putnam 1978, viii) Putnam thinks that we must take seriously the 
thought that truth is epistemically constrained. The biggest difference this 
change makes is in how Putnam understands the gap between warranted 
assertability and truth. In the earlier work Putnam holds that there must be a 
difference as something can be warrantedly assertible but not true. (Putnam 
1978, 108) However, he later argues that we must reject this commitment and 
hence the traditional realist distinction between true and ideal theory.  
The rest of this section is dedicated to properly elucidating Putnam’s view of 
truth and realism. Before I do this, however, I think it is interesting to draw out 
a similarity between earlier period Putnam and the version of his views about 
truth I consider here. In Meaning and the Moral Sciences Putnam makes a general 
and constraining claim about truth. Putnam holds that how we understand the 
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concept of truth should be determined not merely by its formal properties, but 
by the role that it plays within total theory. (Putnam 1978, 37) The significant 
divergence between these different time slices of Putnam, then, isn’t a 
methodological one. To give an adequate account of the concept of truth we 
should look to the role that it plays. The divergence comes as Putnam forwards 
an argument which shows that truth cannot play a role that he previously 
assigned to it. It is to this that I now turn.  
 
iii. Putnam’s Attack on Realist Truth  
 
Putnam claims that his model theoretic argument “has profound implications 
for the great metaphysical dispute about realism which has always been the 
central dispute in the philosophy of language.” (Putnam 1980, 464) Putnam’s 
model theoretic argument aims to show that given plausible considerations 
from model theory, we are misguided in believing that our language can be 
hooked up with a mind-independent world in the right way; where ‘right way’ 
is to be understood as ‘the way the metaphysical realist purports they are 
hooked up’. Putnam thinks this motivates a move away from metaphysical 
realism towards his preferred ‘internal realism’. 
Before turning to the argument itself, I need to outline how Putnam 
characterises the commitments of metaphysical realism. On his view, the realist 
is not committed to one thesis but three interrelated theses. First, a claim about 
the world: “THE WORLD” is to be characterised as independent, in the sense 
of independent of any representation of it. Second, a claim about language: 
that the reference relation for the realist is one of correspondence. That is: that 
there is a determinate reference relation which holds between expressions of 
our language and the parts of the world to which they refer. Third, a 
uniqueness thesis: that there is a singular correspondence between the terms of 
a theory and the objects and the properties to which they refer. (Putnam 1981, 
49)  
Expressing the uniqueness thesis requires some subtlety. Putnam claims that 
for the realist there is a singular correspondence between theory and the world. 
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We might think this is too strong a requirement and as such Putnam is 
overstating the realist commitments. There are some forms of semantic 
indeterminacy that do not seem, prima facie, to be a problem for metaphysical 
realism. There is a prevalent phenomenon of indeterminacy in natural 
language: vagueness. It is not particularly controversial to claim that natural 
language is vague: reference is not always determinant. Paradigm terms that 
exhibit this indeterminacy would be, ‘tall’, ‘heap’, ‘bald’, etc. Such terms admit 
borderline cases; cases where it is not clear whether the predicate applies. 
(Keefe 2000, 6) Such terms apparently lack clear extensions21. Given that there 
are vague expressions in a language, it seems that we need to make sense of the 
reference of a term not being wholly determinant. In offering an explanation of 
this phenomenon, a semantic approach has been historically most popular: 
theorists have tried to explain this vagueness in terms of features of the 
language, and have offered a semantics and a logic for the suspect expressions. 
(Merricks 2001, 146) We might think, therefore, that the existence of vague 
predicates suggests that a one-to-one correspondence is too committal. 
Consider your total theory of reality. Perhaps you quantify over colours. There 
could be two properties, red and red*, which the word "red" in the theory 
could pick out. If our best total theory contains the predicate “is red”, and yet 
there are two equally good candidate referents for “red”, this might seem like 
enough to suggest that there is not a singular correspondence, but rather that 
there may be multiple equally good ones.  
I think that the realist could make three moves. First, perhaps she could 
retreat. A one-to-one correspondence is too committal, and as such the realist 
accepts that in some instances there is not a singular correspondence. The 
theory can correspond to greater and lesser degrees, and the realist prefers 
those theories which correspond more. However, there can still be a degree of 
flexibility, especially in those cases of mundane indeterminacy considered.22 
                                            
21 It is worth noting that the view that extensions are not determinate only fits with some 
explanations of vagueness. For example, according to Williamson’s epistemicism about 
vagueness (1994), the referents of vague terms are determinate; the source of the vagueness is 
in our own ignorance.  
22 Perhaps this could be metaphysically spelled out in terms of a commitment to ontic 
vagueness. This would not be to move away from realism as we can be realist about what is 
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The second option is stricter. This type of realist may object to the putative 
problem, and they will say that no metaphysical theory would quantify over 
colours simpliciter. Perhaps this is because they think that colours are not the 
types of things that belong in the fundamental description of reality, or perhaps 
it is because the language we use to talk about colours in metaphysics do not 
contain the predicates of everyday English but rather precisified technical 
predicates.23 Thus, this realist maintains the one-to-one correspondence, by 
eradicating instances of mundane indeterminacy by some means. Third, 
perhaps the realist could advance the view of vagueness advocated by 
Williamson, according to which there is uniqueness, the terms in question do 
determinately correspond, but rather locate the source of vagueness in our own 
ignorance. (Williamson 1994) Putnam seems to be levelling his argument 
against realists of the second and third variety. For our purposes, what is 
important is the thought that there should be an intended interpretation for 
our theory, even if in some cases we cannot know what it is. The realist 
contention is that the intended interpretation is the one that matches the terms 
of the theory to the way the world is. 
And so, we return to Putnam’s characterisation of realism. Once we have these 
three theses, it should be clear that it is possible that we may be unable to 
represent THE WORLD at all. To put it in Putnam’s terms: truth is, for the 
metaphysical realist, radically non-epistemic. (Putnam 1977, 485) The theory 
which is epistemically ideal, in the sense of meeting all our theoretical virtues, 
might still be false. Of course, it might be the case that ideal theory is true; the 
claim is not that ideal theory must fall short of truth. Rather the claim is that, 
for the realist, idealness does not constitute or guarantee truth. The realist must 
hold that there is a gap between ideal theory and true theory. At the heart of 
Putnam’s attack, therefore, is a distinction that the realist must be committed 
to, but, according to Putnam, cannot maintain: 
                                                                                                               
metaphysically indeterminate. For some illuminating discussion please see Barnes and Williams 
(2011). 
23 This approach obviously resembles Sider’s move to Ontologese that I considered in Chapter 
Three. 
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“Here again, the realist – or, at least, the hard-core metaphysical realist 
– wishes it to be the case that truth and rational acceptability should be 
independent notions. He wishes it to be the case that what, e.g., electrons 
are should be distinct (and possibly different from) from what we 
believe them to be or even what we would believe them to be given the 
best experiments and the epistemically best theory. Once again, the 
realist – the hard-core metaphysical realist – holds that our intentions 
single out “the” model, and that our beliefs are then either true or false 
in “the” model whether we can find out their truth values or not.” (Putnam 
1980, 472) 
Now, let’s turn to the argument. I should note that “the model theoretic 
argument” doesn’t strictly speaking pick any one thing out. Putnam forwards 
several arguments which are similar in spirit, and, whilst they differ in precise 
target and technical machinery, they all aim to forward the same conclusion24. 
Some of his discussion focuses on mathematical language and employs the 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem25, whereas other discussion employs permutation 
models and focusses more on ordinary language26. Here, I focus on the so-
called permutation argument.  
The model-theoretic conception of a theory is one whereby there is a language 
L with a given interpretation function I, which maps the expressions of L onto 
a world of objects and properties. Putnam places some methodological 
constraints on what can fix the intended interpretation. First, there are what 
Putnam terms ‘theoretical constraints’. These include the standard axioms of 
set theory, as well as principles and theories from other branches of science. 
Second, there are the ‘operational constraints’. These are the various empirical 
observations and measurements that we make in the course of scientific 
investigation. There is a dual constraint on the assignment of extensions to the 
subsentential components of the sentences of the language. First, this must be 
constrained by facts about usage, understood in a suitably naturalistic way. I 
                                            
24 This claim is contingent on how finely you individuate the conclusions. When I say similar 
in spirit, therefore, I mean Putnam uses both arguments to attack metaphysical realism.  
25 See for example, Putnam (1980).  
26 See for example, Putnam (1981) and (1977). 
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take it that by naturalistically acceptable Putnam intends to acknowledge his 
Quinean heritage and thus this means taking a somewhat behaviouristic view 
of the data for semantic theorising where the relevant evidence has to be 
public. Second, assignments must be constrained by getting the coarse-grained 
truth conditions of whole sentences correct.  The data which must constrain 
our semantic theorising are the semantic values of whole sentences, and the 
success condition for a theory of reference is to fit this data set. Importantly, if 
there are multiple theories which equally fit the data, then it is indeterminate 
which theory is correct.  
The argument then shows that for every model of any theory, it is possible to 
find a permutation function K, such that each item in L is interpreted “in 
violently different ways, each of them compatibly with the requirement that the 
truth value of each sentence in each possible world be the one specified”. 
(Putnam 1981, 33) The mechanism functions by having the “crazy assignments 
of reference to names can be ‘cancelled out’ by a compensating assignment of 
extensions to predicates, so that, overall, the truth value of sentences is 
unaffected.” (Williams 2007, 369)  
What we find is therefore worrying. There are multiple interpretations, all of 
which meet the requisite constraints. Different interpretations of a sentence 
can produce the same truth value at every possible world, but assign different 
extensions to the subsentential expressions. That is: in both the intended and 
permutated interpretations, ‘cat’ is true of radically different things, but true in 
exactly the same circumstances nonetheless. Given how we defined the 
constraints on our metasemantic theorising, neither interpretation can be said 
to be any better than any other, and it is therefore indeterminate which is 
correct.  
This is deeply in conflict with the commitments of Putnam’s realist. Given the 
realist’s commitment to uniqueness, we would have hoped that there would be 
a single true interpretation function which takes us from terms of the theory to 
the world. However, we find that reference is radically indeterminate. This is 
not the innocuous sort of indeterminacy we considered at the start. It is the 
claim that even with all the constraints on reference assignment in place, and 
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even for precise languages like mathematical language, reference is still 
indeterminate.  
These considerations put pressure on another supposed commit of realism: the 
non-epistemic nature of truth. Putnam’s target realist needs it to be the case 
that there is an independence of ideal theory and true theory. The realist wants 
to claim that the intended interpretation is the one that matches the parts of 
the theory to the right parts of the world. That this is the true theory. So, for 
the realist there may be ideal theories, which meet all the operational and 
theoretical constraints, which nonetheless are false. Putnam takes his argument 
to have shown, however, that such independence cannot be plausibly 
maintained. He claims:  
 “Now, such a model satisfies all operational constraints, since it agrees 
with OP. It satisfies those theoretical constraints we would impose in 
the ideal limit of inquiry. So, once again, it looks as if any such model is 
"intended"-for what else could single out a model as "intended" than 
this? But if this is what it is to be an "intended model", T1 must be 
true-true in all intended models! The metaphysical realist's claim that 
even the ideal theory T1 might be false "in reality" seems to collapse 
into unintelligibility.” (Putnam 1980, 473-474) 
For any consistent theory, that theory has a model, and Putnam’s argument 
shows us that if there is one truthmaking model, then there are infinitely many 
permuted variants. The realist wants to be in a position to say that of all these 
interpretations, one of them is getting it right and the others are getting it 
wrong. For Putnam, the intended interpretation is the one that satisfies all the 
operational and theoretical constraints. Thus we identify truth as idealisation of 
rational acceptability. If the realist wants to maintain that there is more to 
theory being true than being intended in Putnam’s sense, then they need to 
provide some means of discriminating between the interpretations. Putnam’s 
contention is that the sort of relation or constraint required by the realist to 
maintain their distinction between ideal theory and true theory requires 
commitment to some kind of magical relation or constraint. The realist is 
therefore not in a position to say anything principled about why one model is 
getting it right and the others are getting it wrong.  
 176 
 
 
 
IV. Truth and Metaphysics   
 
In the last two sections I presented two different cases for the claim that truth 
is epistemically constrained, and we should therefore reject metaphysical 
realism. In this final section I will evaluate this position. The two main 
arguments in Dummett that get us epistemically constrained truth are the 
manifestation and the acquisition arguments, and these, taken together with the 
claim that the issue at stake between the realist and anti-realist is bivalence gets 
you the rejection of realism. Putnam, on the other hand, establishes both of 
these commitments with the model theoretic argument and the claim that the 
realist requires particular conceptions of truth and reference. It is important to 
separate out two different kinds of arguments at work. First, there are the 
arguments for the claim that truth is epistemically constrained. Second, there 
are arguments which aim to show that this claim about truth is incompatible 
with the commitments of realism, and so realism should be rejected.  
All of these arguments and claims have proved to be contentious. Against both 
Dummett and Putnam’s characterisation of realism, philosophers have argued 
that they both significantly misrepresent the requirements of metaphysical 
realism. Specifically, in ascribing to the realist a particular conception of truth, 
Dummett and Putnam have incorrectly identified the locus of the metaphysical 
realist’s commitments. I will return to consider this line of objection later.  
With respect to Dummett’s arguments for epistemically constrained truth, the 
acquisition argument has come under attack most. The main thrust of this 
attack is from Wright as follows:  
“[T]he realist seems to have a very simple answer. Given that the 
understanding of statements in general is to be viewed as consisting in 
possession of a concept of their truth-conditions, acquiring a concept 
of an evidence-transcendent state of affairs is simply a matter of 
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acquiring an understanding of a statement for which that state of 
affairs would constitute the truth-condition. And such an 
understanding is acquired, like the understanding of any previously 
unheard sentence in the language, by understanding the constituent 
words and the significance of their mode of combination.” (Wright 
1993, 16) 
Another line of attack contends an almost Moorean point: we just do understand 
sentences with evidence transcendent truth conditions. In a similar spirit, some 
philosophers have taken it to be legitimate to merely reject the arguments as 
the almost uniform acceptance of classical logic in mathematics and science 
provides a good inference to the best explanation argument for the realist 
conception of truth. Of course, Dummettian responses are available.  
With respect to Putnam, some philosophers have argued that perhaps a more 
sophisticated theory of reference could show that we were wrong. Putnam’s 
response to this is that a more sophisticated theory of reference cannot save 
our intuitive notion of reference as whatever additional constraint we bring in 
to save some realist notion of reference, could be likewise subjected to a 
permutation.27 That is: the new constraint itself needs interpretation and each 
model will interpret it in different ways. The point of Putnam’s argument is 
that no first order theory can, by itself, determine its own objects up to the 
point of isomorphism. Putnam states the point thus: “The problem as to how 
the whole representation, including the empirical theory of knowledge that is a 
part of it, can determinately refer is not a problem that can be solved by 
developing a more and better empirical theory.” (Putnam 1980, 477) There are 
some philosophers who hold that the arguments for radical indeterminacy 
theses must not be in good standing as they are self-defeating. For example, 
Scott Soames claims that if the conclusions of the arguments were true, we 
couldn’t even state them. (Soames 1998, 213) There are other philosophers 
who have argued that the arguments are not in good standing as they are too 
stringent in what they allow to be taken as the constraints for providing a 
theory of reference. Lewis, for example, argues that we need not be worried as 
                                            
27 For more in-depth discussion of this aspect of Putnam’s argument see Button (2013). 
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some meanings are more eligible than others and so the type of indeterminacy 
in question does not arise. (Lewis 1984, 227)  
There is of course a great deal more to be said about these responses. For my 
present purposes, however, I want to precede by separating two different kinds 
of claims. First, that truth is epistemically constrained and we must therefore 
reject metaphysical realism. Second, that if truth is epistemically constrained 
then we must therefore reject metaphysical realism. If it can be shown that truth 
is sometimes recognition transcendent, then, given that both Dummett and 
Putnam have a monistic conception of truth, the first claim turns out to be 
false. However, the conditional can still hold and, whilst this won’t require that 
we actually need to reject realism, it can establish something significant about 
the relationship between metaphysics and truth. So in evaluating Dummett and 
Putnam’s positions I will not primarily be concerned with engaging with their 
arguments for epistemically constrained truth. What I will rather do is (1) 
highlight the significant point of departure in thinking about truth from the 
other philosophers and frameworks considered, and (2) articulate what I take 
to be the metaphysical consequences of holding that truth is epistemically 
constrained.  
 
iv. Truth and Revisionism  
 
The aim of this section is to map out some foundational issues about how to 
think about the permissible range of analyses of the concept of truth. The way 
of thinking about truth that I’ve detailed in this chapter departs significantly 
from the positions previously considered. Dummett and Putnam both argue 
for revisionary conceptions of truth. I take this divergence to be in large part a 
result of the different constraints placed on the concept, and this raises 
interesting questions about how we should determine the conceptual role for 
truth.  
This can perhaps best be seen by offering a comparison with the way that 
Lewis thinks about the concept. As I argued in Chapter One, Lewis’s project 
promises robust conceptions of both meaning and metaphysics, with a central 
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and integrated role for truth in both these projects. In Lewis’s system, truth is 
both indispensable to semantics, and anchors his theory of meaning, and it 
supervenes on being, and as such is connected to his metaphysical theorising. 
Much of what Lewis says about truth is explicitly or implicitly inconsistent with 
the revisionary approach advocated by Dummett and Putnam. I suggest that 
what would motivate Lewis’s rejection of the sorts of arguments and positions 
that Dummett and Putnam forward are two interconnected commitments. 
Lewis takes the conceptual role of truth to be constrained jointly by the role 
that it plays in the theory of meaning and in metaphysics. Thus, one 
commitment that precludes the sort of revisionary conception offered by 
Dummett and Putnam is that, whatever the concept of truth is, it needs to be 
such that it can service Lewis’s metaphysics. A second and related commitment 
is that Lewis takes it as a constraint on the range of acceptable analyses of any 
concept that departure from our folk theoretical understanding of that concept 
counts as a cost. Lewis’s Mooreanism, then, provides a significant obstacle to 
accepting any view of truth according to which there is no gap between what is 
warrantedly assertible and what is true.  
So, against Dummett’s position I suggest that Lewis would assert that when 
speakers utter sentences like ‘every even integer greater than 2 can be 
expressed as the sum of two primes’, we should take them to be uttering a 
sentence which is either true or false, and this is independent of our ability to 
verify it. Dummett forwards a sceptical position about classical semantics. 
Once we take the manifestation and acquisition arguments seriously, we see 
that there could not be evidence transcendent truth, which means we need to 
reject bivalence. Lewis’s commitment to Mooreanism is going to preclude his 
acceptance of Dummett’s arguments. Lewis takes it as a datum that classical 
logic is central to the practice of natural science. As such, anything that makes 
us doubt it must have gone wrong somewhere.28  
When discussing Putnam’s attack on realism Lewis states the following:  
“If I am looking in the right place for a saving constraint, then realism 
needs realism. That is: the realism that recognises a nontrivial 
                                            
28 This is of course not to say that classical logic is in fact indispensable to the practice of science.  
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enterprise of discovering the truth about the world needs the 
traditional realism that recognises objective sameness and difference, 
joints in the world, discriminatory classifications not of our own 
making.” (Lewis 1984, 67) 
Lewis offers a central place for truth in the theory of meaning. He also thinks 
that the theory of meaning needs to take seriously the linguistic practices of 
speakers; that our theory of meaning/content should make central a theory of 
communication which is governed by conventions of truthfulness and trust. 
However, in addition to this, truth also plays an important role in the 
metaphysics. Lewis’s project of semantic analysis is a prerequisite for 
metaphysical theorising. Semantic analysis furnishes us with truth conditions 
for which we require worldly satisfiers; the analysis therefore, informs both 
metaphysical and empirical inquiry. Lewis thus offers us an integrated 
conception of truth; it is operationally constrained by the role that it must play 
in the theory of meaning and in the metaphysics. So, unlike both Putnam and 
Dummett, who think that the proper understanding of the concept of truth is 
going to be primarily determined by the role that truth plays in the theory of 
meaning and interpretation, Lewis takes it to be a legitimate constraint on the 
concept that it is such that it can also play a role in a common-sense realist 
metaphysic.  
There are two kinds of issues here. All parties agree that the demands placed 
on the concept of truth by the theory of meaning constrain the acceptable 
analyses of the concept. So, the first question is, what kind of constraints can 
be legitimately placed on the concept in the theory of meaning? A second 
further question is, can legitimate constraints be placed on the concept from 
outside of the theory of meaning? For example, is it legitimate for our prior 
metaphysical commitment to constrain the acceptable analyses of the concept? 
I take it that these considerations raise important and interesting questions 
about how we should begin theorising about truth. It is not my aim here to 
determinately answer these questions, but rather to elucidate the theoretical 
options.  
One possible reaction to these considerations is to claim that these issues are 
so fundamental that we aren’t in the right kind of territory for giving 
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arguments which will convince your interlocutor one way or the other. I’m 
imagining a kind of dialectical impasse, where any supposed premise of an 
argument for your preferred view is the negation of a conclusion from a 
disputant’s argument. In such a case perhaps it is permissible to merely state 
what your commitments are and then start to theory build from there. 
Whatever the fundamental truth about truth is, it will be beyond ken. So, it 
counts as no cost against Dummett’s and Putnam’s revisionary conceptions of 
truth that they depart from alethic orthodoxy.  
A second option may be to claim that we have some kind of prior, theory 
neutral, grasp of the concept of truth. The job is then to articulate the features 
of this concept. Any proposed analysis of the concept of truth will succeed 
inasmuch as it conforms with this theory neutral concept. Inasmuch as the 
analysis departs from the theory-neutral concept, this counts against the 
analysis. So, Dummett’s and Putnam’s revisionism would only count against 
their views if it would be shown that their view falls short of this theory neutral 
conception. Such a view of course invites many more questions. Is there really 
such a theory neutral understanding available of the concept of truth which we 
can articulate? Perhaps a good candidate for such an understanding would be 
Wright’s platitudes? Again, further questions require answering. Which 
platitudes? Perhaps we just have the core ones, like disquotation, but to make 
the conception theory neutral we must reject many of the others, like 
bivalence?  
A final option would be to claim that we shouldn’t be in the business of trying 
to find out the fundamental truth about truth. It seems plausible that there just 
isn’t a consistent concept which satisfies all the roles we may want to assign to 
it. You might indeed take this to be the moral of the Liar Paradox: there just 
isn’t a concept which can satisfy all the demands we want to place upon it.  So, 
assuming you think that there is interesting important work for truth, then this 
will require being a little ameliorative about quite what this concept is. Such 
view takes truth as a theoretical concept, and then a candidate analysis of the 
concept is judged relative to the theoretical work it can do. By way of 
comparison, think about Lewis on meaning. Such an approach contends that 
we aren’t trying to articulate the fundamental truth about what meaning is. 
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Rather, what we are trying to do is to demarcate a philosophically useful 
concept which we can put to work. And then the important question for my 
purposes is: given this analysis of the concept, what consequences, if any, does 
this have for metaphysics?  
There is of course much more to say about all of these options. However, I do 
not attempt to settle these fundamental issues in this chapter. I will proceed by 
assuming that an epistemically constrained conception of truth is a legitimate 
way to think about the concept, and the arguments in favour of it are in good 
standing. In the next section I turn to address the metaphysical consequences 
of thinking about truth in the way proposed by Dummett and Putnam.  
 
v. Evaluating the Conditional  
 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the supposed connection between truth 
and realism. Dummett and Putnam each think that it is a constitutive thesis of 
realism that truth is not epistemically constrained. So, when they show that 
truth is epistemically constrained, we have to reject metaphysical realism. One 
way of resisting this argument is to show that truth is epistemically 
unconstrained. Another route is to undermine the connection between truth 
and realism. This latter approach is the one I investigate here. In particular, I 
want to defend the following conditional: if truth is epistemically constrained, 
then this has unavoidable metametaphysical consequences. Defending this 
conditional requires some significant revision of what Dummett and Putnam 
each take to be the realist/anti-realist consequences of their respective 
arguments.  
My plan is as follows. First, I state my assumptions about truth. I assume that 
(1) truth is epistemically constrained, (2) the theory of meaning is truth-
conditional, and (3) a monistic conception of truth. Second, I argue that we 
can articulate a conception of metaphysical realism which is entirely 
independent of any considerations to do with the nature of truth. Finally, I 
argue that despite the availability of a conception of realism which is not in 
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part constituted by an alethic commitment, the epistemically constrained 
nature of truth nonetheless has metaphysical significance.  
My starting assumptions are as follows. First, I assume that truth is 
epistemically constrained. I will assume that the arguments given by Dummett 
and by Putnam for that conclusion are sound. As I’ve already indicated, those 
arguments have come under attack from multiple directions. Nonetheless, to 
adequately make the point I want to make about the relationship between truth 
and metaphysics I will proceed under the assumption that truth is in fact 
epistemically constrained. Related to this assumption, I want to shelve another 
issue which, while relevant, is orthogonal to my present argument. If we 
assume the soundness of Putnam’s argument for epistemically constrained 
truth as I present it here, we are accepting an argument for radical semantic 
indeterminacy. As I argue elsewhere (Fletcher 2016, 49-51) I think that 
Putnam’s argument for radical semantic indeterminacy has serious implications 
for metaphysical realism. However, assessing these implications of semantic 
indeterminacy for metaphysical realism will not be my concern in this section.  
Second, I assume that truth has an ineliminable role to play in the theory of 
meaning. A way out of the argument that I forward below is to claim that the 
we needn’t employ a truth conditional theory of meaning. If we have available 
a theory of meaning which does not employ the concept of truth, then we can 
reject the thought that the correctness of a theory must consist in it being 
ideally warrantedly assertible. Throughout this thesis I have assumed that truth 
has some indispensable role to play in the theory of meaning, so I don’t take 
my assumption at this point to be controversial.   
Finally, in addition to these assumptions, I further assume that there is just one 
truth concept. There is a live debate about the viability of alethic pluralism. If I 
am successful in showing that if truth is epistemically constrained then this 
creates a certain kind of challenge to realism, then perhaps one way that this 
could be resisted is to argue that whilst there is a truth concept which is 
epistemically constrained, there are others which are not and that one of these 
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robust correspondence concepts is the one being employed by the realist.29 
One way of putting this is to say that we can locally accept the conditional. 
There are some domains where the relevant truth concept must be construed 
as epistemically constrained, however, there are other where it is not. For 
example, perhaps the relevant notion of truth pertaining to moral statements is 
epistemically constrained, and so this has consequences for the objectivity of 
moral discourse. By contrast, perhaps the relevant notion of truth pertaining to 
the statements of best science is robust correspondence, and so we can 
legitimately talk about the statements of scientific theories being such that 
there truth values are evidence transcendent. Whilst I think that this debate is 
an interesting one, I will proceed by talking about the concept of truth, and the 
metaphysical consequences of this concept.  
Now I turn to articulate a conception of metaphysical realism which is entirely 
independent of any considerations to do with the nature of truth. One way to 
neutralise Dummett’s and Putnam’s attacks on realism is to show that truth has 
nothing to do with realism. This line is adopted by Michael Devitt. Devitt asks 
this question: “what does truth have to do with realism?” (Devitt 1983, 292) 
His answer to the question of what truth has to do with realism is “nothing at 
all”. (Devitt 1983, 292) Devitt captures the notion of realism he is interested in, 
and according to him the one metaphysicians should be interested in, in terms 
of two commitments. These commitments run along two dimensions. First: 
existence. Realism commits us to a view about what exists. If I am a realist 
about some entity, or class of entities, I am committed to those things existing. 
The second commitment is trickier: “words that frequently occur in attempts 
to capture the second are ‘independent’, ‘external’ and ‘objective’. The entities 
must be independent of the mental; they must be external to the mind; they 
must exist objectively in that they exist whatever anyone’s opinions.” (Devitt 
1983, 292) 
The doctrine of realism according to Devitt should be construed thus: 
“common sense, and scientific, physical entities objectively exist independent 
                                            
29 I do not consider alethic property pluralism because it is far from clear how an epistemically 
constrained concept could pick out an epistemically unconstrained property. 
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of the mental.” (Devitt 1983, 292) Construed as such, I can see the temptation 
to claim that truth does not have anything to do with realism. It makes no 
mention of semantic notions at all and it does not seem clear, at least prima 
facie, how this characterisation might implicitly rest on the sort of alethic 
commitments required to get Dummett’s and Putnam’s attack going. Devitt 
claims that the type of metaphysical significance that Dummett and Putnam 
take their arguments to have is only possible if you endorse a language first 
approach to metaphysics.  
Perhaps we can view Devitt’s criticism as a plea not to conflate metaphysics 
and the philosophy of language. It is only by conflating the two that one might 
be inclined to think that considerations from the philosophy of language could 
impact upon the realist status of the world. Of course, language is a tool for 
theorising. We do theorise using language, but we must not let this confuse us. 
The content of our theorising has nothing to do with language, truth or any kind 
of semantic concerns, and so we should not be alarmed by Dummett’s and 
Putnam’s putative challenge. Metaphysics, realist metaphysics, is concerned 
with the world, not language. 
Additionally, perhaps we can see some immediate appeal to Devitt’s position. 
There is intuitive appeal; what we can and cannot say, what we can and cannot 
theorise about, should not affect what actually is the case. That there is a 
world, and that that world exists mind-independently, should not be affected 
by any concerns pertaining to the epistemic limitations of creatures like us. In 
misrepresenting the commitments of realism Dummett and Putnam get away 
with far more than they should. Whilst we may still have cause for concern 
about the significance of Dummett and Putnam style arguments in the case of 
metasemantics, this does not force us to any conclusions about the viability of 
metaphysical realism. Realism, so construed, has minimal commitments (i.e. an 
existence thesis and an independence thesis), and neither of these 
commitments are affected by the semantic concerns forwarded by Dummett 
and Putnam.  
An obvious concern one could have about Devitt’s proposal is that we don’t 
have an alethically neutral way of explaining in what the independence thesis 
consists. Dummett in particular is worried that we don’t have a non-
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metaphorical way of explicating what independence consists in, and this is 
what motivates him to claim that it should be understood in terms of 
bivalence. What is going to be really important for Devitt, therefore, in 
maintaining the plausibility of this alethically neutral conception of realism is 
that the independence commitment can be spelled out without talk of truth. I 
think that, at the very least, there are intelligible conceptions of independence 
which do not require taking a view about the nature of truth. So, I proceed 
assuming that Devitt has offered an alternative way of conceiving of the 
commitments of realism.   
Both Putnam and Dummett hold the view that the philosophy of language (or 
specifically the theory of meaning or interpretation) underpins debates about 
realism. Now, what if you think, like Devitt, that metaphysical realism has 
nothing to do with truth? Does the view of truth discussed in this chapter 
nonetheless show us something about the limits of metaphysics? I close this 
chapter by arguing that it is infelicitous of Devitt to say that truth has nothing 
to do with realism. The reason for this is because the requirements of realism 
are threefold, and Devitt only secures one such commitment.  
What does it take for a theory to be a realist? The metaphysical doctrine of 
realism according to Devitt requires that there is an independently existing 
reality. However, if I claim to be a realist metaphysician I take it that there are 
two further methodological presuppositions which are necessary for me to 
engage in theorising in the first place. First, I must think that I have some kind 
of access to the world. This could be seen as an epistemological 
presupposition. That is: we can have knowledge of an independently existing 
part of reality. Second, I must think that I am capable of representing the 
world in my theories. This could be viewed as a metasemantic presupposition. 
Whatever I take the metaphysical characterisation of realism to be, it seems 
plausible that I must hold these two presuppositions as given if my 
metaphysical theories are to do what any realist would want them to do.  
The challenge I forward here accepts Devitt characterisation of metaphysical 
realism, and, as such, holds that Dummett’s and Putnam’s conception of truth 
cannot have metaphysical significance. However, I argue that it does have great 
significance for the prospect of realist theorising. It should be clear, therefore, 
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that the picture I propose is not one that endorses any kind of anti-realism; I 
am not making any claims about what exists or the mind-
independent/dependent nature of what exists.  
How does epistemically constrained truth create a problem for realist 
theorising? If truth is epistemically constrained, then what is true cannot 
outstrip what is warrantedly assertible.30 So, there is a certain sense in which 
the semantic presupposition and the epistemic presupposition collapse into 
each other, in that we have to establish what is knowable in order to establish 
what is representable. This matters for the following reason.  Realists very 
often want to shelve the epistemology of metaphysics. However, if truth is 
epistemically constrained, then they have to provide an adequate epistemology 
in order to provide a theory at all. In particular, what the realist cannot do is 
construct a theory and claim that it is true or false but we cannot know which 
because what it is for a statement to have truth conditions is for that statement 
to be knowable. 
An objection to my line of thinking here would be that no metaphysician is 
going to claim that we have no way of knowing whether a metaphysical theory 
is true. First, it is worth noting that if I am a Williamson-style epistemicist 
about vagueness31, and I think that there is some truth about the cut off point 
for baldness but that we can never know it, then this provides at least one 
example of the sort of theory which would be off limits if truth were 
epistemically constrained. However, I suspect that many metaphysicians would 
claim that the answers to metaphysical questions are knowable. In particular, I 
suspect that a metaphysical realist would claim that someone who thought that 
epistemically constrained truth could make trouble for realism in the way I’ve 
suggested, has an inadequate conception of what can count as evidence. 
According to this view, the claims of serious metaphysics are knowable 
because the serious metaphysician can employ theoretical virtues which could 
provide warrant for asserting one metaphysical thesis over another.  
                                            
30 We might prefer to follow Wright and put this in terms of superassertibility (see Wright 
1992), but for my current purposes I’m going to continue talking in terms of warranted 
assertibility.  
31 See Williamson (1994). 
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to settle the issue of the evidential status of 
theoretical virtues. Of course, if it turns out that the sort of cost-benefit 
analyses, employing theoretical virtues, which are frequently given as a reason 
to adopt one metaphysical theory over another, do not constitute an acceptable 
source of evidence, then those ‘theories’ turn out to not be sensibly stateable. 
So, whilst the limits of our knowledge are not the limits of the world, the limits 
of our knowledge to provide a limit to metaphysical theory. Even if we think 
that adopting the sort of ‘metaphysics-first’ approach advocated by Devitt is 
desirable, an inescapable question for realist metaphysics remains: can an 
adequate epistemology of realist metaphysics be given? In conclusion, 
therefore, if truth is epistemically constrained, then this has unavoidable 
metametaphysical consequences. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the supposed connection between 
truth and realism. Dummett and Putnam both think that it is a constitutive 
thesis of realism that truth is not epistemically constrained. So, when they 
show that truth is epistemically constrained, we have to reject metaphysical 
realism. I investigated a possible way of resisting their conclusion which 
proceeds by arguing that there is no such connection between truth and 
realism. I concluded that whilst severing the link between metaphysical realism 
and truth can save some intuitive conception of realist metaphysics, this move 
is unsuccessful in recovering a realist conception of metaphysical theories.  
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Conclusion  
 
The aim of this thesis was twofold. First, I aimed to ascertain whether there is 
a consistent and explanatorily potent concept of truth which can play a role in 
the theory of meaning and in metaphysics. Second, I aimed to determine, 
having thus established a role for truth in metaphysics, the conception of 
metaphysics with which this particular role for truth furnishes us. I aimed to 
provide a theoretical road map which detailed the commitments, choice points, 
and assumptions pertinent to different approaches I considered. I indicated 
throughout places where more work needs to be done or where argumentative 
moves require further justification. In this conclusion, therefore, I want to 
recap, pointing to the challenges that each position faces in sustaining an 
acceptable role for truth in metaphysics, and to describe what I take the 
significant lessons to be.   
In Chapter One I argued that in adopting Lewis’s project of philosophical 
analysis we could have robust conceptions of both meaning and metaphysics, 
with a central and integrated role for truth in both of these projects.  I 
presented Lewis’s project of philosophical analysis as the means by which both 
the semantic and metaphysical projects should be prosecuted and how they 
connect. Lewis’s approach offers a promising project for those metaphysicians 
who want to bridge the gap between the ways in which we ordinarily think 
about the world and what best science and metaphysics tell us about what the 
world is really like. I argued that the primary purpose of philosophical analysis 
is to give the meanings of the concepts under investigation, and that this 
enterprise is a prerequisite for successful metaphysical theorising. The role of 
truth in metaphysics is exhausted by delivering the semantic analyses that are 
required to identify the subject-matter on which metaphysics goes to work and 
by allowing us to forge a connection to being. Thus to ensure a robust 
metaphysics, independent metaphysical methods must be utilised. I argued that 
whether such an approach is acceptable is dependent upon providing 
justification for this independent methodology.  
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A recurring theme in my discussion of Lewis, Sider, and the realist response to 
Dummett and Putnam was the epistemological status of theoretical virtues. All 
of those approaches hope to utilise a method for metaphysical theory 
construction which borrows the criteria for selecting between competing 
theories from science. If the trajectory of the claim is that, because these are 
legitimate methods in science then they can be legitimate methods in 
metaphysics, then there are two places where pressure can be applied. First, we 
might wonder whether science and metaphysics are sufficiently similar that 
utilising the same tools is appropriate. Second, in order for metaphysics to 
inherit such methods, and consequently justification, it needs to be the case 
that the theoretical virtues really play the role suggested in science. There is a 
serious and contentious question in the philosophy of science about the 
evidential status of theoretical virtues, and so even if metaphysics and science 
can be shown to be sufficiently similar, there is still a question about whether 
these methods reliably yield true theories.  
In Chapter Two I argued against Dyke’s metaphysical conception of truth. 
Dyke holds that if we want to adequately sustain a role for truth in 
metaphysics, we need to cut this notion off from concerns that primarily 
pertain to our systems of representation. The approach is therefore promising 
if you are worried that issues in semantics and metasemantics will get in the 
way of serious metaphysical work. Nonetheless, I argued that if we propose to 
make use of the concept of truth in a metaphysical framework that distances 
itself from the role assigned to truth in the theory of meaning, then we must 
have a story to tell about how that concept can play the role assigned to it. I 
further urged that we must be cautious that our desire to do serious 
metaphysics doesn’t rule out the possibility of robust metaphysical projects 
that are anti-realist, and that we must not allow a move towards a ‘metaphysics-
first’ method to rob us of the ability to actually prosecute metaphysical 
theorising. Finally, I argued that when thinking about metaphysical method we 
must be careful to distinguish between claims of epistemological priority versus 
metaphysical priority.  
Part of the discussion in this chapter highlighted a very important separation of 
methodological claims from metaphysical ones. I think that when thinking 
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about the role of truth in metaphysics this distinction cannot be emphasised 
enough. Thinking that metaphysics has reason to care about truth and 
meaning, as these notions apply to theories of natural language, is apt to 
generate criticism from those metaphysicians who think that metaphysics is 
about the world, not language or its properties. Thus, it is crucial when 
thinking about these matters that a distinction is made between the centrality 
of semantic considerations to metaphysical methods versus semantic terms 
having their place (be it central or otherwise) in metaphysical conclusions. The 
type of role for truth that has been the preoccupation of this thesis is how 
truth is relevant to the method of metaphysics, how that impacts upon the 
status of metaphysics.   
In Chapter Three I argued that Sider presents a robustly realist conception of 
metaphysics, where the epistemological status of the enterprise of metaphysics 
should be seen as on par with that of natural science. I argued that truth plays a 
significant role in Sider’s proposed method for metaphysics, first, via the role 
that truth plays in connecting the nonfundamental to the fundamental, and 
second, via the idea of truth as a required feature of metaphysical theory. In a 
similar spirit to Dyke, Sider thinks that in order to sustain the role of truth in 
metaphysics, we need to have available a notion which does not carry the same 
semantic and metasemantic baggage that it does in natural language. Sider’s 
project presents an attractive method for those metaphysicians who want a 
completely general approach to metaphysical inquiry. Nonetheless, I concluded 
that Sider insufficiently motivates his assigned role for truth, and thus a central 
part of Sider’s project is left worryingly opaque.  
The discussion of Sider’s rejection of empirical semantics projects highlighted 
some very important issues in thinking about the role of truth in metaphysics. I 
argued that those who adopt something like an empirical semantics project 
hold that semantic concepts only earn their keep if they play some role in 
empirical theories and that this requires that there have to be discernible 
connections between the application of these concepts and observable facts. 
So, in the case of truth, truth earns its keep in an empirical theory of 
communication. Adding the concept of truth to our conceptual repertoire 
makes an explanatory difference when we are trying to give empirical theories 
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of understanding, communication, belief, and interpretation. In particular, we 
only get a respectable notion of truth if is it bound to observable facts about 
assent. Truth is that thing that sentences are held to have when they are 
asserted or believed. If the only way we can motivate a role for truth in 
theorising simpliciter is through its role in the theory of meaning, then any role 
that it may play in metaphysics is going to need to be accordingly constrained 
by this primary function.  
In a similar spirit to the conclusion of the previous chapter, then, the 
important take away from this chapter is that if we propose to make use of the 
concept of truth in a metaphysical framework then we must have a story to tell 
about what legitimises this use. Recall I said in the Introduction that I was 
taking it as a constraint on the acceptable deployment of the concept of truth 
that it cannot make it opaque how truth can play the role assigned to it. Now, 
it would be uncharitable to claim that Dyke or Sider do not offer truth an 
explanatory role. Both of them take truth to play a very important role in 
metaphysics. But, crucially, it is far from obvious how the explanatory role that 
they assign to truth makes an empirical difference to successful theories. I 
suggest that more work needs to be done in thinking about the legitimacy of 
deploying the concept in a way which is autonomous from the explanatory role 
it plays in theorising about the observable facts of human communication. This 
is not so say that the challenge cannot be met, or indeed that a satisfactory 
story must follow analogous lines to empirical semantics projects, but I suggest 
that whether Sider or Dyke’s approaches to thinking about truth in 
metaphysics are acceptable depends on whether some adequate story can be 
told.  
In Chapter Four I argued that Davidson assigns an important role to truth in 
metaphysics. Davidson advocates for an approach to ontological inquiry 
according to which we derive ontological commitments when the truth 
conditional analysis of the true sentences of the language requires quantifiers 
and domains of quantification. The concept of truth that plays this robust role 
in metaphysics is one which is shaped with the demands of an empirical 
semantics project in mind. Importantly, the nature of Davidson’s empirical 
semantics project is such that we cannot ensure subsentential semantic 
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determinacy. Thus, given the method for metaphysics that Davidson forwards, 
we cannot talk in absolute terms about the ontological commitments of our best 
theory.  
I argue that Davidson’s project illuminates how the status of metaphysical 
inquiry can be transformed depending on claims made about semantic 
concepts. If you think both that a truth conditional analysis of language is a 
prerequisite for generating metaphysical commitments, and that the 
interpretation of that language is indeterminate, then these commitments 
together have a serious impact upon the type of metaphysical project in which 
you can engage. For approaches to metaphysics which take the study of 
language to be in some sense authoritative, Davidson’s project is instructive in 
demonstrating how assumptions about the nature of truth and the theory of 
meaning can transform the limit or status of metaphysics. I therefore caution 
that we must be mindful of how metaphysical assumptions can get smuggled in 
to the method of metaphysics. I take both the discussion of Davidson and of 
Dummett and Putnam to usefully demonstrate how seemingly benign 
assumptions about truth and reference can have an impact upon the status of 
metaphysical conclusions. In particular, in this context, the claims that content 
is determinate or that truth is bivalent are not metaphysically innocent.  
In Chapter Five I argued that if the metaontological deflationist approach to 
ontological inquiry is to be workable, it needs to be furnished with an adequate 
account of truth. I showed how truth plays a significant role in the 
metaontological deflationist framework: truth is that feature which we take the 
sentences from which we derive our ontological commitments to have. I 
further articulated how the approach would be attractive to those philosophers 
who want to demystify the method of metaphysics. Nonetheless, I claimed that 
as it stands, an adequate account of truth has not been sufficiently articulated. 
Given the significant theoretical role that truth plays, this should be worrying. 
On the one hand, making good on the epistemological and methodological 
virtues of the approach is held hostage to the development of such an account. 
On the other hand, and more importantly for my current purposes, for the 
metaontological deflationist’s conception of the role of truth in metaphysics to 
be compelling, they need to be able to provide some kind of story about how it 
 194 
 
is that truth can play the role assigned to it. I suggested that an adequate notion 
could be articulated, and I gestured towards an approach I believe to be a 
fruitful in attempting to do just that. Of course, the acceptability of this way of 
thinking about truth is going to depend on whether it is an acceptable way of 
thinking about the role of truth in the theory of meaning. 
In Chapter Six I argued if truth is epistemically constrained, then this has 
unavoidable metametaphysical consequences. Dummett and Putnam each 
think that it is a constitutive thesis of realism that truth is epistemically 
unconstrained. So, when they show that truth is epistemically constrained, we 
have to reject metaphysical realism. I investigated a possible way of resisting 
their conclusion which proceeds by arguing that there is no such connection 
between truth and realism. I concluded that whilst severing the link between 
metaphysical realism and truth can save some intuitive conception of realist 
metaphysics, this move is unsuccessful in recovering a realistic conception of 
metaphysical theories. Thus, an important take away from this this chapter was 
similar to that of Chapter Two: we must ensure that a ‘metaphysics-first’ 
method does not rob us of the ability to actually prosecute metaphysical 
theorising. 
A significant consideration that was highlighted in this chapter, which came 
out of the discussion of how Dummett’s and Putnam’s projects differed from 
the others I have considered, was about the legitimate demands that can be 
placed on the concept of truth. I claimed that it is possible that there might not 
be a consistent concept which can satisfy all of the roles that we may want to 
assign to it. So, assuming you think that there is interesting and important work 
for truth, this may require being a little ameliorative about the concept. What 
the limits of amelioration are with respect to truth is an open question, and one 
that requires further study. Whatever we say about these matters, however, I 
hope to have demonstrated how we must be sensitive to the complex sets of 
demands that we place on the concept of truth. In particular, we must mindful 
of how the role assigned to truth in the method of metaphysics can limit or 
impact upon the status of metaphysical inquiry.  
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